Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in Supporting Arbitration in Africa by Onyema, Emilia (ed.)
SOAS Arbitration in 
Africa Conference 2016 
22 - 24 June 2016 
Rethinking the Role of Courts and 
Judges in Supporting Arbitration in 
Africa 
Venue 
Lagos Court of Arbitration 
1A Remi Olowude Street,Lekki Peninsula Phase 1 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Our Sponsors 
Our Sponsors 
Our Partners 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 Principal Organisers and Funders of the Conference 5 
2 Programme 7 
Conference Photographs 10 
3 Speakers Profiles 16
4 Discussion Paper 34
5 Articles 45 
Rapporteur’s Report 
by Mr Prince Olokotor; Mr Ikpeme Ikebem and Dr Jean-Alain Penda 
48
Welcome Address by Ms Megha Joshi of LCA 53
Courts and The Effectiveness of Arbitration in Africa 
by Hon. Justice Edward torgbor 
56
National Court Judges and the Arbitral Process 
by Dr Emilia Onyema 
74
The Attitude of the Sudanese Courts towards Arbitration 
by Ahmed Bannaga 
79
Practitioners Experience of the Role of Judges in Upholding Arbitration in 
Africa Perspectives from Southern Africa with Special reference to 
Botswana by Edward W. Fashole- Luke II 
85
Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in Supporting Arbitration in 
Africa – A Young Practitioner’s Perspective by Isaiah Bozimo 
89
Aluko & Oyebode Powerpoint Slides 102
Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in Supporting Arbitration in 
Africa – Outline of the Nigerian Perspective by Mrs Olufunke Adekoya, 
SAN 
108
Supportive Role of the Courts in Ghana in Arbitration by Esine Okudzeto 114
Egypt – The Role of Courts and Judges in supporting Arbitration in Africa 118
6 List of Tables (Appendix) 126
7 List of Participants 133
Extract of Feedback from Delegates at the Conference 139
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 2 
Diberate blank page
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 5 
Principal Organisers and Funders of the Conference 
SOAS University of London Team 
Organiser/convenor:  Dr Emilia Onyema, PhD, FCIArb, School of Law, SOAS, University of London. 
Co-convenor: Judge Edward Torgbor (Kenya). 
Rapporteur:  Mr Ikpeme Nkebem (ICAMA) 
Mr Prince Olokotor (SOAS) 
Mr Tolu Obamuroh, (LCA) 
Dr Jean Alain Penda, Consultant, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, London. 
Administration: Ms Christine Djumpah School of Law, SOAS, University of London. 
Lagos Court of Arbitration Team 
Ms Megha Joshi, General Counsel.  
Ms Opeyemi Akinlade, Counsel.  
Mr Tolu Obamuroh, Associate General Counsel 
Financial Sponsors 
Faculty of Law & Social Sciences, SOAS, University of London 
Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA) 
International Centre for Arbitration and Mediation Abuja (ICAMA) 
Wilmer Hale LLP 
Stephenson Harwood LLP, London 
Aluko & Oyebode 
White & Case LLP, France 
G Elias & Co 
Templars 
Ajumogobia & Okeke 
Jones Day 
Royal Heritage 
Sofunde Osakwe Ogundipe & Belgore  
Ms Xander Meise 
 Partners 
International Arbitration Africa (i-ARB) 
Africa International Legal Awareness (AILA) 
Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) 
International Lawyers for Africa (ILFA) 
Mrs Kate Emuchay 
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 6 
Diberate blank page
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 7 
2. Programme
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 8 
SOAS Arbitration in Africa Conference Series 
Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in supporting Arbitration in Africa, Lagos Court of 
Arbitration International Centre for Arbitration and ADR, Conference Hall, Lagos, 22-24 June 2016 
Programme 
22 June 2016: Arrivals 
1800-2000: Welcome reception for delegates: Hard Rock Café, Victoria Island, Lagos. 
23 June 2016 
Morning Session Rapporteur: Mr Ikpeme Nkebem (ICAMA) 
0830-0930: Registration and welcome 
0930-0955: Welcome formalities (Ms Megha Joshi, LCA Centre) 
1000-1015: Introduction of SOAS Research Project by Dr Emilia Onyema, SOAS 
1015-1035: Keynote address by Judge Edward Torgbor (Kenya/Ghana): Judges and the Effectiveness of 
Arbitration/ADR in Africa. 
1030-1045: Tea/Coffee Break 
1045-1245: Panel 1: Report from Arbitration Institutions and actions from Addis Conference (chair: Ms Xander 
Meise): Panel discussion by the following: 
 Dr Fidele Masengo (Kigali IAC, Rwanda)
 Ms Ndanga Kamau (LCIA-MIAC, Mauritius)
 Dr Narcisse Aka (CCJA, OHADA)
 Hon Wilfred Ikatari (Lagos Regional Centre)
 Mr Emmanuel Amofa (Ghana Arbitration Centre)
 Mr Ustaz Alsahaby (Arab Centre for Arbitration, Sudan)
 Ms Megha Joshi (Lagos Court of Arbitration, Lagos)
1245-1400: LUNCH 
Afternoon Session Rapporteur: Mr Prince Olokotor (SOAS) 
1400-1600: Panel 2: The role of Courts and Judges in Arbitration (chair: Justice Ayo Phillips, rtd) 
 Dr Emilia Onyema: The Symbiotic Nature of the Relationship between Judges and Arbitrators.
 Dr Hakeem Seriki: Judicial Support during the Arbitration Reference.
 Prof Uche Ewelukwa: African Courts and International Investment Law.
 Ms Leyou Tameru: Publication of Arbitration related Judgements from Africa: I-Arb Judgment
Gathering Project.
 Prof CJ Amasike: Training of African Judges in the Law and Practice of Arbitration.
 Ms Rukia Baruti: The Training and Recognition of African Lawyers: AILA Project
1605-1615: Tea/Coffee Break  
1615-1815: Panel 3: The view from Domestic Arbitrators (chair: Prof Paul Idornigie, SAN) 
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 Mr Babajide Ogundipe (Nigeria)
 Ms Ryham Ragab (Egypt)
 Dr Sylvie Bebohi (OHADA, Cameroon)
 Mr Phillip Aliker (East Africa)
 Dr Tunde Ogowewo (Nigeria)
 Prof Andrew Chukwumerie (Nigeria)
1900-2100: Evening Drinks Reception and Dinner at LCA 
Day 2: 24 June 2016 
Morning Session Rapporteur: Mr Tolu Obamuroh (LCA) 
1000-1220: Panel 4: Practitioners experience on the role of judges in arbitration in Africa (chair: Ms Lise 
Bosman of PCA) 
 Mrs Funke Adekoya (Nigeria)
 Mr Tunde Fagbohunlu (Nigeria)
 Mr Jimmy Muyanja (Uganda)
 Mr Ahmed Bannaga (Sudan)
 Ms Esine Okudzeto (Ghana)
 Mr Edward Luke II (Bostwana/Sierra Leone)
 Mr Isaiah Bozimo (perspective of young practitioners)
1230-1400: LUNCH 
Afternoon Session Rapporteur: Dr Jean Alain Penda 
1400-1600: Panel 5: Foreign practitioners’ experience of the attitude of African Judges towards arbitration 
(chair: Mr Ucheora Onwuamaegbu)  
 Mr Steven Finizio, Wilmer Hale LLP
 Mr Roderick Cordara, QC, Essex Court Chambers London
 Mr Duncan Bagshaw, Stephenson Harwood LLP
 Mr Baiju Vasani, Jones Day LLP
 Mr Charles Nairac, White & Case, Paris
 Mr John Gaffney, Al Tamimi, UAE
1600-1615: Tea/Coffee Break 
1615-1730: Panel 6: Response from Judges on how they can better support arbitration/ADR (chair: Judge 
Edward Torgbor) 
 Hon Chief Justice Mahmoud, Chief Justice of Nigeria
 Lady Justice Irene Chirwa Mambilima, Chief Justice of Zambia
 Judge Marcel Serekoisse-Samba,  President of OHADA CCJA
 Prof. Haider Ahmed Daffala, Chief Justice of Sudan
1730-1800: Closing and action points from the conference 
1930-2200: Closing dinner and after dinner speech by Chief Bayo Ojo, FCIArb, SAN: sponsored by ICAMA, 
Abuja. 
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Panel 5: View from Foreign Practitioners
Panel 6: Response from Judges
(Judges)
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Speakers Profiles – Panel 1 
Rapporteur 
Mr. IKPEME NKEBEM is the General Manager of International Centre for 
Arbitration and Mediation Abuja (ICAMA). He previously served as the 
Branch Administrator of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrator (UK) Nigeria 
Branch. A Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (UK) and 
Member Chartered Institute of Economics of Nigeria. He is a non-lawyer 
with a keen interest in ADR and a rich experience spanning over a decade 
in   Management, Investment Portfolio and Hospitality & Recreation 
MS. ALEXANDRA (XANDER) KERR MEISE Alexandra (Xander) Meise’s 
practice at Foley Hoag LLP focuses on international arbitration (including 
investor-State and commercial arbitration), public international law 
disputes, and sovereign representation. Xander advises governments, 
NGOs, and multinational corporations on legal reforms, human rights 
compliance and conflict prevention, and resolution of human rights 
disputes through alternative mechanisms. She is an adjunct law professor 
at Georgetown University, teaching International Human Rights Law. 
Before her legal career, Xander worked in finance and international 
political development. 
Ms. Xander Meise 
Mr. Ikpeme Nkebem 
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MR. NARCISSE AKA is the Secretary General of the Arbitration Centre of the 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) of OHADA and a trainer in 
arbitration law at the Higher Regional School of Magistracy of OHADA 
(ERSUMA) in Porto Novo, Benin, and expert for various institutions including 
the Office International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International 
Development Law Organisation (IDLO). Former Magistrate, former trainee 
at the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, he was also Secretary 
General of the Court of Arbitration of Ivory Coast near the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Côte d’Ivoire (CACINarcisse Aka is author of 
several publications on arbitration, including the commentary to OHADA 
Uniform Act on arbitration law, practice and institutions in Africa. 
Mr. Narcisse Aka 
Ms. NDANGA KAMAU is Ndanga is Registrar of LCIA-MIAC in Mauritius. Prior 
to that, she lived in Cape Town, Geneva, Houston, London and Nairobi. Her 
career spans international law, international development, and the 
extractive industries in law firms, governments, research institutions and 
international organisations.. Ndanga has an undergraduate degree in 
economics, postgraduate diplomas in law and an LLM in international 
dispute settlement. She was called to the Bar by Middle Temple. Ndanga is 
Kenyan.  
Ms Ndanga Kamau 
DR. FIDELE MASENGO is Board member of Kigali International Arbitration 
Center (KIAC) who has been appointed to serve as KIAC Executive Director 
assuming temporary the duties of KIAC General Secretary. He has served 
as the Deputy Chief of Party and Senior Technical Adviser within USAID-
Chemonics International- LAND Project since June 2012 up to May 2015. 
Before joining USAID-LAND Project, Fidèle worked and is still working as 
legal consultant. He also worked as independent Advocate registered with 
Rwanda Bar Association since 2005 and in various other key legal positions 
in Rwanda, most notably in Rwanda Ministry of Justice as the Director of 
Public Prosecution services and Relations with the courts (from 1999 to 
2001) and as the Director of the Administration of Justice (from 2001 to 
September 2004).  
Mr. Fidele Masengo 
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HON. WILFRED D. IKATARI is a Legal Practitioner, Arbitrator, Administrator 
and Agricultural Economist. He has a vast legal experience at the bar and 
the bench having practiced and thereafter sat as Presiding Chairman 
(Judge) at the Investment and Securities Tribunal in Nigeria. He has 
participated in several local and international seminars, workshops and 
conferences. He was appointed Director of the Lagos Centre in   July, 2014 
and has since then been working tirelessly to reposition the Centre in its 
rightful place.   
Hon. Wilfred Dan Ikatari 
MR. EMMANUEL AMOFA is a Partner of Hagan Law Company and 
Administrator of the Ghana Arbitration Centre since its incorporation in 
1996. His expertise and interest include Corporate Law, Investment Law 
and Negotiation, Civil Litigation, Land Law, International Commercial Law, 
International Business Transactions, Negotiation of Commercial 
Transactions, Arbitration and Mediation, Petroleum and Energy Law, Legal 
Sector Reform, Privatisation and Banking Law. He is a lecturer in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution at the Ghana School of Law.  
Mr. Emmanuel Amofa 
MS. MEGHA JOSHI was appointed the first Executive Secretary/Chief 
Executive Officer of the Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA) International 
Centre for Arbitration & ADR (ICAA) in November 2012.  She has been 
responsible for implementing the institutional framework of the business, 
administration and engagement of all the stakeholders of dispute 
resolution services at the LCA.  
Ms. Megha Joshi 
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Rapporteur
MR. PRINCE OLOKOTOR is a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree from the University 
of Benin, Nigeria and, a Master of Laws (LL.M) degree from the University 
of Glamorgan (now University of South Wales), United Kingdom. In 2012, 
Prince was appointed a research assistant at SOAS, University of London 
for a research project on: “The Multi-door Court House (MDC) Scheme in 
Nigeria – A Case Study of the Lagos MDC”. Prince is currently a PhD 
candidate, on the recognition and enforcement of transnational 
commercial arbitral awards in England and Nigeria, at SOAS, University 
of London. 
Mr. Prince Olokotor 
Speakers Profiles – Panel 2 
JUSTICE AYOTUNDE PHILLIPS attended the University of Lagos, Nigeria 
and the Nigerian Law School in 1974. She was appointed a Judge of the 
Lagos State High Court in February 1994. In June 2012 she was sworn in 
as the 14th Chief Judge of Lagos State and retired from the High Court 
Bench on the 26th July 2014. She is a Member of the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators.  
Justice Ayo Phillips 
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DR EMILIA ONYEMA is a senior lecturer in International Commercial Law, 
and Associate Dean at SOAS, University of London; Fellow of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators; qualified to practice law in Nigeria; a non-practising 
Solicitor in England; alternative tribunal secretary of the CSAT; and is listed 
on various arbitrator panels. Her current research is on, “Creating a 
sustainable culture of arbitration as a mechanism for commercial dispute 
resolution in Africa”. 
Dr.  Emilia Onyema 
LEYOU TAMERU is a legal consultant from Ethiopia. Educated in Addis 
Ababa University and Georgetown Law, her work focuses on International 
Arbitration. She has consulted on international arbitration cases while 
working with international and Ethiopian firms including WilmerHale and 
Emahizee Global Consulting. Leyou has also taught law at Addis Ababa 
University and has a broad experience ranging from investment policy to 
legal research while consulting with the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). 
Ms. Leyou Tameru 
PROFESSOR EWELUKWA is also currently the Secretary-General of the 
African Society of International Law, is the Co-Chair of the Africa Interest 
Group of the American Society of International Law, and is an active 
member of the Nigerian Bar Association 
Prof. Uche Ewelukwa 
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PROF. C J AMASIKE has worked as a Special Adviser to the Honourable 
Attorney- General of the Federation and Minister of Justice and at 
different times was Chairman of various Federal Government of Nigeria 
Committees and Panels. He is a Fellow and Chairman of Council of 
International Dispute Resolution Institute [IDRI] and the Founder & 
President of Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution In Africa 
[AAAAA], which firm is a leading Arbitration & ADR Service Provider. He 
is also an Author, Speaker at several International and Local Conferences 
and Visiting Professor & External Examiner to a number of Local and 
Foreign Universities. 
PROF. C J AMASIKE 
MS. RUKIA BARUTI is the founder and Managing Director of Africa 
International Legal Awareness (AILA), a not-for-profit organisation 
working to enhance legal professional competence and raise 
awareness of existing expertise in international economic laws in 
Africa.  Prior to founding AILA, Rukia practiced law at SJ Berwin’s 
International Arbitration Group.  She regularly sits as arbitrator and is 
currently completing a PhD at the University of Geneva on foreign 
investment laws in Africa.  
Ms. Rukia Baruti 
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Ms RYHAM RAGAB specialises in international commercial and 
investment arbitration and corporate law. She worked at leading 
international law firms in Egypt, New York, London and Paris. At 
Mishcon de Reya New York LLP, she specialised in international 
commercial arbitration.  
Ms Ryham Ragab 
PROFESSOR PAUL OBO IDORNIGIE, a University Scholar, holds a 
doctorate degree in International Commercial Arbitration; is a Fellow of 
the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (London); 
Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (UK);   member, 
London Court of International Arbitration; member, Nigerian Bar 
Association; member, Nigerian Association of Law Teachers; member, 
International Bar Association and Commonwealth Lawyers Association.   
He is on the Panel of Neutrals at the Abuja and Lagos Multi Door 
Courthouses, Nigeria and the Panel of  
Professor Paul Idornigie NIALS 
Speakers Profiles – Panel 3 
MR. BABAJIDE OGUNDIPE is a partner in the Lagos firm, Sofunde, 
Osakwe, Ogundipe & Belgore. He is a former Chairman of the Nigerian 
Branch of the Chartered Institute and was the first President of the 
Lagos Court of Arbitration serving between 2010 and 2014.  He practises 
in Lagos primarily providing advice on anti-corruption and anti-fraud 
matters, as a litigator in commercial disputes and as an arbitrator.  
Mr. Babajide Ogundipe 
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DR. SYLVIE BEHONI EBONGO is a research officer at the Association for the 
Promotion of Arbitration in Africa (APAA) based in Yaounde, Cameroon. 
BEBOHI holds a Ph.D. in Law, with a specialization in international arbitration 
from the University of Amiens (France) and is currently undertaking the 
necessary steps to become a member of the French and Cameroonian Bar. 
Bebohi works also as an independent consultant for law firms. She joined 
APAA in 2008 as an assistant researcher. She has also been a trainee lecturer 
at the University of Amiens. 
Sylvie Bebohi Ebongo 
MR PHILLIP ALIKER’S practice comprises multi-jurisdictional commercial 
contractual disputes for corporations and governments of high-value and 
often of considerable reputation risk and/or with significant political and/or 
economic implication. Phillip is currently sitting in Kenya as a sole arbitrator 
in a substantial construction dispute under the Rules of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators. Recognised in Chambers & Partners 2015 as a Foreign 
Expert (Uganda) in disputes with an East African connection. 
Mr Phillip Aliker 
DR. TUNDE OGOWEWO is a Senior Lecturer at The Dickson Poon School of 
Law, Kings College London.  He teaches Corporate Finance Law, Corporate 
Governance, and Mergers and Acquisitions Law at postgraduate level. He is 
also a Joint Global Hauser Professor of Law at NYU Law School, New York and 
Visiting Professor of Corporate Governance at the National University of 
Singapore.  He is presently on the editorial board of the African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (Edinburgh University Press) and the 
Securities Market Journal. He is a qualified Barrister (Middle Temple) and 
Solicitor (England and Wales) and a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria. He also sits as arbitrator and has also acted as Counsel to 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria in investment disputes. 
Dr. Tunde Ogowewo 
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Prof. Chukwuemerie, SAN, FCIArb (UK) attended the Colliery 
Comprehensive Secondary School, Ngwo, Enugu and later proceeded to 
study Law at the Universities of Maiduguri (for the LL.B) and Lagos (for the 
LL.M).  He was called to the Nigerian Bar in December 1989 after passing
the Bar Finals (BL) examination that year. He became a Professor of
Commercial Law in 2005 after 7 years of lecturing/teaching. He was
appointed a Senior Advocate of Nigeria in 2009 and was sworn in in 2010.
Before he became a lecture of Law he had been in private practice since his
call to the Bar in 1989.  He has been in that practice since then.
Professor Andrew Chukwumerie 
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MR TOLU OBAMUROH obtained his LL.M from Columbia Law 
School, where he was an editor of the American Review of 
International Arbitration Journal while also serving as a Research 
Assistant to Professor George Bermann in respect of the American 
Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of International Arbitration. He 
is a doctoral candidate at Penn State Law. Tolu has worked in 
Nigerian and international law firms including Babalakin & Co., 
WilmerHale, London (Visiting Foreign Associate) and a brief stint at 
White & Case LLP, New York (Weinstein Fellow). He is currently the 
Associate General Counsel of the Lagos Court of Arbitration. 
Mr. Tolu Obamuroh 
Rapporteur 
Speakers Profiles – Panel 4 
Lise Bosman is Senior Legal Counsel at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and Executive Director of the International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA). She is also an Adjunct Professor at 
the University of Cape Town, a Fellow of the Association of 
Arbitrators (Southern Africa) and is the general editor and 
contributing author of Arbitration in Africa: a Practitioner's 
Guide (Kluwer).She can be contacted via lbosman@pca-
cpa.org or +31.70.302.2833. 
Ms Lise Bosman 
MRS ‘FUNKE’ ADEKOYA is a Partner at ǼLEX, one of the largest full 
service commercial law firms in Nigeria where she heads the 
Dispute Resolution practice group. She is a Chartered Arbitrator 
and a Vice President of the ICC Court of Arbitration. She both leads 
as arbitration counsel and also often sits as an arbitrator in both 
international and domestic arbitration proceedings [institutional 
and ad hoc]. 
Mrs. Olufunke  Adekoya, SAN 
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 MR. BABATUNDE FAGBOHUNLU is a partner and head of the Litigation, 
Arbitration and ADR Practice Group in Aluko & Oyebode. In December 
2008, Tunde was conferred with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria 
(SAN) by the Nigerian Legal Practitioners Privileges Committee. He 
regularly represents Nigerian as well as foreign and multinational clients in 
Ad Hoc arbitrations and arbitrations administered by arbitral institutions. 
Tunde has also served on the Federal Government of Nigeria’s Committee 
on the Reform and Harmonization of Arbitration/ADR Laws.).  
Mr. Babatunde Fagbohunlu SAN 
MR. JIMMY MUYANJA, LLM (Commercial Law), is the Executive Director, 
Center for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CARDER), Uganda. He is a 
Board Member of Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration, and a 
registered Arbitrator and Mediator, Centre for Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution, Kampala, Uganda. He has authored several papers on 
Arbitration in Uganda. He developed reporting scheme for Uganda 
Arbitration cases on the UNCITRAL Case Law on Uncitral Text; developed 
jurisprudence on compulsory appointment of Arbitrators; and also 
developed and oversaw implementation of case division scheme for 
court-connected mediation at the Commercial Court of Uganda. He is a 
Member, NCIA legislation Committee and has arbitrated and mediated 
cases within Uganda. 
Mr. Jimmy Muyanja 
MR AHMED BANNAGA is a practicing lawyer in Sudan and a member of 
the Chartered institute of Arbitrator –London holding the title –MCIArb. 
He graduated from SOAS, University of London with LLM in Dispute & 
Conflict Resolution where he specialized in international arbitration in 
2009. He is now the Representative of the Sudanese Bar at the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority in England & Wales (SRA) – London, the Founder and 
Partner at Bannaga & Fadlabi LLP and The legal advisor of numerous local 
and multinational companies in Sudan. He has many publications in 
relation to arbitration. 
Mr Ahmed Bannaga 
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MS ESINE OKUDZETO is a partner and heads one of Sam Okudzeto & 
Associates’ Corporate/ Commercial law groups. Her focus is on Mergers 
and Acquisitions, Capital Markets, Oil and Gas law, Corporate law, 
Commercial law, Labour law, Intellectual property and Arbitration. Esine 
has performed due diligence for several international clients advising her 
clients on mergers and acquisitions and the formation of Joint Ventures in 
Ghana. Esine played a leading role in a Fortune 500 company’s acquisition 
of Unilever Plc’s oil palm business in Ghana 
Ms. Esine Okudzeto 
MR. ISAIAH BOZIMO is a Senior Associate and Deputy Head of Chambers 
in Law Firm of Ikwueto.  He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (UK) and has over nine years post qualification experience as a 
Barrister and Solicitor.  He is an alumnus of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and Queen Mary University of London. 
Isaiah’s practice is Commercial Dispute Resolution and Commercial 
Advice.  
Mr Isaiah Bozimo 
MR EDWARD LUKE II is the Managing Partner of the firm and one of the 
leading lawyers in Botswana with a wealth of local and international 
experience and is listed in Who’s Who of Southern Africa, and the 
International Who’s Who of professionals in Washington D.C. He has 
spoken at several International Conferences on International Arbitration 
including at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, in Mombasa Kenya in 
August 2014 , the Commonwealth Lawyers Association Conference in 
Glasgow, Scotland in April 2015, International Arbitration at the 
International Bar Association conference in Vienna in October 2015 and on 
Arbitration and judicial case management at the International Bar 
Association Africa Regional conference in Livingstone Zambia in November 
2015 to name a few. 
Mr Edward Luke II 
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MR. UCHEORA ONWUAMAEGBU is an International Attorney at Arent 
Fox LLP, Washington, D.C.  He provides advisory services to 
governments and corporations, and sits as arbitrator in international 
disputes.  For about a decade, Uche was Senior Counsel at the World 
Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), and was a lawyer at the United Nations Compensation 
Commission, Geneva, before that. He is also qualified in Nigeria and in 
the UK. 
Mr Ucheora Onwuamaegbu 
Rapporteur 
DR. JEAN ALAIN PENDA, Independent Consultant at Price Waterhouse 
Coopers LLP, London, United Kingdom and OHADAC Project Manager, 
headquarters in the French West Indies. He is a Director at the 
Foundation for a Unified System of Business Law (FUBLA) and a regular 
consultant for the Association for the Unification of Business Law in 
Africa (UNIDA) and ACP Legal, both which are non-governmental 
organisations promoting legal integration in Africa and the Caribbean. 
Author of several articles on OHADA law, Jean Alain Penda is regularly 
invited to speak at conferences and represents its association in most 
events worldwide 
Dr. Jean Alain Penda 
Speakers Profiles – Panel 5 
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MR. STEVE FINIZIO is recognized as one of the leading international 
arbitration lawyers in London in the Chambers UKGuide, named in 
the Euromoney Guide to the World's Leading Experts in Commercial 
Arbitration and recognized for his standing in the field of international 
arbitration in Legal 500, Chambers Global, Chambers Europe, Global 
Arbitration Review's Who's Who in International Arbitration, PLC Which 
Lawyer? and Legal Media Group's The Best of the Best Mr. Finizio's practice 
includes international arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, 
general commercial litigation, and internal investigations, focusing on 
complex commercial and regulatory issues. Mr. Finizio also serves as an 
arbitrator.
Mr Steve Finizio 
MR. RODERICK CORDARA has an expansive commercial litigation and 
arbitration practice and acts as adviser and advocate in a spectrum of 
courts and arbitration tribunals worldwide. He has offices in London, 
Singapore and Sydney. He is admitted to appear in the Courts of the United 
Kingdom, the European Court of Justice, the Singapore International 
Commercial Court, and the State and Federal Courts of Australia. He has 
arbitrated in cases in Europe, Asia, and Africa.  His principal practice is 
advocacy. He also sits as arbitrator. Additionally, he is admitted to appear 
in the Singapore International Commercial Court and he is a silk in both the 
UK and Australia. 
Mr Roderick Cordara 
MR DUNCAN BAGSHAW is a barrister, called to the bar in 2003. He is 
Counsel in Stephenson Harwood's international arbitration and Africa 
teams. Duncan's practice is focussed upon representing African 
governments and corporations, particularly on cases concerning 
infrastructure and development projects, and shareholder disputes. From 
2012 to 2015 Duncan was the first Registrar of the LCIA Mauritius 
International Arbitration Centre, developing the institution and the 
arbitration law and environment in Mauritius. of Cape Town, Tsinghua 
(Beijing) and Wolverhampton (UK). 
Mr. Duncan Bagshaw 
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MR. CHARLES NAIRAC is a partner in the International Arbitration Group 
of White & Case, based in the firm’s Paris office. He has been involved in 
international commercial and investment arbitrations, under most of the 
major institutional rules as well as in ad hoc arbitrations, in English and in 
French. He currently lectures on international arbitration at the 
Universities of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas) and Nancy. He is recognized in 
leading legal directories such as Chambers, Legal 500, Who's Who Legal, 
the International Who's Who of Construction Lawyers and the GAR 100. 
Mr Charles Nairac 
MR. JOHN GAFFNEY, Al Tamimi & Company, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates – Senior Associate; LLM (Amsterdam); specializing in 
international arbitration in various areas, including construction, 
corporate/commercial, energy, investment treaty, IP, and 
telecommunications matters under variety of rules (DIAC, ADCCAC, ICC, 
LCIA, UNCITRAL); arbitrator in DIAC cases and WIPO name disputes and 
an Expert in ICC Expertise proceedings; Case Notes Editor of EIAR; 2016 
ICCA Ambassador. 
Mr. John Gaffney 
MR BAIJU VASANI is an international arbitration lawyer and arbitrator. He 
has served as counsel and arbitrator in international arbitrations involving 
ICSID, ICC, LCIA, ICDR, SIAC, UNCITRAL Rules, bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), the Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA, DR-CAFTA, and public 
international law. He also has advised states on the negotiation and 
drafting of treaties and companies in investment structuring. 
Mr Baiju Vasani 
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Speakers Profiles – Panel 6 
HON. JUSTICE EDWARD TORGBOR CA, FCIArb, LLD, Professor of Law and 
Legal Consultant He is currently a Chartered Arbitrator (England) and Fellow 
of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (England), Court Member of the 
LCIA and Vice-President of the LCIA African Users’ Council. Justice Torgbor 
is a specialist practicing arbitrator and mediator based in Nairobi with cases 
in Kenya, France and England.  Formerly barrister in England, Judge of the 
High Court of Kenya, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia, Attorney at 
Law, Ghana, Lecturer and Tutor in arbitration law and practice.  He has 
published professional articles and is a Contributor to LCIA and Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators’ journals, Chairman, Participator and Presenter at 
numerous arbitration conferences, seminars and workshops in Kenya, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Lesotho, South Africa, and England.   
Hon. Justice Torgbor 
CHIEF BAYO OJO, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) was called to the 
Nigerian Bar in 1978. He later got admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme 
Court of England and Wales. Since then he has been in active Commercial 
law, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Oil and Gas, Litigation and 
International Law practice. As Attorney General of the Federation and 
Minister of Justice, he initiated key reforms in the justice sector. Mr Ojo also 
acted as Chairman of the review panel for licensing round of oil blocks issued 
in 2005 in Nigeria, was an advisor on the exit of Nigeria from the London and 
Paris Clubs, advised and participated in the negotiation of a loan of $2.5 
billion US Dollars for the Mambilla Hydro, Railways and Rural Telephony 
from the China Exim Bank in Beijing, advised on the new regime for 
borrowing put in place by the Debt Management Office for the States and 
Federal Government, advised on the putting together of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, the current Central Bank Act, Tax Acts and review of 
Nigerian Investment Laws and a new Nigerian Arbitration Act to mention a 
few.  
Chief Bayo Ojo SAN 
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 34 
4. Discussion Paper
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 35 
Delibrate blank page
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 36 
Discussion Paper 
Dr Emilia Onyema (SOAS) 
Introduction 
This is the second conference in the series of four identified themes in our research project on 
transforming and enhancing the use of arbitration as the dispute resolution of choice within the 
African continent. The four year research project itself is titled ‘Creating a Sustainable Culture of 
Arbitration as a mechanism for Commercial Dispute Resolution in Africa’.  This research project is 
necessary because as stated in my introduction to the Addis Ababa Discussion Paper for our first 
conference in this series which examined the role of arbitration institutions in this process1: 
there is no viable empirical research in this field in the continent to inform decisions, revision 
of laws, and knowledge and practice sharing across the continent.  
The primary purpose of this research project is to “increase the visibility (of arbitration practitioners 
in Africa) and the viability of arbitration in the domestic, intra-Africa and international dispute 
resolution market”. To achieve this, 
This project will pull together stakeholders in the sector of dispute resolution, articulate and 
monitor their practices and (measure the) impact of the outcome of our conferences and 
research output, to find a measurable change in all aspects of arbitration in the continent. The 
various aspects are arbitration specific laws and rules and their reviews; courts and judges; 
arbitration institutions; arbitration practitioners; and the state. The second (goal) of this 
research (project) is knowledge sharing between researchers and academics, arbitration 
practitioners, and arbitration institutions outside and within the continent.2 
This second conference focuses on another primary stakeholder in the promotion of arbitration in 
Africa: courts and judges. This conference specifically focuses on the role of judges and courts in the 
promotion and viability of arbitration in Africa. The conference papers will critically examine the 
current disposition towards arbitration of the courts and judges from various regions of the continent. 
The judgments and comments of judges in arbitration related disputes will be examined to objectively 
determine their disposition towards arbitration. This is in recognition of the fact that decisions of 
judges in arbitration related matters greatly influence the perception of users and their advisors (both 
within and outside the continent) on how conducive the legal environment is towards arbitration.  
This perception feeds directly into the nomination of cities in Africa as seats of arbitration, and the 
appointment of arbitration institutions and arbitration practitioners, within the continent. Effectively 
therefore, the perception of a poor attitude towards upholding arbitration agreements and valid 
arbitral awards or of lack of support of the arbitral process by a judiciary, directly and negatively 
impacts on the attractiveness of a state as seat of arbitration. This perception in turn discourages 
arbitral references and the use of legal advisors and arbitration institutions in the particular 
jurisdiction. This lack of arbitral references consequently reduces the number of arbitration related 
1 Our first conference held in the premises of the African Union in Addis Ababa on 23 July 2015. The 
conference papers are available online at: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/20421/ (hereafter Addis Ababa Conference 
paper) 
2 Addis Ababa Conference paper, page 23. 
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decisions judges in such jurisdictions make. Another peculiar issue affecting most African jurisdictions 
is that such few decisions available are not easily accessible. This state of affairs seemingly 
predominant in a number of African jurisdictions does not encourage disputants to choose to arbitrate 
their disputes in Africa and so ought to be reversed and improved upon.    
We, as stakeholders, believe that this narrative needs to change. The desired change is to make African 
jurisdictions viable seats for international, intra-Africa and domestic arbitration references; and to 
make accessible the authoritative decisions of African judges on arbitration related matters.3 Our 
conferences built around our core research project, aim to drive or at least contribute to this process 
of change.   
Arbitration does not displace national courts but in an ideal world the two processes co-exist in a 
harmonious symbiotic relationship (which as in any marriage may not be harmonious all the time!). In 
this regard, Michael Kerr once succinctly noted,  
international arbitration cannot function without the assistance of national courts. Only they 
possess the coercive powers to enforce agreements to arbitrate, as well as the resulting 
awards.4  
It can (for now) be boldly asserted that national courts are indispensable to a successful arbitration 
environment. However such indispensability arises from national courts playing a supportive and not 
disruptive role. So what exactly does such a supportive role involve? The discussion below quotes 
extensively from section 3 of the paper I delivered at our Addis Ababa Conference titled “Africa as a 
Viable Space for Arbitration: Role of National Courts and Laws”5  
Supportive role of national courts 
The legal framework that supports arbitration includes the courts which appear to be the primary limb 
that is out of joint or sync with developments in this sector. All current 55 African states have national 
courts with general jurisdiction also covering civil and commercial matters before which arbitration 
related matters are heard. In most of these jurisdictions, there is a hierarchy of courts with the 
Supreme Court (or in some states the Constitutional Court) as the highest court. Though for matters 
falling within the OHADA Treaty, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA), as a 
supranational court is the court of last resort. The same also applies to the East Africa Court of Justice 
for member states of the EAC Treaty6. The jurisdiction and powers of these courts are also contained 
in national constitutions which usually provide rights of access and appeal to litigants.  
As is well known, courts at the seat of arbitration may become involved in the process broadly at three 
stages: prior to commencement of the arbitration; during the arbitration and after publication of the 
final award (a stage which they share with the enforcing court).7 Before the commencement of an 
arbitration reference, for example, one party to the dispute may contest the existence or scope of the 
3 The publication of these arbitration related judgements will ensure that African judges contribute to the 
growth of global arbitral jurisprudence, and also ensure that our “African voices” are heard and taken seriously 
by the international arbitral community.  
4 Michael Kerr, “Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration” (1997) 13 Arb Int 121 at 127. 
5 This paper is at pages 141 to 147 of the Addis Ababa Conference Discussion Paper. 
6 See for jurisdiction of the EACJ: http://eacj.org/?page_id=27 (accessed 12 February 2016). 
7 For more details see Emilia Onyema, “Power shift in international commercial arbitration proceedings”, 
(2004) Vol 14 (Nos 1 & 2) Caribbean Law Review, pages 62-77.  
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arbitration agreement before a national court so that the other party will be forced to assert the 
existence, scope and effect of the agreement. Such litigation may give rise to anti-suit injunction.8 The 
involvement of the court at this stage can be supportive of the arbitral reference. This will be where a 
robust view is taken to ensure the effectiveness and performance of the arbitration agreement.9 
However it may also lead to courts frustrating the arbitration process even before it starts. Therefore, 
issues such as the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and validity of the arbitration agreement, among 
others, may be raised to frustrate the existence and performance of the arbitration agreement.  
Examples abound of situations where one party to an arbitration agreement refuses or fails to honour 
their promise under the arbitration agreement but instead chooses to litigate the very question of the 
existence of the arbitration agreement and its import. Contesting the existence or validity of the 
arbitration agreement is not the problem. The forum of contestation is the problem that raises 
concerns. This is particularly so in the face of arbitration laws that expressly confer jurisdiction on the 
arbitral tribunal to determine its jurisdiction and all matters relevant thereto. 10 In defiance of this 
requirement, some parties still approach the courts to make that determination and some courts, 
especially first instance courts, take jurisdiction and determine the question. Clearly such courts lack 
jurisdiction to so determine since their action effectively usurps the powers conferred by their own 
law on the arbitral tribunal (at least at that stage of the reference) to determine its jurisdiction. It is 
perfectly legitimate for disputing parties to challenge an arbitration agreement that in their view is 
invalid (or to use the terminology of the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, “null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”11). It is however for the courts to determine 
whether parties in pursuing what on its face is a legitimate challenge, should be allowed to circumvent 
their bargain (to arbitrate their disputes) using the court’s processes. So for example most arbitration 
laws clearly state that the arbitral tribunal can make such determinations as part of certifying its 
jurisdiction.12 So a national court that interferes with the arbitral jurisdiction conferred by its national 
law not only flouts that law but also denies requisite support for arbitration.13 
Upon commencement of the arbitral reference, issues such as arbitrator appointment and challenge, 
and application for interim measures of protection may also be litigated before the courts. National 
courts may also be requested to support the arbitral reference with the taking of evidence, 
summoning witnesses and enforcing orders made by the arbitral tribunal. Finally after the award has 
been rendered, issues of enforcement and challenge of the award pull in national courts again either 
at the seat or place of enforcement. In most African jurisdictions, any of these stages can entail the 
start of legal proceedings from the court of first instance all the way to the Supreme Court. These are 
the issues that consume time, increase costs and frustrate those disputants who wish to progress the 
8 For example as required under Art II.3 of the New York Convention, 1958. 
9 The effectiveness of the arbitration agreement is the consent of the parties to arbitrate and not litigate the 
covered dispute. It is this consent that courts need to give effect. 
10 Examples of such laws include: art. 11 OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999; s. 24 Ghana ADRA 2010; s. 
12 Nigeria ACA 1988; art. 22 Egypt Arbitration Act 1994; s. 17 Kenya Arbitration Act 2012. 
11 Art. II.3 of the Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, New York; 
art. 8(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (2006 revision). 
12 See examples in footnote no 10 above. 
13 Pursuit of interim measures of protection in the courts before constitution of the arbitral tribunal or where 
the applicable arbitral rules do not provide for emergency arbitrator or special measures process or pre-
arbitral procedure, is not regarded as a breach of the arbitration agreement. For this see for example, art.9 
UNCITRAL Model Law (1985 with 2006 revision) 
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resolution of the dispute in their chosen forum of arbitration. It is such interferences that earn courts 
the reputation of not being supportive of arbitration or of being interventionist and even disruptive 
of the arbitral process. There is a perception (correctly or wrongly held) that the courts in most African 
jurisdictions do not play a supportive role to arbitration (whether domestic or international). This 
conference will examine these issues with the full participation of judges, whose views on these issues 
will be critically considered. 
I also note that some African states (such as Mauritius) have taken various steps to ensure very limited 
interference or recourse to the courts in their laws and have established specialist commercial courts 
manned by judges with specialist knowledge of arbitration law and practice. This conference will 
interrogate this option to determine whether it will be necessary for states or governments/legislators 
to step in through legislation as Mauritius has done.  
It is my considered view that as it relates to the symbiotic relationship between arbitration and the 
courts, this may not be one of those challenges we legislate our way out of. My view is that, it will be 
important to tighten the laws (so show a clear policy preference in favour of arbitration) in this regard 
but that cannot be all. It will also be equally (or even more) important to properly educate the judges 
who will interpret these laws and possibly get a buy-in from them so they fully understand the policy 
considerations and consider these in the exercise of their interpretative powers. Examples abound of 
courts in other jurisdictions taking into consideration clearly defined policy concerns in interpreting 
various laws.14 So to clarify, African states may need to re-examine the contents of their arbitration 
laws to update them so they are relevant to modern arbitration practice. It is even more important to 
drastically reduce the opportunities available to disputants to make references (so feeding the 
interventionist inclination of courts) to courts before and during the arbitral process. This will leave 
the parties to arbitrate covered disputes and the arbitrators to determine their jurisdiction as 
permitted by the applicable law and to decide the substantive dispute in the arbitral award, which is 
the legitimate expectation of the disputing parties.     
Access to and determination of disputes by competent courts is part of the Universal Principles on 
which the definition of the rule of law adopted in the World Justice Project (WYP) Rule of Law Index is 
based. This Principle no 4 is described as a system where:  
Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and 
neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of 
the communities they serve.15  
The Index notes that the delivery of: 
14 For example, in Hebei Import and Export Corpn v Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd (1999) YBCA Vol XXIVa 652, the 
High Court of Hong Kong SAR held that to set aside an award, it must be so fundamentally offensive to the 
jurisdiction’s notions of justice that it cannot be expected to overlook it. On 19 January 2016 the English High 
Court (Queen’s Bench Division) in Pencil Hill Ltd v US Citta di Palermo SpA [2016] WL 212897, enforced an 
award in which it upheld a penalty clause (which is not enforceable under English law) which was valid under 
the applicable law of the contract (which was Swiss law). See also Westacre Investments v Jugoimport-SDPR 
Holding Co. Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 770 where in the face of competing two public policies (corruption v 
enforcement of awards) the English Court of Appeal favoured enforcement of awards. 
15 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2015 at page 10. 
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Effective civil justice requires that the system be accessible, affordable, free of discrimination, 
free of corruption, and improper influence by public officials. .. It also necessitates that court 
proceedings are conducted in a timely manner and not subject to unreasonable delays. … This 
factor also measures the accessibility, impartiality, and efficiency of mediation and arbitration 
systems that enable parties to resolve civil disputes.16  
It will not be too difficult to find in each African country examples of cases that fall foul of these 
principles. It is this that explains why the African countries surveyed in the Index scored very poorly.17 
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2015 scored 18 countries from sub-Sahara Africa18 and three from North 
Africa19 with Botswana retaining its top ranking. Interestingly, there is no known major arbitration 
institution located in Botswana, and its arbitration law dates from 1959 though it is party to both the 
New York and ICSID Conventions.  
It remains my view that these effectively are the standards African courts and judges need to 
consistently strive to attain. The authors of the Index conclusion show a clear link between an effective 
rule of law regime and development in its various permutations: 
Where the rule of law is weak, medicines fail to reach health facilities, criminal violence goes 
unchecked, laws are applied unequally across societies, and foreign investment is held back. 
Effective rule of law helps reduce corruption, improve public health, enhance education, 
alleviate poverty, and protect people from injustices and dangers large or small.20   
Problems of Court Interference 
The problem of court interference will be examined as it relates to complicity of the court in parties 
breaching their arbitration agreement and delay caused by satellite litigations. 
Breach of arbitration agreement 
As is well known, the arbitration agreement is a contract in which the parties promise each other to 
arbitrate covered disputes that arise from a defined legal relationship to which the agreement is 
connected. Therefore failure or refusal by one party to the arbitration agreement to arbitrate a 
covered dispute that arises is a clear breach of the party’s contractual promise. Such a breach should 
be remedied and not acquiesced in by the courts. However it appears that the current situation in 
quite a number of jurisdictions in Africa is that the courts acquiesce in this breach by one of the parties. 
It is not too far-fetched to state that by adjudicating such disputes (covered by an arbitration 
agreement) courts thereby become complicit (advertently or otherwise) in the active breach by the 
parties. It is therefore important for a strong policy position to be canvassed and taken against such 
improper judicial interference.  
16 Ibid at page 13. 
17 See for the 2015 rankings: http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf (accessed 8 
February 2016). 
18 These are (in order of ranking out of 102 countries worldwide): Botswana (31), Ghana 34), South Africa (36), 
Senegal (38), Malawi (61), Tanzania (72), Zambia (73), Cote d’Ivoire (76), Burkina Faso (78), Madagascar (82), 
Liberia (83), Kenya (84), Sierra Leone (87), Ethiopia (91), Uganda (95), Nigeria (96), Cameroon (97), and 
Zimbabwe (100).  
19 These are (in order of ranking and rank out of 102 countries worldwide): Tunisia (43), Morocco (55) and 
Egypt (86). 
20 WJP Rule of Law Index 2015 at page 9. 
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 41 
Delay 
The second consequence of such lack of support is the delay that satellite litigation occasions in 
arbitration. If I take an example of delay periods which is in the public domain from the English Court 
of Appeal decision in IPCO v NNPC21 in 2015, it took 10 years for a simple preliminary question to be 
dealt with before the Nigerian courts while a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, giving expert evidence 
stated that it may take a generation for a dispute to go through the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria.22 It 
appears the experience of delay before the Nigerian courts is similar to what obtains in other African 
jurisdictions. Delay before courts must be tackled. It defies understanding how parties can spend 
under one year in arbitration to get a final award and 12 years after are still going through the courts 
and in some cases (such as IPCO v NNPC) in various jurisdictions just to get the award enforced. The 
simple commercial question in such cases is why go through arbitration (with all the additional costs) 
only to end up in the litigation process? In the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index already referred 
to above, in all the 21 African countries surveyed, ‘duration of the cases’ featured strongly in 
influencing people’s decision whether or not to go to court.23  So, we must acknowledge that delay in 
the courts is not good for arbitration business. This will therefore lead to business flight to other 
developed jurisdictions by disputing parties (including domestic businesses) choosing to arbitrate their 
disputes in other jurisdictions. The cumulative effect as already mentioned is less work for our 
arbitration institutions; less work for our lawyers particularly arbitration specialists as counsel and as 
arbitrator; and lack of input from our judges in shaping arbitral jurisprudence and practice; and finally 
less arbitration references with seats in African states. This attitude of our courts leads to a loss for all 
involved.   
Appendix 
Verifiable data is a major resource not easily accessible on the continent but necessary to substantiate 
assertions commonly made about Africa. Five tables have been compiled in the Appendix of some 
data which speakers and delegates may find useful to refer in their discussions. Table 1 is a list of the 
54 independent states that make up the African continent and their arbitration related laws and 
conventions as at end of April 2016. Table 2 is a list of 72 centres that describe themselves as offering 
services for the administration of arbitration disputes operating in various countries of the continent. 
Table 3 is a list compiled from available ICC data on the number of African parties/cities/arbitrators 
involved in arbitrations under the ICC from 2000-2015.24 Table 4 is data from the Headquarters of the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators of their African membership who have taken their courses in 2015.25 
Table 5 is a ranking of 21 African countries in various categories by the World Justice Rule of Law Index 
for 2015. 
21 IPCO v NNPC [2015] EWCA Civ 1144 and see Emilia Onyema, “IPCO v NNPC Saga and liability of the Nigerian 
Legal System” in The Guardian Newspapers of 22 December 2015 available online at: 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/21653/ (accessed on 3 February 2016). 
22 As outrageous as the testimony was, it is still happening and it would have been interesting to find out from 
the former CJN what he did while CJ to reduce these times. 
23 WJP Rule of Law Index 2015 at pages 45-46. 
24 The data from the ICC are from various ICC Bulletins but the details of the 2015 statistics were kindly 
provided by Mr Tunde Ogunseitan, Counsel at the ICC International Court of Arbitration, Paris, for which I am 
most grateful. 
25 This data was kindly provided by Mr Nigel Joseph, the Members Services Manager, for which I am most 
grateful. 
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Conclusion 
Courts therefore play a major role in arbitration generally and especially on the continent where there 
is still a poor culture of voluntary compliance with the order of a validly constituted decision maker 
such as an arbitral tribunal.  Such culture also leads to the involvement of the courts at various stages 
of the arbitral reference. Evidently such recourse to courts effectively defeats the primary aim or 
intention of the disputing parties to opt out of the litigation process for a private process of arbitration. 
Clearly African governments need to do more to make cities in their countries attractive venues; their 
courts accessible and credible, ensure security of lives and property, among others, to attract not just 
investors but to ensure that when these investors and their own citizens have disputes, they choose 
such cities as seats of arbitration and appoint arbitrators of African origin as their dispute resolvers. In 
addition and even more viable is the importance of creating an enabling legal environment for 
domestic and intra-Africa arbitration references to thrive. Thus the centrality of the role of courts and 
judges in the promotion and attractiveness of arbitration to a jurisdiction cannot be over emphasised. 
Aim of the conference 
This conference primarily aims to diagnose the reasons African seats and courts do not feature 
prominently in international arbitration practice. The interrogation will also extend to domestic and 
intra-Africa arbitration references.  
Expected contribution from the conference 
The panel discussions will focus on: defining, streamlining and appraising the role of courts in 
arbitration; clarifying the symbiotic relationship between courts and arbitration; identifying the 
current gaps in this relationship; and formulating a strategy on how to turn this situation around for 
adoption and implementation by the courts and judges in various African states. The strategy will 
consist of clear action points which will be strongly recommended to judiciaries across the continent 
for adoption.   
Expected output from the conference 
The papers presented at the conference and a final report from the conference will be published 
online on the SOAS website and made freely available to the general public. In addition peer-
reviewed versions of the papers presented at the conference will be published in a special volume of 
the LCA Dispute Resolution Journal.26 
Venue for the conference 
This conference is co-hosted by the Lagos Court of Arbitration Centre (LCA)27 in their newly completed 
ultra-modern international conference centre at the megacity of Lagos, Nigeria in West Africa. As 
noted at the Addis Ababa Conference in 2015, each conference in this series will be hosted by a 
relevant institution within Africa and in each of her major regions. Each host-centre volunteers and 
the LCA kindly volunteered to host this 2016 conference.   
26 This is the journal of the Lagos Court of Arbitration. 
27 The main host of the four conferences in the series is SOAS University of London. 
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Conference website 
All information relevant to the main research project and all the connected conferences are available 
online at: http://www.researcharbitrationafrica.com/  
Outline of the conference sessions 
This conference is spread over two days partly in response to the feedback from attendees at our 
Addis Ababa conference in July 2015.28 On the evening of Wednesday 22 June 2016, there will be a 
delegate’s welcome reception.   
Rapporteurs 
There are four rapporteurs who will summarise the deliberations of the panels which we hope to email 
to the delegates at the end of each day. The rapporteurs are: Mr Ikpeme Nkebem (ICAMA); Mr Prince 
Olokotor (SOAS); Mr Tolu Obamuroh (LCA) and Dr Jean-Alain Penda. 
On Thursday 23 June 2016, registration and welcome ceremonies for the conference will start at 0830. 
Ms Megha Joshi the Executive Secretary/Chief Executive Officer of our host, The Lagos Court of 
Arbitration Centre (LCA) will welcome all participants. Dr Emilia Onyema will briefly introduce the 
SOAS Arbitration in Africa research project and where this conference fits and what the project hopes 
to achieve. Judge Edward Torgbor (Kenya/Ghana) will then give the keynote speech on “Judges and 
the Effectiveness of Arbitration/ADR in Africa”.  
Panel 1 will be in the format of a panel discussion to receive feedback from the various arbitration 
institutions that attended the Addis Ababa conference. This session will be chaired by Ms Alexandra 
Meise of Foley Hoag LLP, Washington DC. As part of the monitoring dimension of the research project, 
each arbitration institution will report on the steps they have taken and implemented since (and as a 
result of) our Addis Ababa conference. Panellists include: Dr Fidele Masengo (KIAC, Kigali); Ms Ndanga 
Kamau (LCIA-MIAC, Mauritius); Dr Narcisse Aka (CCJA, OHADA); Hon Wilfred Ikatari (Lagos Regional 
Centre); Mr Emmanuel Amofa (GAC, Ghana); Ms Megha Joshi (LCA); and Mr Ustaz Alsahaby (ACA, 
Sudan). This panel will discuss the following issues which shall be followed by a question and answer 
session: 
 Any changes the institution has made to its service delivery since Addis Ababa 2015.
 Any results from the implementation of those changes.
 Any additional steps taken by the institution to improve its services.
 Any collaboration between the institution and other institutions in Africa or elsewhere.
 Any plans by the institution to grow its domestic or regional market.
After lunch, Panel 2 will examine general issues relevant to the role of courts and judges in arbitration. 
This session aims to clearly articulate when, how and why courts become involved in arbitration 
proceedings with seat in the continent. It will also examine how the perception of judges and courts 
can be assessed through making available to the public, arbitration related judgments from various 
courts in the continent. Dr Emilia Onyema will examine the different stages courts/judges become 
involved in the arbitral process and interrogate the role/function of judges in arbitration and set out 
the symbiotic nature of these relationships.  Dr Hakeem Seriki will then examine the support judges 
28 Participants wished additional time to discuss while speakers wanted more time to fully present their 
papers. 
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can provide to arbitration during the reference with primary focus on interim measures. Professor 
Uche Ewelukwa will examine the impact of the perception of African judiciaries on the ability of the 
continent to host investment arbitration hearings. Ms Leyou Tameru will discuss her I-Arb project on 
gathering arbitration related decisions and making these available from one online platform. Prof CJ 
Amasike will discuss the training facilities on arbitration available for judges across the continent. Ms 
Rukia Baruti will then examine the training and qualification of African lawyers provided by AILA. This 
panel will be chaired by Judge Ayo Phillips, the former Chief Judge of Lagos state and member of the 
LCA Court of Arbitration. Each speaker on this panel will make a 15 minutes presentation followed by 
a question and answer session. 
After tea, speakers on Panel 3 will discuss the view from domestic arbitrators on their perception of 
the role of judges in arbitration from their experience of sitting as arbitrators in African countries. The 
panellists will focus on their perception of African judiciaries in their role as arbitrators. They will also 
discuss and suggest how the judiciary can better support them in performing their task as arbitrators. 
In this way the panellists will articulate their expectations of the judiciary and the support they require 
from the judges to effectively and efficiently perform their own functions. The panellists are: Mr 
Babajide Ogundipe, the former President of the LCA (Nigeria); Ms Ryham Ragab (Egypt); Dr Sylvie 
Bebohi (OHADA/Cameroon); Mr Phillip Aliker (East Africa); Dr Tunde Ogowewo (Nigeria); and Prof 
Andrew Chukwumerie (Nigeria). This session will be chaired by Prof Paul Idornigie, SAN, FCIArb, who 
is an experienced domestic and international arbitrator. This panel will discuss the following issues 
which shall be followed by a question and answer session: 
 Any positive experience of sitting as domestic arbitrator in Africa.
 Any negative experience and how they dealt with it.
 Any need during the hearing for court assistance and how this was executed.
 Any need for such assistance but decided against asking the court: why and what did you do?
 Any experience of your appointment or jurisdiction being challenged before a court?
 Any thoughts on how the laws and courts can better support arbitrators.
This will bring DAY 1 of the conference to a close. 
Friday 24 June 2016 will start with Panel 4 composed of arbitration practitioners sharing their 
experience on the role of judges in arbitration in Africa. The speakers are drawn from various regions 
of Africa for a comparative view of the attitude of judges on the continent.  Each speaker will examine 
whether the perception of poor arbitration related decisions from the courts in the continent is 
justified. Where there is evidence of such poor decision making, the speakers will make suggestions 
on possible solutions. Topics for discussion will include: what their experience has been in Africa; 
where the gaps are in arbitral practice in Africa; what suggestions they have for improving arbitration 
in Africa, including the view from young arbitration practitioners. The panellists are: Mrs Funke 
Adekoya, SAN (Nigeria); Mr Tunde Fagbohunlu, SAN (Nigeria); Ms Esine Okudzeto (Ghana); Mr Jimmy 
Muyanja (Uganda); Mr Ahmed Bannaga (Sudan); Mr Edward Luke, II (Botswana/Sierra Leone); and 
giving the view of young practitioners, Mr Isaiah Bozimo (Nigeria). This panel discussion will be chaired 
by Ms Lise Bosman of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. This panel will discuss the 
following issues which shall be followed by a question and answer session: 
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 Any positive experience of court assistance with arbitration: when an arbitration agreement
is challenged; assistance with appointing arbitrator; support during the arbitration and
enforcement or challenge of the award.
 Any negative experience of court intervention in arbitration?
 In your opinion, where are the gaps and any suggestions on how these can be fixed?
 Any suggestions on the causes of delay and how these can be fixed in arbitration-related
litigation in your jurisdiction?
 Any suggestions on how counsel can better support the judges in their task.
After lunch, Panel 5 composed of attorneys from various jurisdictions outside Africa will examine why 
foreign law firms prefer to adopt foreign seats or pursue enforcement of arbitral awards against an 
African party in a non-African jurisdiction. Speakers will also share their experience (if any) of sitting 
as arbitrators or appearing as counsel in arbitrations held in Africa. The panellists are: Mr Steven 
Finizio ( WilmerHale, London); Mr Roderick Cordara, QC (Essex Court Chambers, London); Mr Baiju 
Vasani (Jones Day, London); Mr Duncan Bagshaw (Stephenson Harwood, London); Mr Charles Nairac 
(White & Case, Paris); and Mr John Gaffney (Al Tamimi, UAE). This session will be chaired by Mr 
Ucheora Onwuamaegbu of Arent Fox LLP and formerly of ICSID, Washington DC. This panel will discuss 
the following issues which shall be followed by a question and answer session: 
 Any personal experience of African judiciaries: negative or positive.
 What is your perception of any particular African judiciary and why?
 Where from your experience are the gaps?
 Any suggestions on how in your opinion, these gaps can be fixed?
 What will make you advise your clients to choose an African seat?
 What will make you appoint African arbitrators with expertise?
Having listened to all of these presentations, judges from various African states will give their views 
on the issues that have been discussed over the two days in Panel 6. The speakers on this panel are 
chief justices of various countries of the continent. Each speaker will respond to the issues raised in 
the earlier sessions and discuss any solutions being put in place to help make their country (and the 
continent) more attractive to hosting arbitrations and contributing to the global arbitral jurisprudence. 
The panellists are: Chief Justice Mahmoud (Nigeria); Lady Justice Irene Chirwa Mambilima (Zambia); 
Judge Marcel Serekoisse-Samba (OHADA, CCJA); Prof Haider Ahmed Daffala (Sudan).This session will 
be chaired by Judge Edward Torgbor, former judge and currently active arbitrator.    
This will be followed by a closing dinner sponsored by ICAMA (Abuja) with after dinner speech given 
by Chief Bayo Ojo, SAN. 
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RAPPORTEURS’ REPORT 
Mr Prince Olokotor; Mr Ikpeme Ikebem and Dr Jean-Alain Penda 
Introduction      
The second SOAS Arbitration in Africa Conference was held at the Lagos Court of Arbitration, Lagos, 
Nigeria from 22nd to 24th June, 2016.  Present at the Opening Ceremony was the Chief Judge of 
Nigeria represented by Hon. Justice John Inyang Okoro, The Honorable Chief Judge of Zambia Hon. 
Justice Irene Chirwa Mambilima, The former Chief Judge of Lagos State Hon. Justice Ayotunde Philips 
among other dignitaries and participants from all over Africa, Europe, and USA. 
This conference started with an evening reception at the Hard Rock Café, a few feet away from the 
shores of the Lagos Lagoon with excellent cocktails and canapés on the evening of 22 June 2016. On 
the morning of 23 June, conference delegates registered and were each given a goodie bag containing 
the conference materials and promotional items from the sponsors of the conference. Ms Megha Joshi, 
the Executive Secretary of the Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA) welcomed delegates to the LCA 
premises for the second edition of the ‘SOAS Arbitration in Africa Conference Series’. She reminded 
all, especially those who attended the first conference last year in Addis Ababa at the African Union 
Commission, of her comments about the LCA. She noted that the LCA was very happy to host the 
second edition of the conference in their permanent headquarters building located at the Okunde 
Bluewaters Scheme Peninsular (which is planned to be surrounded with resort, shopping malls and 
recreational facilities). She noted that the LCA now has a team of talented staff and over 450 members 
with interest in ADR. She stated that LCA partnership with international organisations, collaboration 
and support from funding partners has played a major role in their achievements; she enjoined all to 
enjoy their stay while they share, learn and engage with each other during the dialogues and 
deliberations. 
Dr. Emilia Onyema of SOAS briefly told the audience about the on-going SOAS arbitration in Africa 
research project. The four year project which commenced last year with a conference at Addis Ababa 
will in 2017 be hosted by the Cairo Regional Centre for Arbitration and finally in 2018 by Kigali 
International Arbitration Centre. Hon. Justice Edward Torgbor then delivered his keynote address on 
‘Judges and the Effectiveness of Arbitration/ADR in Africa’. 
The conference was generally structured into 6 panels over two days with 3 panels on each day.  
Panel 1 
The first panel focused on ‘Report from Arbitration institutions and actions from Addis conference.’ 
This panel was chaired by Ms Xander Meise and the speakers were Ms Megha Joshi of the Lagos Court 
of Arbitration Lagos, Mr Kizito Beyuo of the Ghana Arbitration Centre, Ms Ndanga Kamau of LCIA-
MIAC Mauritius, Dr Fidele Masengo of Kigali IAC, Rwanda and Mr Jimmy Kodo of CCJA, OHADA. Ms 
Meise gave a brief recap of what happened at the Addis conference and raised some questions for 
discussion by the panel on their learning from the Addis conference; provision of information on their 
activities; and their challenges. From the responses, the institutions were engaging in many 
collaborations with arbitration organisations and institutions within and outside Africa. However most 
of them still have various difficulties with publishing data on their activities. Various suggestions were 
made by the delegates including use of law students as interns to collate and process their data for 
publication, and encouraging the centres to publish arbitration related judgments from their 
jurisdictions and the list of the arbitrators that operate under their rules. There is a clear need for 
greater transparency of the activities of the centres. 
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Panel 2 
The second panel examined ‘The Role of Courts and Judges in Arbitration.’ It was chaired by Justice 
Ayotunde Phillips (Rtd.) with Dr Emillia Onyema, Dr Hakeem Seriki, Ms Leyou Tameru and Ms Rukia 
Baruti as panellists. 
The various discussions by the speakers focused on the question of how courts and judges can support 
arbitration in Africa. The Chair remarked that arbitration as one aspect of justice dispensation and 
requires judicial support not only for the appointment of arbitrators, as the case may be, but right 
through to enforcement of the arbitral award. Several dimensions of the collaborative support were 
assessed and elaborated on by the speakers. First, the symbiotic nature of the relationship between 
arbitrators and judges were examined. Second, ways of the judicial support during arbitration 
reference suggested. Third, it was considered that training African lawyers and judges on arbitration 
practice is one way by which these practitioners and the judiciary can be equipped to adopt a 
supportive approach rather than an interventionist attitude towards arbitration. Lastly, publication of 
arbitration related judgements from African judiciaries was also suggested as a means of measuring 
whether or not African courts give the desired support needed for arbitration to thrive in Africa.  
Dr Onyema in her paper examined the reciprocity of services that judges and arbitrators render to 
disputing parties. She assessed the many fronts by which judges get involved in arbitration and 
questioned their role in the reference. In highlighting the functions of courts in arbitration, Dr Onyema 
posed the questions: when should courts get involved in arbitration and, what is the purpose of 
arbitration? Her paper also evaluated the common nature of the relationship between judges and 
arbitrators. On the question of when courts may, if at all, get involved, she identified three fronts 
namely: before the constitution of the arbitral panel, after the constitution of the arbitral and, after 
the close of the arbitration reference. With respect to ‘before the constitution of the arbitrator(s)’, 
she submitted that courts may get involved on issues related, but not restricted, to the appointment 
of the arbitrator, or extension of time to take certain steps, or preservation of the subject matter of 
the arbitration. On the involvement of courts ‘after the constitution of the arbitral panel, Dr Onyema 
asserted that the role of courts should be limited. However, if courts must get involved, it must be to 
support the arbitration and not to interpose. Regarding ‘after the close of arbitration’, she noted that 
courts involvement must be to give effect to the arbitral awards, save on restricted grounds. With 
respect to the symbiotic character of the relationship between judges and arbitrators, Dr Onyema 
posited that judges and arbitrators are not in competition. Rather, judges and arbitrators render the 
same services to disputing parties in different fora. 
Ms Rukia Baruti examined, “The training and recognition of African lawyers: AILA project.” Ms Baruti’s 
presentation focused on the work of the Africa International Legal Awareness (AILA), a not-for-profit 
organisation based in the UK. AILA is authorised by the Solicitors Regulation Authority of England and 
Wales as an external Continuing Professional Development provider. In her presentation, Ms Baruti 
asserted that Africa has the required international arbitration expertise and arbitration institutions to 
settle her investment and commercial disputes. However, these expertise and institutions are not 
utilised as much as they should because of the perception that some African courts are anti-arbitration. 
This raises the need to train African lawyers and arbitrators who may want to be internationally 
recognised as arbitrators, and to change the negative perceptions about African courts. To this end, 
AILA organises and runs trainings, workshops, seminars and other exchanges of knowledge for African 
legal and arbitration practitioners. She noted that AILA also aims to encourage the recognition of 
African lawyers, arbitrators and mediators by providing them with a platform to promote their legal 
expertise via the AILA online directory and use of blogs.  
Dr Hakeem Seriki spoke on “Judicial support during the arbitration reference.” Dr Seriki’s paper 
discussed courts’ ability to support and improve arbitration reference by upholding parties’ arbitration 
agreement. He argued that injunctive relief is one of the vehicle through which this judicial support 
during the arbitration reference can be achieved. For example, if a party to the arbitration agreement 
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decides not to honour the agreement but instead goes to court to commence legal proceedings. What 
can the court do? The court can support the arbitration in this instance by restraining the party in 
breach and at the time compel the party to submit to arbitration. This way, Dr Seriki submitted that 
the court is not interposing but rendering a supportive service to the course of the arbitration 
reference. Dr. Seriki also stated that another way courts can use injunctions to support arbitration is 
by granting the medieval injunction or freezing order. This can happen where an arbitral tribunal has 
not been constituted and one of the parties to the arbitration agreement decides to destroy or remove 
the subject matter of the arbitration or its assets from the seat of arbitration.  
Ms Leyou Tameru discussed the “Publication of arbitration related judgements from Africa: I-Arb 
judgement gathering project.” Ms Tameru’s presentation focused on her I-Arb project of creating 
online visibility of arbitration related judgements connected to Africa for the utilisation of lawyers, 
arbitrators and judges who are interested in using African arbitration institutions and expertise. Ms 
Tameru contended that Africa has the institutions, expertise and laws that support and promote 
international arbitration. For instance, 35 out of the 55 African countries are Contracting-States of the 
New York Convention of 1958. Ms Tameru also discussed some awards from investment arbitration 
to support her argument that African practitioners must engage with the international arbitration 
process. In conclusion, Ms Tameru noted that I-Arb Africa’s aim is to make Africa an active participant 
as much as it is a consumer of international arbitration. This can be achieved by African arbitrators 
and institutions making themselves visible by advertising and publishing the works that they do. 
Panel 3 
The third panel considered ‘The views from domestic arbitrators.’ Prof Paul Idornigie, SAN chaired the 
panel discussion with Mr Babajide Ogundipe, Dr Jean Alain Penda, Dr Tunde Ogowewo and Prof 
Andrew Chukwumerie, SAN as panellists. 
Prof Idornigie in his preliminary comments noted the boundary between national courts and the 
arbitration process. He highlighted the issue of Nigerian courts’ intervention in the arbitral process 
vis-à-vis Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Comparatively, he said that in England, the Arbitration 
Act 1996 on the issue used ‘should’ instead of Article 5 ‘shall’ and that the English courts are known 
for their pro-arbitration stance. However, the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988 (ACA) like 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the issue, used the word, ‘shall’.  
Prof Chukwumerie focused his comments on the correctness or otherwise of the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal case of SPDC v Crestar. The case concerned the question whether, in Nigeria, the Courts have 
jurisdiction to make Orders of injunction to restrain a party from taking further steps in respect of an 
international arbitration seated outside Nigeria. The Court of Appeal after considering the provision 
of Section 34 of the ACA granted the injunction sought by Crestar. Prof Chukwumerie agreed with the 
court’s position and emphasised that Section 34 of the ACA only relates to domestic arbitration and 
not arbitration seated outside Nigeria. 
Dr Ogowewo discussed the constitutionality or otherwise of parties’ agreement to settle their dispute 
by arbitration. He discussed the issue from the backdrop of Sections 6 and 36 of the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution (as amended). Dr Ogowewo cited Nigerian Supreme Court case of Agu v Ikwibe where 
the court held that customary arbitration is recognised under Nigerian law. He also cited the Supreme 
Court case of Araromi v Eleamor where the court held that the Section 36 right of the 1999 
Constitution (as amended) is waivable by parties’ agreement. In conclusion, Dr Ogowewo stated that 
arbitration is not affected by the said sections of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). In effect, 
arbitration in Nigeria is constitutional. 
Dr Penda focused his comments on the role of courts/judges in arbitration in Cameroon. He stated 
that Cameroon is friendly to arbitration because of its laws. At the national level, arbitration is 
governed by the Uniform Act on Arbitration. At regional level, arbitration is regulated by OHADA. 
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However, Dr Penda stated that one of the challenges that users of arbitration face in Cameroon is the 
lack of training of the judges and arbitrators especially, those of the English speaking parts of 
Cameroon.  
Mr Ogundipe spoke about the need for the law of obligation to be clearer and for the courts to make 
clear exposition of substantive laws. This is because arbitrators, by the nature of their tasks, tap into 
such expositions to arrive at a decision. He also stated that the trend of case law reporting has to 
change from just reporting decisions on procedural issues to reporting decisions on substantive issues. 
This way, the common law will be developed to support arbitration and attract international 
arbitration users.  
The last day of the conference 
Panel 4 
The fourth panel focused on ‘Foreign practitioners’ experience of the attitude of African judges 
towards arbitration.’ It was chaired by Mr Ucheora Onwuamaegbu with Mr Steven Finizio, Mr Baiju 
Vasani, Mr Charles Nairac, Mr Roderick Cordara, Mr Duncan Bagshaw and Mr John Gaffney as 
panellists. 
The panellists included six experienced foreign practitioners from various jurisdictions outside Africa. 
They shared their experiences as to why their firms prefer choosing foreign seats in arbitration 
proceedings involving an African party or appoint a non-African arbitrator in disputes held in Africa. 
Duncan Bagshaw described the Mauritius arbitration centre as an example for other arbitration 
centres in Africa to emulate. Mauritius has designated particular courts, selected judges in both the 
lower courts and the Supreme Court to deal with arbitration matters. This approach has made 
Mauritius a preferred seat of arbitration and an image of an arbitration friendly destination. The other 
panellists agreed with this view and recognized that each jurisdiction has its weaknesses and strengths. 
Hence, as regard to other African jurisdiction, the tendency is that the qualities of judges are never 
the issue, but the case procedures are less predictable due to several adjournments and lack of respect 
for procedural rules. However, Baiju Vasani noted that judges should bear in mind that in making their 
decisions, the legal community in the world will read them. 
On the appointment of African arbitrators, the panellists suggested that practitioners should ensure 
visibility of their activities, profile and marketing themselves through networking events, contribution 
with a scholarly article in arbitration journals. During the interaction session with the audience, the 
members of the panel were asked to pledge to at least consider appointing African arbitrators and a 
seat of arbitration in Africa, whenever the dispute is connected to Africa. 
The fifth panel considered ‘Practitioners experience on the role of judges in arbitration in Africa.’ The 
panel gathered arbitrators from various regions of Africa to share their experience with a comparative 
attitude of judges toward arbitration on the continent. This was based on a thorough analysis of 
arbitration-related decisions. Ms Lise Bosman of the PCA chaired the discussions with Mr Ahmed 
Bannaga, Mr Luke Fashole II, Ms Esine Okudzeto, Mr Jimmy Muyanja, Mrs Funke adekoya, Mr Tunde 
Fagbohunlu, and Mr Isaiah Bozimo. 
The first three speakers discussed the position in Nigeria. Mr Bozimo identified two areas as 
problematic:  First, the increasing court intervention in arbitration disputes and, second that the 
Nigerian arbitration system. He noted that arbitration-related decisions by Nigerian judges were made 
without consideration that they will be read outside of Nigeria. Mr Bozimo reviewed several recent 
decisions on arbitration by the Nigerian courts to support his assertion that there were ‘good, bad and 
ugly’ decisions from the Nigerian courts. 
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Mr Tunde Fagbohunlu, SAN and Mrs Funke Adekoya, SAN respectively addressed some challenges of 
judges in Nigeria when dealing with arbitration cases. They identified the absence of training for 
judges in Nigeria as a factor in the misinterpretation and misapplication of arbitration rules and 
procedures.  
Esine Okudzeto discussed the Ghana experience and praised the Ghanaian judges and the courts for 
their expeditious approach to encouraging counsel in the course of arbitration proceedings to attempt 
to resolve all matters within the arbitration proceedings barring constitutional issues or public policy 
issues. Although it is widely held among practitioners in Ghana that the judges are arbitration friendly, 
thus a sitting judge will not be quick to intervene in arbitral proceedings. Though the judges are 
reserved in intervening in arbitration proceedings, it has not stopped lawyers in Ghana from seeking 
the intervention of the courts.  To deter lawyers from filing frivolous applications, Ms Okudzeto 
proposed that a sanction be imposed on lawyers that file applications that are determined as frivolous 
suit.  She also recommended an increased use of practice directions, training for judges and lawyers, 
publication and easy access to previous decisions. 
Jimmy Muyanja presented a thriving arbitration practice in Uganda.  He attributed this to the 
separation of arbitral proceedings from the courts.  Further, he explained that the Uganda Arbitration 
Centre enjoys autonomy from the courts. Thus, all matters must first be attempted to be resolved in 
the course of arbitration proceedings. Where such issues are not successfully resolved they are raised 
before the director of the arbitration centre who also acts as a “chief justice" in all arbitration related 
matters. It is only through the directives of the director of the arbitration centre that counsel can seek 
a court intervention on an issue from an ongoing arbitration. 
In the case of Botswana, Edward Luke II reported that based on the decisions that have come out of 
the various levels of courts in Botswana, it could be agreed that Botswana is an arbitration-friendly 
jurisdiction. 
As for Sudan, Ahmed Bannaga presented an up-to-date development of arbitration in the country.  He 
noted that Sudan passed into law her Arbitration Act 2016 on June 22, 2016, the day the conference 
was launched. He noted that the arbitration legislation and its interpretation as well as its application 
is often interfered with by the executive am of government.  
The last panel focused on the ‘Response from judges on how they can better support arbitration/ADR’ 
in Africa. The panel was chaired by Judge Edward Torgbor. The panel was made up of Justice Irene 
Mambilima, Justice John Okoro (representative of the Chief Justice of Nigeria), Judge Candide-Johnson 
(representative of the Chief Judge of Lagos State), Justice Roli Harriman, and Justice Goodluck. 
Justice Mambilima of Zambia admonished all the judges and attorneys present to understand and see 
the courts and arbitration as a complementary system. She made it clear that the nature of 
commercial activities is such that delays and inconsistencies cannot support it.  She also conceded 
that there is room for an expeditious training of judges and lawyers to ensure the quality of judges 
and their support on arbitration matters. Under her jurisdiction, she acknowledges the fact that 
arbitration is gradually gaining roots in Zambia with the backing of a legal framework. The remaining 
Justices agreed with the Honourable Chief Justice of Zambia, in particular on the point of expeditious 
training for both judges and lawyers.  The justices decried the practice of lawyers running to the courts 
for intervention while arbitral proceedings are pending. 
The day ended with a closing dinner hosted by ICAMA, Abuja with after dinner speech by Chief Bayo
Ojo, SAN. SOAS University of London had given various sculptures and Nigerian arts to various 
sponsors and partners of the conference and all the judges who attended the conference. 
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SOAS-LCA Conference, Lagos 
Welcome Address by Ms Megha Joshi of LCA 
My lords and distinguished and honoured guests, I am very excited to welcome you all to the second 
edition of the “Africa Arbitration Conference Series”, here in Lagos, especially after meeting so many 
of you last year in Addis Ababa at the African Union, and telling you all about the Lagos Court of 
Arbitration and our magnificent International Centre for Arbitration & ADR –now you are able to 
experience it! 
To develop an international standard, institutionalised ADR service centre is a very long term project 
and investment.  We are extremely fortunate to be a product of the vision and foresight of Lagos State 
Government for conceptualising and delivering ‘a total arbitration solution’, with this centre and all of 
its facilities to safeguard the long term viability and independence of the project, and support Lagos 
as a seat for arbitration.  The LCA was born out of the Lagos State Arbitration Law and the Lagos Court 
of Arbitration Law, both enacted in 2009, as reforms to support the proliferation of arbitration and 
ADR in order to enhance Lagos’ attractiveness and viability for foreign direct investment, and assist 
with decongesting the commercial courts with cases that could be resolved with an alternative process. 
From our location, as you can see, the centre is the first development on the Okunde Bluewater 
Scheme Peninsular which was earmarked as a tourism and commercial zone, so over the next couple 
of years the current surrounding environment will be replaced with resorts, shopping malls and 
recreational facilities.  I think one of the most satisfying aspects of developmental work, is not only 
participating in the process, but also watching transformation as it occurs.   
The LCA has come such a long way since I joined the organisation in November 2012 when there were 
only two members of staff.  Now we have a team of 7 very talented people, 450+ members with a 
bona fide interest in ADR.  We have a long list of partnerships with established international 
organisations such as the School for Oriental & Asian Studies (also known as SOAS); the International 
Law Association, International Council for Commercial Arbitration, the Law Society of England & Wales; 
as well as with peer ADR organisations such as JAMS International that recognise the importance of 
the establishment of the LCA and actively support our mission.  Later this year the LCA will deliver a 
knowledge workshop in collaboration with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), and 
we are planning a conference with UNCITRAL next year.  I am also pleased to announce that the first 
arbitration cases were filed earlier this month. 
The growth of the LCA has been strategic and in recognition of the fact that as an institution, the LCA 
has had to take the lead in creating awareness about the demand for arbitration and alternative 
dispute resolution services, and take ownership of driving the ADR dialogue in Nigeria. 
In March earlier this year, in collaboration with the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, the LCA lead 
the arbitration and ADR sessions at the National Assembly policy reform dialogues framed around 
improving Nigeria’s ranking in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business report that the legislative arm 
of government is addressing head on.   
We recognise that dialogues and discussions are very important outreach activities to increase the 
knowledge and merits of ADR in the vast domestic private sector in Nigeria.  Thus with the support of 
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our funding partners, the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF), we have been able to start a 
schedule of monthly programmes that includes an ADR Speaker Series and Industry Roundtable 
focuses - for example within the Nollywood and the entertainment sector, and will also feature 
tourism and hospitality, and the online/digital space. 
The assistance of the ICF has been integral part of the LCA’s story and growth.  With their support, the 
LCA has grown its staff strength, and we are in the process of creating an intellectually curated 
resource and library centre.  The ICF has also sponsored all of the LCA’s ADR knowledge and awareness 
workshops for the judiciary, and I will further elaborate on all of these engagements in the first panel 
discussion with the other institutional ADR service providers.   
The LCA has endeavoured to tackle the issue of training and skills head on, and has set up the LCA 
Executive ADR School to bridge the gap between theory and practical experiences for budding 
practitioners that was launched earlier this month, and features a series of prominent specialists in 
international arbitration every month.  The quality of the registered candidates is testimony to the 
type of courses that are in demand, and that the LCA has been able to deliver. 
Within the Secretariat, we are focusing on developing policies to govern efficiency and global 
standards of best practice in our conduct of arbitration proceedings and to deter malpractices – watch 
this space for “The Lagos Memorandum for Guidelines for Effective Arbitration”.  Our staff receives 
on-going training and support for case management from JAMS International and through our 
partners at the International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP). 
We have revved up the activities to promote our panel of experienced arbitrators, and the list of 
registered neutrals is now published on the LCA website.  This list is live and routinely refreshed with 
up to date information, after all our experts are our greatest people and assets. 
In terms of transparency; annually the LCA holds an AGM for our members and produces a report 
featuring our activities and financials.  It is a forum for our members, and I urge you to join the LCA 
and register as members to support our mission and work; it is after all an institution that was created 
by the users of ADR for the users of ADR.  Your participation and involvement to promulgate the 
positive benefits of ADR to resolve disputes quietly, quickly and cost effectively to ease doing business 
and decongest the courts is vital for our long term success.  More information about how to join as a 
member is readily available; I urge you to register now while the fees are still N15,000 per year as they 
will surely increase as our activities become more widespread. 
One of the first projects I had to coordinate was the production of the LCA’s Dispute Resolution Journal 
which is a platform for LCA members to publish their work so long as the articles are well structured 
and researched.  To ensure the standards are maintained, the submissions are reviewed by an 
independent peer review committee.  So very early on in my LCA career the LCA Board provided me 
with two recommendations to participate on the peer review committee; Dr Emilia Onyema and 
Professor Honourable Justice Edward Torgbor.  I have to say they that both Dr Onyema and Justice 
Torgbor, are two of the most committed, hardworking and professional individuals I have had the 
privilege to work with.  Although they give me the tricky task of relaying their (sometimes severe) 
feedback to the writers, their standards are gold ensuring our publication will be a widely respected 
and regarded reference point for arbitration in Nigeria and Africa.  I would like to take this opportunity 
to recognise and acknowledge their active support and contribution to the mission of the LCA on a pro 
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bono basis, in addition to their work to promote African arbitrators and arbitration.  After working 
together for so long, it is particularly gratifying that the 2nd conference in the Arbitration in Africa 
Series is hosted by the LCA here in our permanent headquarters.  
I hope that you will enjoy our centre and learning more about the work of the Lagos Court of 
Arbitration, and your facilities here at the International Centre for Arbitration & ADR.   
The goal of this conference is to share, learn and engage; I hope that you will enjoy all of the dialogues 
and deliberations, and widen your networks in the field and in Africa.  
For those of you that have come to Lagos for the first time, I hope that you will fall in love with Africa’s 
Big Apple (just like I did 8 years ago), and proudly spread the joy of your new knowledge and 
experiences far and beyond when you return to your home countries.  
On behalf of everyone at the Lagos Court of Arbitration, I welcome you to Lagos and the conference – 
please enjoy!!!  
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COURTS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 
Keynote Address 
By 
Hon. Justice Edward Torgbor29   
“We know all men are not created equal in the sense some people 
would have us believe – some people are smarter than others, some 
people have more opportunity because they’ve been born with it, 
some men make more money than others, some ladies make better 
cakes than others – some people are born gifted beyond the normal 
scope of most men….. 
The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is in a court-
room, be he any colour of the rainbow…..”30 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the role of courts and judges in arbitration.  It looks at the legal and systemic 
capacities, functions and constraints of courts and arbitral tribunals, leading to consideration of the 
symbiotic relationship between the judicial and arbitral legal systems, in meeting user expectations. 
The discourse is in the context of the Arbitration in Africa Conference Series for the transformation of 
arbitration in Africa.31  
Courts and Judges 
Users of courts need no introduction to courts or judges.32  Judges preside over courts and their 
connection arises from the judge being a government or state appointed official who tries and decides 
disputed issues in court.  Therefore “judge” interchanges with “court” in common speech.  The State 
Court is also commonly known as “a Court of Law” and a “Court of Justice”. 33   Because of the 
hierarchical order of courts and the fact that in some judicial systems a court may be presided over by 
a Justice of the Peace (JP), a Magistrate or a Judge it is appropriate to clarify “the court” or “competent 
court” designated by arbitration law with defined powers of intervention in arbitration matters.  
29 LLD, Former Judge and Chartered Arbitrator; LCIA Vice President, African Users’ Council.  This keynote 
lecture was delivered at a Lagos Arbitration Conference (22nd – 24th June 2016) on the broad theme of 
“Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in Arbitration in Africa”. 
30 Harper Lee: To Kill A Mocking Bird, Arrow Books 2006.  Editions: 1960, 1989, 1997, Arrow Books 2006. 
31 This is the second in a series of four projected conferences focusing on the role of four major arbitration 
stakeholders in Africa, being arbitration institutions, courts and judges, states, and arbitration practitioners. 
The first conference on arbitration institutions was convened by Dr. Emilia Onyema of SOAS University of 
London and Hon. Justice Edward Torgbor in Addis Ababa on 23rd July 2015. 
32 “A Court is a place where justice is judicially ministered” Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and 
Phrases Vol. 1.  “Parliament is a Court.  Its duties as a whole are deliberative and legislative: the duties of a 
part of it only are judicial.  It is nevertheless a Court.  There are many other Courts which, though not courts 
of justice, are nevertheless Courts according to law.  There are tribunals with many of the trappings of a 
Court which nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power”, Words and 
Phrases Judicially Defined Vol. 1. 
33 The London “Court” of International Arbitration (LCIA) and ICC International “Court” of Arbitration are 
therefore not State Courts in that sense of the term. 
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Designations of the arbitration court are in various instances territorial, country-specific or 
adaptations of the UNCITRAL Model Law version of court. 
In Kenya and Uganda the court designated for arbitration under their national arbitration statutes is 
the national or state High Court.34  Two observations: It is noteworthy that a court to be known as the 
“Arbitral Court” was established by a Kenyan statute35 for proceedings in international commercial 
arbitration conducted under the auspices of the statute and the Nairobi Regional Centre.  The other 
significant observation is that the wider definition of “court” in the Ugandan Evidence Act36 which 
includes all judges, magistrates, jurors, assessors and all persons legally authorised to take evidence, 
excludes arbitrators and proceedings before an arbitrator, from its purview.37   
Egyptian arbitration law38 describes the “court” simply as belonging to the judicial system of the 
state.39  The Law assigns the jurisdictional competence to review arbitral matters to the court of 
original jurisdiction over the dispute; but competence with regard to international commercial 
arbitration conducted in Egypt or abroad, lies with the Cairo Court of Appeal unless the parties agree 
on another appellate court in Egypt. 40   The Law thereby recognises and distinguishes between 
arbitration matters that may be reviewed by a court of originating jurisdiction and international 
commercial arbitration matters reviewable only by appellate courts. 
Examples of territorial or country-specific definitions of an arbitration court are provided by the 
arbitration statutes of South Africa, England and Nigeria.  Under the South African Act “court” is any 
court of a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa.41  In England the court in 
the Arbitration Act 1996 is the High Court or a county court.42 
The arbitration court in the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) Cap 19 is plainly territorial 
being the High Court of a State, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or the Federal 
High Court 43 each one of which is a competent court for purposes of the ACA; and a judge, in that 
context, is a judge of any of the three territorial High Courts.44  While in Nigeria we may also mention 
the Lagos State Arbitration Law45 in which “court” and “judge” respectively mean the Lagos State High 
Court and a judge of that court.   
34 This is apparent, for example, in sections 7(1), 12(5) and 14(3) of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 
as revised in 2010; and section 2(f) of the Ugandan Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2000. 
35 The Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration Act, Act No. 26 of 2013, section 21.  The Act 
commencing 25th January 2013 provides for international commercial arbitration, the Arbitral Court 
and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  Consequently when the Centre is up and running 
arbitral parties in international commercial proceedings will have an option to proceed under this Act 
instead of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995.   
36 Chapter 6, section 2(1). 
37 Chapter 6, section 1. 
38 Egyptian Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, No. 27/1994 published in the Official 
Gazette No. 16 (bis) on 21st April 1994. 
39 Article 4(2). 
40 Article 9. 
41 Arbitration Act 42, 1965, section 1.  This Act repealed provincial legislation on arbitration but did not 
repeal the common law (see Law of South Africa Vol 1 para 543 and 544).  Therefore a submission to 
arbitration that may be invalid (for example for not being in writing) under the Act may nevertheless be 
valid and enforceable under the common law (ibid para 544). 
42 Section 105. 
43 Section 57(1) ACA (also referenced as ACA Cap A18 of 2004 of the Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria – Cap A18 LFN 2004 for short). 
44 ibid. 
45 Section 63.  The Law came into force on 18th May 2009, (section 64). 
SOAS/LCA Arbitration Conference, 2016 Page 58 
The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act replicates the UNCITRAL Model Law definition of court as “a body or 
organ of the judicial system of a State”.46  The Model Law prescribes various functions for that court 
because of which Article 6 allows the state legislature that enacts that Law to designate the state court 
or authority that is to perform those functions.     
The Functions of Tribunal and Court: The Doctrinal Underpinnings 
The functions and capacities of arbitral tribunals and courts in arbitration are primarily determined by 
the arbitration agreement and the governing arbitration law.  The function of the arbitral tribunal is 
to decide disputed issues for the parties before the tribunal.  The judge decides disputed issues in 
court.  But the scope of arbitrability, in the sense of what an arbitrator can or cannot arbitrate, is often 
tested not only by the arbitration agreement and arbitration law but also by other laws and 
considerations of public interest in the subject matter of the dispute.  Conceptually therefore the 
functions, capacities and constraints on the arbitral tribunal and court can be viewed in the context 
and doctrines of (a) arbitrability,47 (b) legality48 and enforceability of the parties’ contract and, when 
pertinent, (c) considerations of public policy.49  Therefore the absence of, or inadequate, provisions 
on arbitrability in the arbitration agreement or the law is in effect a constraint and an invitation for an 
arbitral or judicial interpretation of the parties’ contract to determine whether a disputed issue is 
arbitrable.  In the current state of arbitration law and practice the arbitral tribunal, domestic or 
international can, but does not, have the final say on the scope of application and interpretation of 
any of these doctrinal concepts, a function often left to the courts and an imperfect point of reference 
in the relationship between tribunal and court.  That is not all. 
Public policy, by which disputed issues of arbitrability and legality are tested is a troublesome subject 
for tribunal and court for the lack of a uniform or universally accepted definition.  The importance of 
the concept of public policy and interest is such that even the Model Law that otherwise delimits court 
intervention in arbitration matters, cedes the ultimate decision on a disputed issue of arbitrability50 
or public policy51 to the national court.52 
46 The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act 1996, Article 2(c) and UNCITRAL Model Law Article 2(c).   
47 Arbitrability involving a determination of whether or not an alleged dispute can be submitted to 
arbitration is not uniformly defined by national laws.  In some jurisdictions issues involving insolvency, 
real and intellectual property registration, family law, criminal law, succession and rights in rem are 
not arbitrable and a national court can refuse recognition and enforcement of an award, domestic or 
international, tainted by an illegality such as tax evasion and importation or exportation of goods 
fraudulently obtained.  The New York Convention forbids the recognition and enforcement of an 
award in a dispute not arbitrable by state law; Article V(2)(a). 
48 ibid: an illegal contract that is unenforceable under national law cannot produce a valid and 
enforceable award on the fundamental precept that an illegality cannot found a legal outcome.  
49 Respect for principles of national sovereignty and considerations of rectitude in moral, economic 
and social practices and the requirement of fairness in international relations have generated judicial 
pronouncements that frown upon conduct that is injurious to the public interest.  It has been 
suggested that international public policy should be invoked only in flagrant, effective and concrete 
violations: Francisco Blevi: “The Role of Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration”, 
Arbitration Vol 82 No. 1 February 2016 p. 6.  Blevi discusses the distinction between substantive and 
procedural public policy, ibid pp 6 – 8.  See also Patrick Devlin: The Enforcement of Morals, OUP, 
1968; Simon Blackburn: In Defence of Moral Philosophy “Just as we need clean air, we need a clean 
moral climate”.  Some look to Plato and Aristotle, Hume or Kant or garner empirical results from 
questionnaires on what is moral.   
50 Model Law Art. 34(2)(b)(ii).  
51 Model Law Art. 34(2)(b)(ii). (Setting aside an award) and Art. 36(1)(b) (grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of awards). 
52 Model Law Art. 5. 
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National statutory definitions53 that merely describe an arbitration agreement as an agreement to 
submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or may arise between parties are 
indefinite for not specifying arbitrable disputes.  Therefore where the governing national law is silent54 
or adds nothing to this statutory description the way is wide open for the court to decide whether an 
alleged dispute is within the remit of this indefinite provision.  On the other hand, disputing parties 
and their legal advisers are afforded some guidance on arbitrability where the law sketches out 
matters that are or are not arbitrable.  The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act does this by specifying disputes 
that may be arbitrated.55 
The conclusion is that the doctrinal and contractual principles and requirements of validity and legality 
that underpin an enforceable arbitration agreement correlate with the principles of validity and 
legality that ensure an enforceable arbitral award.  The recommendation is that arbitration’s promises 
of speed, least expense and finality, should support the expansion, by legislation, of the arbitrator’s 
mandate to take charge of the arbitration from beginning to end, enabling the competent arbitral 
tribunal to have first opportunity to determine all disputed issues before it without the often 
misguided and misused threat of court intervention hanging over it during the arbitral proceedings. 
This will have the desirable and salutary effect of discouraging and preventing resort to court as a 
tactical ploy for delaying the arbitration. 
Model Law Constraints on Tribunal and Court 
The limited court intervention in arbitration matters imposed by Model Law Article 5 has been noted.  
That Law makes no attempt to set out all court functions in its provisions.56  The specific functions in 
Article 6 are limited to the appointment of arbitrators (Art 11), deciding challenges (Art 13), 
terminating the arbitral mandate (Art 14), ruling on jurisdiction (Art 16) and deciding applications for 
setting aside an award (Art 34).  Because the Model Law prescribes other functions to all courts of an 
enacting State it needs mention that the Article 6 functions are to be performed in international 
commercial arbitration where the place of arbitration is in the enacting State, with no appeal from the 
decisions of the court or competent authority. 
It is noticeable that (a) in all these specific provisions involving court intervention the opportunity to 
make a decision or choice is first given to the arbitral tribunal or parties, who may resort to the court, 
where party disagreement persists or the arbitral tribunal fails or is unable to perform a specified 
function, within a prescribed time57 and (b) in all such cases, with no appeal from the competent 
court.58 
Restrictions in the other functions assigned by the Model Law to the court are evident in the provisions 
of articles 8 (power of court to refer parties to arbitration in arbitration matters); article 9 (power to 
grant interim measures of protection at party request, noting however that the arbitral tribunal may 
53 Examples: S. 3(1) Kenyan Arbitration Act; section 2(c) Ugandan ACA.  Likewise section 3(1) of the 
Lagos State Arbitration Law that merely allows disputing parties to enter into an arbitration agreement 
to define their legal relationship to determine issues. 
54 Such as the Nigerian ACA. 
55 Section 4(1); Section 4(2) exempts from arbitration an agreement that is contrary to public policy or 
a matter specifically exempted by any law, criminal cases, matrimonial causes, matters affecting 
minors or persons under legal disability, and consumer contracts. 
56 UNCITRAL bears no blame for this.  The difficulties UNCITRAL encountered in attempting to 
formulate standards for universal acceptance are described in the legislative history of its Model Law. 
57 Model Law article 11(3) (a) and (b). 
58 Model Law articles 11(5); 13(3); 14(1); 16(3). 
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also grant interim orders of protection it considers necessary at party request); article 27 (court 
assistance in taking evidence at the request of tribunal or party with tribunal’s approval); article 35 
(recognition and enforcement of the award) and article 36 (grounds for refusing recognition or 
enforcement). 
It is evident also, from the constraints on the arbitral and judicial powers, that party autonomy is 
paramount and decisive in almost all the stated instances on what tribunal or court can do in 
arbitration matters.  Consequently neither tribunal nor court may do as it pleases in arbitration 
disputes.  Nevertheless, and undesirably, attempts by party legal representatives to circumvent these 
restrictions by strategic interruptions, procedural and jurisdictional challenges, still persist in 
arbitration practice in Africa.59 
Appeals 
In domestic arbitrations some national arbitration statutes specify the High Court as the competent 
court to perform those functions prescribed by the national statute.60  So, for example, in the Kenyan 
Arbitration Act, as noted, it is the High Court of Kenya that is mandated by the Act to perform those 
functions prescribed by the statute to assist the implementation and enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement with limited recourse to the Court of Appeal in domestic arbitrations in prescribed 
circumstances.61 In effect therefore these appeal provisions in a national statute may override the 
limitations prescribed in international arbitration by a Model Law-based arbitration statute. 62   In 
addition, in questions of law arising from domestic arbitration, the Kenyan Arbitration Act63 allows 
appeals from decisions of the High Court to the Court of Appeal by party agreement or with leave of 
the Appeal Court.64   
The question whether or not national appellate courts exercise “extra-legal jurisdiction” in arbitration 
matters provoked contrasting views from two Nigerian legal scholars.  One contention is that sections 
34 and 57 of the Nigerian ACA,65 based on Model Law Articles 5 and 6, limit litigation in arbitration 
matters to only first instance courts.  This contention therefore opposes “the current free appeals that 
disregard the law, promote delays, frustrate the policy of finality and speedy settlement and affect 
the choice of Nigerian Law in arbitration agreements”.66 
The rejoinder is that judicial powers are vested by the Nigerian Constitution in the established courts 
with jurisdiction in both state and federal High Courts (as first instance courts) and the appellate 
system in Nigeria.  Therefore both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from the first instance courts in arbitration matters in Nigeria, which jurisdiction is not extra-
legal.67 
59 See Sadrudin Kurji & Another v Shalimar Ltd & 2 Others (2008) eKLR.pdf.  The court noted with 
reference to the section 10 limitation of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 (equivalent to Model Law Art. 
5) that the Court cannot stand aside and helplessly watch even where serious breaches such as non-
observance of cardinal rules of natural justice persist; but would intervene only in “exceptional cases
where it must interfere to correct an injustice”.
60 As noted above from the relevant provisions of the Nigerian, Ugandan and the English Arbitration
Statutes.
61 Section 39, Arbitration Act 1995 as amended by Act No. 11 of 2009.
62 Sadrudin v Shalimar (supra); Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v Cresta
Integrated Natural Resources Ltd, CA/L/331M/2015.
63 Section 39(3).
64 Section 39(3) (a) and (b).
65 Referenced as Cap A18 LFN 2004.
66 Per Ola O. Olatawura; “Nigeria’s Appellate Courts, Arbitration and Extra-Legal Jurisdiction: Facts,
Problems and Solutions” Arbitration International, Vol 28 No. 1, 63 – 76.
67 Per the rejoinder with same title by Paul Obo Idornigie in Arbitration International, 2015, 31, 171 –
180.
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Proponents of arbitration who respect the autonomies of party and tribunal and advocate the doctrine 
of finality in arbitral awards might sympathise with the rejection of unnecessary appeals in 
arbitration.68  As noted, Egyptian Law No. 27/1994 places this issue beyond doubt and argument by 
donating jurisdictional competence in international commercial arbitrations to the Cairo Court of 
Appeal or any other Egyptian appellate court agreed by the parties. 
My views on arbitral appeals are summarised in an earlier article.69  Appeals are costly proceedings.70  
Because arbitrations are governed by law the need to apply the law correctly would justify party 
agreement for the retention of a limited right of appeal on questions of law.  Therefore a statutory 
provision to facilitate such party agreement is, to that limited extent, supportable.  Three intertwined 
considerations preponderate against a general right of appeal and the appellate jurisdiction: (i) the 
Parties’ choice of an arbitrator (instead of court) to resolve their dispute, (ii) Parties’ use of arbitration 
as the preferred mode for resolving the dispute finally and for the tribunal to render an enforceable 
award, and (iii) Court respect for the parties’ choice of arbitrator, procedure and the applicable rules. 
The idea of a private arbitral process being transferred to the public court process, other than for the 
execution of the award, is imperfect.  The goals of private arbitration will be defeated “if the courts 
are too quick to find fault with the manner in which the arbitration has been conducted and too willing 
to conclude that the faulty procedure is unfair or constitutes a gross irregularity.71 
Perspectives on the Relationship between Arbitration and the Court 
Both arbitrators and judges dispense justice within their respective legal systems and jurisdictional 
domains.  But whereas their adjudicative functions are similar, their structural and systemic 
differences do not warrant being considered competitors.  So competitors they are not.  Judges 
presiding over state courts, as noted, are paid public officials within the judicial organ of state 
governance.  Commercial arbitrators in our jurisdictions are primarily private persons usually 
appointed and paid by party agreement.  The State judge’s scope of jurisdiction under the whole 
gamut of national laws and Constitutions (including the inherent jurisdiction) is much wider than that 
of an arbitrator confined by an arbitration agreement and arbitration law.  We know that arbitrators 
have neither the cloak nor clout of judges; that arbitrators and arbitral parties may have technically 
superior ability to decide the merits of their dispute but not the coercive powers to sharpen the rugged 
edges of arbitration; and that arbitration remains risky because of a lack of equal playing field for the 
two systems.  Therefore arbitrators err who assume the aura of judges because they dispense arbitral 
justice, as do judges who over jealously guard their judicial and jurisdictional powers for the 
misapprehension of being usurped by arbitrators.  Judges are trained in the law.  Arbitrators emerge 
from diverse disciplines and backgrounds.  Judges take an oath of office to do justice under the law. 
Arbitrators also do justice under the relevant law but do not take an oath of office.  What both 
arbitrator and judge lack in terms of specialisation and expert knowledge outside their primary 
disciplines can be provided by specialist or expert witnesses from the relevant field.  In similar vein 
the non-lawyer arbitrator’s lack of legal knowledge or expertise can be mitigated by a legal expert at 
evidential hearings.  What matters, from the perspective of arbitration practice, is how best to harness 
the respective duties and functions of arbitrators and judges in the services they provide for their 
communities. 
68 Comment: These are welcome thought provoking contentions as there is room for innovative 
thinking in the development of arbitration law on the continent.   
69 Torgbor E., “The Right of Appeal and Judicial Scrutiny (2010) 76 Arbitration 2, p. 244. 
70 As evident from the time and resources expended for example, in the Kenyan case Shell v Kobil 
Civil Application No. NAI57 of 2006 (30/2006/UR) and the English case Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority v Impregilo SPA [2005] UKHL 43: [2006] 1AC 221; [2005] 3WLR 129. 
71 O’Regan ADCJ in Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates Pty Ltd v Andrews Bopanang Construction CC 
(CCT 97/07) [2009] ZA CC 6. 
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The invitation for this keynote address left it open for personal reflection and experiential comment 
as judge and arbitrator.  Aside from generalizations, and at a personal level, my role as judge differed 
widely from my role as arbitrator.  As an arbitrator I engage mostly with sectoral, contractual, 
commercial and investment disputes at domestic and international levels, sometimes with colleagues 
from different disciplines, combining our inputs and experiences to resolve disputes.  The scope of 
arbitrability and the arbitral jurisdiction are delimiting, but the challenging opportunities and demands 
of specialised knowledge, though intensive, can be fulfilling.  The opportunity of sitting, conferring and 
interacting with highly qualified, distinguished and internationally reputable professionals from other 
jurisdictions, is humbling but deeply enriching and rewarding.72   
As a judge my primary discipline was the law with the concomitant duty, as the constitutional oath 
demanded, of doing justice according to law.  The scope of litigation and the laws applied, as noted, 
are wider and far beyond arbitration law and practice.  The greater the legal content of any issue the 
greater the need for further study and research.  There is no uniform judicial method, but delving into 
the cumulative store and wealth of legal and judicial precedent, built up institutionally over the years, 
promotes consistency and predictability in the dispensation of curial justice.  Therefore having a bit of 
both arbitrator and judge in my professional armoury is advantageous and beneficial for my current 
practice as a Chartered and International Arbitrator.  Is one role loftier than the other?  Comparisons 
demand defined and measurable tests.  I had the cloak, clout and the coercive powers of a judge but 
not as arbitrator.  On the one hand, I know highly esteemed and eminent arbitrators who would not 
swop that role for any other.  Professional satisfaction and benefit are highly prized achievements.  On 
the other, I accede to the remarks of a senior and long-serving judicial colleague that there is no 
privilege better known to him than the great honour of serving as a judge.73   
A significant point of departure between judge and arbitrator is in the judicial method on which, as 
noted, there is no uniformity.  Ross Cranston74 brings erudition and perspicacity in an eloquent and 
elegant analysis of the judicial method of Lord Bingham of Cornwall,75 and other eminent common 
law judges.  He adverts to the declaratory theory of law and the traditional school of judging associated 
with Viscount Simonds (“the traditionalist method”); Sir Owen Dixon, Chief Justice of the High Court 
of Australia76 (“Dixon’s Legalism”); the “Holmes logic and experience” associated with Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes; Lord Denning’s Justice – founded on his judicial philosophy that judges are there to 
use the authority of the law to do justice; that in too many respects the law was inadequate for the 
needs of his day, and that some lawyers cared too much for law and too little for justice; Lord 
Bingham’s “pragmatism” – that judges had sometimes to make a choice and, unless superseded by 
legislation, that choice determined what the law should be, that is to say, judges do have a law-making 
function into which their own values enter.  The judicial method is therefore formalistic and, though 
not always logical, involves the application of principle “reasoned to a defensible conclusion”.77   
72 Arbitration law permits arbitrators to state conclusions without necessarily or in every case giving 
the reasons. 
73 I claim that my career as barrister, arbitrator and judge exposed me to encounters and interactions 
with truly distinguished professionals, amongst whom were and are: the late Tom Bingham QC, my 
pupil master at Fountain Court; the late Lord Michael Mustill – panel chairman and co-arbitrator, Prof. 
Derek Roebuck – friend and scholarly mentor, and lately Prof. William Park of Boston University and 
former President of the LCIA – panel chairman and co-arbitrator – all in the pantheon of learned legal 
scholars, distinguished authors and illustrious  contributors to the story, agriculture, and architecture 
of arbitration, and the dispensation and advancement of knowledge of dispute adjudication and 
decision-making in our time and for all time. 
74 Ross Cranston Graya, No. 126, Hilary 2013. 
75 My former Pupil Master, and later Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. 
76 1952 – 1964. 
77 Cranston, ibid. 
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I am reminded of Prof. William Park’s recourse78 to perceptions in some quarters that arbitrators may 
be less reliable than judges in applying the law, but that the opposite may be true; that the calculus 
of duty is simply not the same as between judge and arbitrator; that bearing obligations to the 
citizenry as a whole, judges may seek to implement societal values that sometimes trump private 
agreements; that no such social engineering usually falls to arbitrators because as creatures of the 
parties’ consent, arbitrators must show special fidelity to shared expectations expressed in contract 
or treaty, fixing their eyes on existing norms rather than proposals for the law as it should be; and 
when interpreting the law arbitrators may be more inclined to take statutes and cases as they are, 
rather than considering public policies that justify shaping or stretching norms to meet new social or 
economic challenges.  I discern from all this that the difference in the arbitral and judicial methods in 
the application of law is not that the duly qualified arbitrator is less able than the judge in interpreting 
the law, but that the expectations of an arbitral party and the public interest, restrict and restrain the 
esoteric forays and frolicsome eruditions of the one, but not the other.   
I know that sometimes the judicial decision is not between right and wrong, but between sound and 
well established but conflicting principles in which the judge makes a choice.  The judicial oath of office 
and the law-making function are therefore significant points of distinction between judges and 
arbitrators.  I have an abiding respect for the enormous public responsibilities of the court, and share 
the firm belief that, ultimately, it is the one place where a citizen should confidently expect equal 
treatment under the law, and a square deal.   
I have stated and given reasons why arbitrators and judges are not competitors.79  But in discussing 
the relationship between arbitration and the court other related questions emerge, almost all of which 
imply arbitration’s inadequacy or subservience to the court.   
Are the roles of arbitration and court collaborative and complementary?  They can and ought to be.  
There is no contradiction in stating however that even a free-standing private arbitration system with 
clearly defined boundaries of the arbitral mandate and jurisdiction cannot be on equal footing or in 
competition with a public state court exercising inherent and statutory powers over a broad spectrum 
of rights, law-suits involving private and public rights, crime, fundamental freedoms and protections 
guaranteed by national constitutions, including the much needed support for arbitration. 
Does party autonomy render the arbitrator subservient to the parties? 
The preponderance of the party agreement and freedom to choose the arbitrator and the arbitral 
procedure, the lack of true alignment between the autonomies of party and tribunal, and the 
occasional doctrinal and spatial conflicts thereby generated, can mislead the unwary practitioner into 
bullish but unrewarding confrontations with the arbitral tribunal.  Therefore it is important to mention, 
relevantly, that the arbitrator is, in critical respects, independent of the parties.  The arbitrator is a 
“quasi-judicial adjudicator” and in no sense subordinate to the parties.80   
Can the arbitration system stand alone without the courts?  Is the current state of the law the best 
possible achievement for arbitration or should the law do more for arbitration? 
We can all think up answers to these questions depending on our dispositions, preferences, 
expectations, experiences and indeed what we each think is best for the party that chooses arbitration 
in preference to litigation.  Lord Mance81 is credited with the clarification that the arbitrator decides 
a legal dispute in the same way as, and instead of, a judge, by identifying the law and matching the 
78 William W. Park: “The Predictability Paradox”, Arbitrators and Applicable Law Dossier XI of the ICC 
Institute of World Business Law (ICC Publication No. 753E). 
79 At the beginning of this section. 
80 K/S Norjarl A/S v Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd [1992] QB 863, 885. 
81 ibid. 
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relevant facts to the relevant legal provisions; that the award is the goal and outcome of his activity; 
and that apart from any restrictive provisions of the arbitration agreement which prescribes the way 
to that goal, the arbitrator is “entirely free, freer than that of an ordinary judge”.82 
The discussion on the relationship between arbitration and courts is therefore conducted from 
different standpoints.  One is that court intervention should be at all stages always respectful of the 
parties’ intention to arbitrate.83  Others proceed from the standpoint that the arbitration agreement 
by which parties choose arbitration in preference to the court does not oust the jurisdiction of the 
court and give instances of current practice by which the court enters the dispute and the arbitration 
before, during and after the arbitration, for enforcing the award.84  Some see the exercise of court 
powers at the stated stages as supportive of arbitration.  Others consider such role as intrusive and 
unhelpful to the development of a complete arbitration system.  Examples of court involvement in 
arbitration85 may help the reader to take a stand.   
Before the commencement of arbitration the court may enforce the arbitration agreement and in 
recognition of that agreement, stay its own powers to try the dispute and refer the parties to 
arbitration.  It may, in some instances, even appoint the arbitrator.  During the arbitration the court 
may remove the arbitrator, grant interim orders for the protection and preservation of a disputed 
property or extend time-limits for compliance with an arbitrator’s orders.  After the arbitration a party 
may ask the court to enforce the award and, despite, and in itself a lengthy arbitral process leading to 
the award, the court may set it aside or decline to enforce it. 
Those who see value in the role of the court from the instances given here consider those roles as 
supportive of arbitration and would want the court to continue exercising those statutory powers of 
assistance, intervention and supervision.  But precisely because those powers are statutory the 
proponents of a stand alone arbitration would argue for those powers to be transferred by statute to 
the arbitral tribunal.  In other words it should be for the arbitral tribunal, rather than the court, to 
exercise the powers of recognition and enforcement of the arbitration agreement, grant the interim 
orders that are granted by the court and give effect to a valid and enforceable award rather than 
leaving it to the court to set it aside or decline its enforcement, after all the time, adjournments, fees, 
costs and expenses consumed by the arbitration.  Arbitration proponents therefore argue for the law 
to do more for arbitration by granting more powers to the arbitral tribunal. 
Specific Concerns in the Legal and Judicial Roles in Arbitration 
Concern with the finality of the award and curtailment of the courts’ powers in arbitration is 
recognised in international arbitration by statutory provisions that delimit the extent of judicial 
intervention in arbitration.86 Even so there are still several instances, too many perhaps, where courts 
82 Ibid. 
83 Dominique Hascher: “The Courts as Collaborators in the International Dispute Resolution Project” 
(2015) 81 Arbitration, Issue 4 pp 443 – 445.  Hascher sets out conditions to govern court intervention 
with the observation that the efficiency of arbitration is directly linked to the quality of the judicial 
system.  I do not subscribe to this view which may be a misreading of London Principle No. 2 because 
the efficiency of arbitration depends first and foremost on competent arbitrators rather than a 
supportive Court. 
84 See CA Candide-Johnson and Olasupo Shasore, Commercial Arbitration Law and International 
Practice in Nigeria, Chapter 7, on Arbitration and the Courts pp 119 – 139.   
85 A selected list of superior Court decisions across the continent is attached for those who may 
desire to research this subject further.  For this reason arbitration institutions should compile and 
publish significant arbitral awards, rulings and decisions in which arbitral parties and tribunals 
demonstrate technically superior ability in deciding the merits of their dispute. 
86 Model Law Article 5 leads the way with the provision that bars court intervention in arbitration 
matters except as provided by that Law, a provision that has been replicated or adapted by national 
arbitration statutes such as: Section 34 ACA; section 59(1) Lagos State Arbitration Law, 2009; section 
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enter the arbitration space either through gaps in the arbitration agreement, a liberal interpretation 
of the arbitration statute or by resort to the inherent powers of the court.  In current practice, parties 
and their lawyers readily interrupt arbitration proceedings with dubious court applications, under 
incoherent statutory and constitutional provisions, that deliberately delay the arbitration.  Arbitration 
law and rules can change this. 
Corruption in the courts and arbitration87 is a serious concern and the level of corruption in some 
African judiciaries is particularly alarming if media revelations88 are believable.  The ensuing loss of 
public confidence in the court systems arising from such damaging stories, if proven, would be 
devastating in institutions whose public standing and professional integrity ought to be beyond 
reproach, quite apart from the public humiliations of the individual judges named or found to be 
associated with corruption.89  We do well to remember that judges and arbitrators are not alone in 
this and that the hand maidens of corruption are both the givers and takers of bribery and corruption90 
- that is, the public.
There is good reason for delimiting judicial intervention, such as it is, by more specific legislation.  It is 
that most judges in our regions have little or no training or experience at all in arbitration law and 
practice or have scant appreciation or understanding of the processes and purposes of arbitration and 
the scheme of national arbitration statutes.  Arbitration law was not a course of study for most judges, 
and a qualification in arbitration law and procedure is neither a prerequisite nor a requirement for 
judicial appointments.  It is submitted that the occasional arbitration workshop or seminar for judges 
does not adequately seal this gap in the judicial armoury for intervention in arbitration.  It is also not 
tenable to send all judges to school in arbitration and leave their courts empty.91  Perhaps we should 
consider a specialised arbitration court as a more viable option, of which more below.   
Consider also the fact that in several instances the application for judicial intervention is from the 
decision of an arbitrator, with greater experience in the subject matter in dispute, to an inexperienced 
judge vested with jurisdiction to try any issue from any field of dispute.  It is not surprising therefore 
that the backlog of delayed rulings from the courts include considerable numbers of arbitration 
applications awaiting determination by the court over several months which in turn delays a final 
arbitral award.  It is no commendation for a judge in such a position to be considered the better placed 
decision-maker, than the specialist arbitrator, to rule in arbitral matters, but for the statutory powers 
and inherent jurisdiction of the judge that are denied to the arbitrator. 
Therefore the role of courts and judges in arbitration ought to be viewed from the perspective of the 
qualifications, aptitude, capability and expertise of the court and judge called upon to decide 
arbitration matters.  Parties who go to arbitration freely should expect the outcome to be fully final 
and the award to be enforced by a process as independent as possible of the court system.  If 
9 Ugandan ACA; Article 5 Zimbabwe Arbitration Act, 1996; section 10 Kenyan Arbitration Act 1996; 
section 1(c) English Arbitration Act 1996.     
87 Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon was prosecuted, imprisoned, fined and deprived of his honours:  
Derek Roebuck, Miscellany of Disputes, Holo Books The Arbitration Press 1999 pp 66 – 68, 
recounted by Lord Neuberger in Keynote Speech, Arbitration Vol. 81, No. 4, Nov 2015 p. 427. 
88 Recent media stories of corrupt judicial practices in Ghana and Kenya have shocked, and shaken 
public confidence in the communities in those countries.  An advocate criticises the Kenyan Judiciary 
severely perhaps for “swimming like fish in a bowl giving the impression of much activity and 
movement but plagued by old predicaments – backlog of cases and corruption”; The Standard, 
Sunday April 24, 2016, p. 17. 
89 While the accusations remain allegations until proven, some speculators of outcomes give credit to 
the judiciaries of Ghana and Kenya for initiating and conducting the investigations aimed at identifying 
corrupt judges and combating the vice. 
90 Arbitration p. 427 Vol. 81 – Neuberger on Roebuck, (supra). 
91 I hasten to add that judges with training and experience in arbitration law and practice are making a 
difference to arbitration practice in Africa – but perhaps there are still too few of them. 
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arbitration is increasingly seen as unable to deliver what it promises then there is much to be done to 
reverse that perception by statutory provisions to remove the real and apparent impediments in 
current arbitration practice.  Traditionalists cannot see the ends of justice being fully or satisfactorily 
served without a final curial pronouncement on a dispute.  Others would prefer arbitral tribunals to 
start and finish the arbitration and for arbitral parties to go away with the final outcomes they sought, 
without stopping or ending up in court for further action or worse still, submitting to a litigation they 
had avoided.   
As both arbitration and litigation operate within their respective legal domains an arbitration system 
that does not deliver effectively to users needs rethinking, overhauling and to be better equipped.  It 
bears remembering that the extent of court intervention in arbitration is formulated as a bar to courts, 
not to arbitration.  Therefore the circumstances for resort to court or setting aside an arbitral award 
and denying its enforcement or the finality of the arbitral process should be reviewed and substituted 
by stricter requirements that will as far as feasible make arbitration free standing with judicial resort 
only where inevitably and unavoidably necessary, but even then as mandated by law for the 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the award, in order for the final award, to be truly final. 
Enabling the Arbitral Tribunal to take full charge of the arbitration 
There are problem areas for arbitration that need to be clarified and covered by arbitration law and 
rules to strengthen arbitration and enable the arbitrator to take full control of the arbitral process 
confidently and competently. 
Problems that exist or arise before the commencement or appointment of the arbitral tribunal should 
rightly be resolved by a competent authority, such as the court, in whom general jurisdictional, 
statutory and inherent powers are vested.  However, troublesome issues persist even after 
appointment of the arbitrators in areas not specifically or adequately provided for by the arbitration 
agreement or arbitration law.  These, as noted, revolve around the interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement, choice of the applicable law, arbitrability, alleged breaches of natural justice, 
considerations of national and international public policy, and issues of procedural fairness, upon 
which the fair and just outcome of the proceedings depend.  Because, broadly speaking, they involve 
issues of principle, law, mixed law and fact, and public policy, they call into question the ability and 
professional competence of the arbitrator, particularly the non-lawyer arbitrator, to determine these 
issues.  The current perception, rightly or wrongly, that the court of law is the appropriate forum on 
such matters strongly persists.  But pertinent also is the adequacy or otherwise of the powers of the 
professionally qualified and competent arbitrator to determine such issues.  Putting it more 
specifically, is the arbitrator or court better qualified to determine legal or quasi-legal issues?   
For purposes of this paper the issue narrows down to a choice between the arbitrator experienced in 
the area of the dispute or the judge with little or no knowledge or experience of arbitration.  We ought 
to be concerned, rethink and redesign the role of the court in a state with, say some 150 High Court 
judges of whom less than 10 have some training or exposure to arbitration law and practice, and an 
Appellate Court of 50 or so judges of whom less than five have working knowledge and experience of 
arbitration.  Consider also a case allocation system whereby arbitration matters and applications are 
dealt with by a judge who happens to be the one free and available judge on the date of allocation.  
We ought also to be concerned whether the purposes of arbitration and party expectations are best 
served in the numerous instances where the decisions of an arbitrator, experienced in the area of 
dispute, can be and are overturned by an inexpert or novice judge for no meritorious reason other 
than being a judge. 
There is a role here for party legal advisers to offer sound legal advice and guidance to ensure that the 
arbitrators they recommend and nominate for appointment are suitably qualified to deal with the 
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subject-matter of the dispute.  The point of emphasis is that provided the arbitrator/tribunal has the 
requisite professional expertise and ability to determine such issues there should be no good reason 
to refer such matters to court.  Besides, the court (as well as parties who, under expert legal advice 
and guidance, consciously choose an arbitrator in preference to a judge), should be facilitated by the 
law to accept the decision of the arbitrator. 92   Dependence on the legal profession for effective 
arbitration means the legal profession itself ought to be professionally well-trained in the law and 
practice of arbitration, with lawyers skilled and learned in commercial and international arbitration 
law and practice.  Perhaps this concern may be effectively covered by institutional arbitration rules.93 
It has been noted that both arbitrator and judge have powers to direct and seek the assistance of 
expert witnesses in areas outside their professional experience; and that the arbitrator who is seised 
with the dispute should have requisite powers to embark on the dispute and conduct the arbitration 
from beginning to end.  Enforcement of the award with the legal and administrative assistance of a 
competent authority is then appropriate support for arbitration. 
Gross or substantial irregularity (including alleged misconduct) of the sort that should justify the 
removal of an arbitrator will depend on its facts and governing principles of law and procedure.  Who 
should determine those facts and law?  In line with the principle of competence that enables the 
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction and jurisdictional challenges it is submitted that the 
arbitrator should, likewise, have first opportunity to consider allegations of gross or substantial 
irregularity or personal misconduct and decide whether or not to withdraw before redress is sought 
outside the arbitral process.  The paramount consideration here is the need to promote by law and 
rules an expeditious arbitral process and the finality of arbitration and the arbitral award. 
In addition to this is the need to discourage diversionary tactics deployed by party representatives, 
devious challenges from spurious allegations in order to promote, as much as possible, the finality of 
arbitration and the arbitral award. 
The Commercial Court 
It is increasingly apparent that, in several instances, neither the regular public court nor private 
arbitration is able to deliver the user expectation of speedy justice with least cost and expense; and 
that the resistance to arbitration is still felt amongst practitioners and others who, by disposition, 
instinct and training, distrust private adjudication.  Perhaps a properly constituted, well-equipped and 
competent Commercial Court may well be a preferable partial solution, if not a complete alternative 
to a stand alone arbitration system.  Courts and arbitration users do have a choice of dispute 
resolution systems with proper guidance from legal and technical advisers.   Commercial Courts exist 
in several countries, albeit in differing formations, structures and competences.94  
92 An independent judiciary that is competent, efficient, with expertise in International Commercial 
Arbitration and respectful of the parties’ choice of arbitration as their method for settlement of their 
disputes is one of several so-named London Principles for the conduct of international arbitration; 
Arbitration Vol. 81 No. 4 November 2015 of p. 405.  See also Dominique Hascher, ibid, footnote 55: 
Courts should enforce the parties’ right of access to arbitral justice by giving effect to arbitration 
clauses; enforcing that right obligates the court to ensure that the arbitration agreement is fully 
effective.   
93 David Rivkin and Samantha Rowe: “The Role of the Tribunal in Controlling Arbitral Costs” (2015) 81 
Arbitration, Issue 2 pp 116 – 130: “The long-running debate whether tribunals had to accept 
procedures agreed by the parties – is over” with references to Institutional Rules that enhance the 
Tribunal’s powers to take control – UNCITRAL Rules art. 17(1); ICC 2012 Rules arts. 11(2); 22(1); 
22(4) and 22(5).  LCIA Rules 2014 art. 5(4); art 14(1) – (5); ICDR Rules 2014 art 12(1) and (4), art 
20(1) and (2) & (3) & (7).  All are concerned with expeditious disposal of disputes and saving time and 
costs. 
94 As in Kenya, the Gulf States, Singapore and England. 
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The Commercial and Admiralty Court of Kenya (“CAC”) is untypical.  The CAC is a division of the 
national High Court.95  The Court, composed of the regular judges of the High Court,96 began work in 
1998,97 with jurisdiction over commercial matters, classified by the then Chief Justice, to include: 
proceedings for injunctions to restrain the realization of securities, company, bankruptcy and 
intellectual property matters, claims for recovery of unsecured debts, and matters certified by a Judge 
at the Commercial Court as determinable by that Court98 and, relevantly for this article, “all matters 
related to arbitration other than enforcement of awards”.  As such it is not a specialised arbitration 
court.99  The challenges of the Court include inadequate Judicial Officers, transfer of judges to other 
courts, and a “missing files” phenomenon occasioned by concluded cases being refiled back with 
active cases in the Registry.  The greatest challenge, according to the Court’s Status Report, is a lack 
of good record management system to ensure the availability of accurate and reliable records – all 
this is bad news for arbitration matters that end up in that court. 
A competent Commercial Court Judge dealing with arbitration matters might be expected to have a 
demonstrable ability and expertise in dispute resolution by arbitration, and relevantly, with 
knowledge and experience in international commercial arbitration law and practice, to warrant the 
designation of “Seat Court” in international arbitration. 
Kenya aspires to internationality with the “Arbitral Court” established by the National Centre for 
International Arbitration Act (NCIA Act).100 The Court consists of a President, two-Deputy Presidents, 
a Registrar and, notably, 15 leading international arbitrators.  The President has supervisory powers 
over the Court101 which has exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over all disputes referred to it 
under the Act or any other written law102 and, again notably, the Court’s decision is final103 – great 
advances when the Court actualises and fructifies.  The internationality of the Board of Directors 
administering the Arbitral Court is challenged by the Board’s composition104 consisting of Kenyan 
Government Officials – a chairperson appointed by the Cabinet Secretary, the Attorney General, 
Principal Secretary from the Justice Ministry, and Chief Registrar of the High Court of Kenya.105 
In Mutubwa’s opinion this “Arbitral Court” is not one of the Courts envisaged by the Kenyan 
Constitution106 and may be “unconstitutional”, adding that, not being a “Court” in the strict terms of 
the Constitution, it can be nothing more than an “arbitral tribunal”.  He is discomfited by the fact that 
the Arbitral Court is not subject to the supervisory or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court of Kenya 
or any courts established by the Constitution, including the Kenyan Supreme Court.  This, despite the 
95 The divisions are: The Family and Children Division, The Commercial and Admiralty Division, The 
Civil Division, The Criminal Division, and The Constitutional and Human Rights Division. 
96 Information from a documentary report entitled: “Republic of Kenya, Judiciary, Status Report For 
Commercial and Admiralty Division dated 8th October 2015”.  The Report provides information on the 
background, history, structure, functions and challenges of the Court. 
97 The Status Report: ibid. 
98 ibid. 
99 According to Deputy Registrar Elizabeth Tanui. 
100 Act No. 26 of 2013, section 2.  This paper expounds a little on this Court because of its potential 
claims to independence and internationality and prospective significance for international arbitration. 
101 ibid, section 21(5). 
102 ibid, section 22(1). 
103 ibid, section 22(2). 
104 Wilfred Mutubwa: “The Making of an International Arbitration Hub: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration Act 2013” (2016) 82 Arbitration, Issue 2 pp 135 – 145. 
105 Section 5. 
106 Article 162. 
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unanimous decision of the Kenyan High Court107 that asserts and exercises jurisdiction over all public 
organs and constitutional bodies.108   
The far-reaching critique of the NCIA Act109 and its Arbitral Court is an insightful contribution worthy 
of note by those who see merit in the establishment of an Arbitral “Court” or “Tribunal”110 that is truly 
independent, professionally well equipped and competent to take on both domestic and international 
arbitrations as to win the confidence and respect of domestic and international users and investors. 
Other Commercial Courts 
The formation of local Commercial Courts in Dubai, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), 
the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre (QICDRC), and the Singapore 
International Commercial Court (SICC), is acknowledged as inspired by the model of the London 
Commercial Court.111  The Dubai, Qatar and Singapore Commercial Courts aim to attract international 
commercial cases where the local national courts are unable to deal with such cases.112   
A Senior Counsel 113  discusses the relationship between commercial courts and international 
arbitration in the jurisdictions of Singapore and Dubai and the impact of the newly established 
Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) on the existing Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre (SIAC), and opines that the two institutions will likely complement each other. 114   The 
Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) is a different kind of Commercial Court from the 
Kenyan Commercial Court.  Though it is also a separate division of the High Court of Singapore115 it is, 
unlike the Kenyan Court, set up to hear international, commercial, and offshore cases as defined in 
the Rules of Court.116   
107 Republic v Interim Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission ex.p Elliot Lidibwi Kihusa 
[2012] eKLR: “No person or body could claim not to be subject to or beyond the powers of the High 
Court when it is alleged that he or she has committed a transgression in exercise of a legitimate 
power conferred by the Constitution and the Law.  The jurisdiction of the High Court can only be 
ousted by very clear and express language of the Constitution…. the Court was not constrained by 
the statutory provisions or Common Law remedies”, Sadrudin Kurji & Another v Shalimar Ltd & 2 
Others, (2008) eKLR (supra). 
108 Such as the mighty Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).  The High Court’s 
view is that ouster clauses, such as s. 22 of the NCIA Act, are legal propositions of dubious legality. 
109 See Mutubwa at footnote 76.  In effect the NCIA Act seems to render the 1995 Arbitration Act 
subservient or subordinate to it, and, unlike the latter statute, overrides party autonomy, parties’ 
freedom to choose their own procedure, protection of confidentiality and the right of appeal granted by 
the 1995 Act.  In other words there is potential conflict in the provisions of the two arbitration statutes 
in the specified areas. 
110 The critique even suggests that the description “Arbitral Court” was inadvertent as it is more 
properly an “Arbitral Tribunal”.  This is questionable as the term “Arbitral Tribunal” is specifically 
defined by the Kenyan Arbitration Act as a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators: S. 3(1) KA Act, 
1995, and the “Arbitral Court” is differently designed and structured. 
111 Sir Vivian Ramsey: “National Courts and Arbitration: Collaboration or Competition?  The Courts as 
Competitors of Arbitration, Arbitration Vol. 81, No. 4 Nov 2015 p. 446. 
112 Sir Vivian Ramsey, ibid. 
113 Michael Hwang: Commercial courts and international arbitration – competitors or partners: 
Arbitration International, 2015, 31, 193 – 212.   
114 It seems that the Model Law standards of curial review are not yet adopted in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), that includes mainland Dubai, as the arbitration law is contained in the sketchy 
provisions of an unmodernised Federal Civil Procedure Code.  On the other hand, the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) uses an Arbitration Law of 2008, based on the Model Law 
principles and jurisprudence. 
115 It is said to be similar to the New South Wales Supreme Court (ibid). 
116 In the past, parties in cross-border disputes who did not desire to arbitrate went to London and 
New York.  A significant aim, amongst others, of the SICC is to offer cross-border, multi-jurisdictional 
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The sources of the SICC jurisdiction are the parties’ jurisdiction agreement to refer their disputes to 
the SICC and referrals from the Singapore High Court to the SICC in cases without a jurisdiction 
agreement.  The merit of the SICC seems to be that it is a forum for parties who do not choose either 
ad hoc or international arbitration as practised by arbitration institutions or the national court of one 
of the disputing parties, for whatever reason.  Hwang asserts that the SICC and the SIAC are 
complementary.  The SICC is a hybrid – it emulates some of the distinctive features of international 
arbitration but also remains a national court possessing certain features peculiar to arbitration 
tribunals.  Consequently although the SICC, SIAC and the High Court will be, to some extent, 
competitors the arrangement offers a choice of forum to disputing parties. 
The Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (“the DIFC Courts”) are described as “a common law 
island in a civil law ocean”117 because UAE laws are based on the civil law, while the DIFC laws are 
based on common law.  As noted, the DIFC uses an Arbitration Law 2008 based on the Model Law and 
applies to all arbitrations seated in the DIFC, which is a separate seat from the Emirate of Dubai.  The 
DIFC Court is therefore the curial court for all DIFC seated arbitrations.  The Court is international 
because at least one party is from outside Dubai or the UAE, with primary jurisdiction over arbitral 
parties incorporated or registered in the DIFC or related to events within the DIFC.  Besides, most 
occupiers of the DIFC are international persons or companies and there is an opt-in jurisdiction from 
parties outside the region and jurisdiction over cases with a written jurisdiction agreement.  Unlike 
Singapore, there is no separate court with special rules because the practice and procedural rules are 
largely based on the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) particularly the Rules of the English 
Commercial Court.118  
While the Kenyan Commercial and Admiralty Court has no international features or attributes the 
Singapore International Commercial Court is a hybrid court with distinct arbitral and litigational 
features and an international outlook. 
In England, a judge of the Commercial Court or an Official Referee may accept appointment as a Sole 
Arbitrator or Umpire by virtue of an arbitration agreement subject to stated circumstances119 but their 
fees are taken in the High Court120 and the London Commercial Court is credited as the venue of choice 
for many commercial disputes particularly where English law is chosen as the proper law.121 
For Africa, although the composition and qualitative prescriptions of a good Commercial Court seem 
rigorous they are attributes that can be cultivated by Africans from the available historical and modern 
examples of sound practices of the advanced jurisdictions.  Moreover, the principles and requirements 
of procedural fairness and equal treatment of parties that are enshrined in the Model Law122 and 
written into or adapted by national arbitration statutes123 also avail.  These universal principles and 
rules would underpin and guide the performance of the Commercial Court in Africa as would the 
dispute resolution services as Asia becomes a popular destination for foreign trade and investment, to 
harmonise the differing legal systems in Asia and eliminate their uncertainties and inconsistencies by 
developing a free-standing body of international commercial law. 
117 Hwang, ibid. 
118 The reader will find Hwang’s article informative and illuminating on the complex structure of the 
DIFC Courts. 
119 Sections 93(1), (2) & (3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
120 ibid, Section 93(4). 
121 ibid. 
122 Model Law Art. 18 (equal treatment of parties); Art. 19 (determination of rules of procedure). 
123 Kenyan Arbitration Act sections 19 and 20; Nigerian ACA, sections 14 and 15; the Ugandan ACA, 
sections 18 and 19; and the English Arbitration Act, sections 1(a) and (b). 
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statutory provisions aimed at facilitating easy access and forum safety.124  A demonstrable capacity to 
ensure fair and just outcomes can only win confidence in such courts.  These attributes could 
substantially meet user expectations and address some of the perceptions and concerns that 
negatively impact on the practice, progress and transformation of arbitration in Africa.  
We may take a leaf from Judge Allsop’s observations that good Commercial Courts exist around the 
world with deeply embedded skill and expertise attractive to foreign parties; that given an 
international character and outlook they can provide greater confidence in international arbitration 
practice; and that these are trends and approaches that challenge nations to adapt their dispute 
resolution systems to the needs of international commerce.  Judge Allsop recognises these challenges 
also “as emerging opportunities for nations to harness and deploy their expertise and capital, physical 
and human, that is locked up in their court systems”.125  Indubitably a good arbitration can produce 
decisions as expeditiously and competently as a good court.126  It is therefore up to nations to promote 
and uphold what is good in either system of justice, being objectives and processes in the achievement 
of which all of us in the legal, arbitral or judicial systems can participate to mutual advantage and 
benefit. 
Conclusion 
Some troublesome aspects in the relationship between arbitration and the court have been identified 
and discussed.127  In Africa the inadequate powers of the arbitrator and the lack of confidence in both 
the arbitral and judicial systems have negatively impacted on, polarised their respective positions and 
compromised, their effectiveness.  To win public confidence we may expect law makers who created 
both systems by legislation to re-design and re-allocate their powers, jurisdictions, ability and 
effectiveness to do justice.   
In this current situation, and bearing in mind the shortcomings of the judicial systems on the continent, 
the achievement of a free arbitration system is desirable to strengthen the Arbitral Tribunal and 
eliminate extraneous and diversionary processes that frustrate arbitration and the finality of the 
award.  This will assist arbitration to deliver on its promises as the dispute resolution mechanism of 
choice.  My optimism for arbitration is not dimmed or diminished.  It is that, subject to well-defined 
statutory improvements, arbitration can be a free-standing system, free to settle its own procedures 
and develop its own substantive law,128 enabling it to deliver complete and final arbitral justice outside 
the existing court system.129 
124 London Principles – No. 6. 
125 James Allsop: “National Courts and Arbitration: Collaboration or Competition?” Arbitration, Vol 81, 
Issue 4, Nov 2015. 
126 ibid.  A sentiment borrowed from Allsop’s reference to “best courts” and “best arbitrations”. 
127 In the paragraphs on Perspectives and Specific Concerns. 
128 Reminiscent of Lord Wilberforce’s vision for arbitration in the then House of Lords’ debate on the 
English Arbitration Bill: Hansard 18 January 1996 col. 778. 
129 Lord Jonathan Mance’s article “Arbitration: a Law unto itself?” Arbitration International Vol 32, 
Number 2, June 2016, introduces an English legal and judicial perspective noting an “unfortunate 
difference” in attitude between common law and French civil law and between strands of doctrinal 
thought on the fundamental basis of arbitration; and argues that arbitration should not be a law unto 
itself for lacking a coherent jurisprudence and confidence in its efficacy with no general means of 
ensuring awards are consistent.  Differing perspectives on the progress and development of 
arbitration laws and practice should be healthy not “unfortunate”, it may be thought. 
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ANNEXURE 1 
A LIST OF KEY JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN AFRICAN ARBITRATION130 
1. Attorney General v Balkan Energy Ghana Limited Balkan Energy LLC and Philip Elders [2012]
2SCGLR, pages 998 –1037.
2. Westchester Resources Ltd v Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd and Africore (GH) Ltd v Ashanti Goldfields
Co Ltd Consolidated Civil Appeal No. J4/63/2013 (11th November, 2015).
3. IPCO (Nigeria) Limited v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2015] EWCA Civ 1144 (10th
November 2015).
4. Statoil (Nig) Ltd & Anor v Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC & 3 Others (2013) 14
NWLR (Pt 1373).
5. Statoil (Nigeria) Limited & Anor v Federal Inland Revenue Service & Anor, (2014) LPELR – 23144
(CA).
6. Nigerian Agip Exploration Limited [NAEL] v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) & Ors
(2014) 6CLRN 150.
7. The Shell Development Company of Nigeria Limited & Ors v Cresta Integrated Natural Resources
Limited (Appeal No. CA/L/331M 2015)
8. YariCornacchia v Nsanawe Ndekwe, RCOMA 0053/15/CS, 26/2/2016.
9. Southern District Council v Vlug & Another, 2010, 3BLR315 HC Case No. Misca 222 of 2008.
10. Attorney General v Oatile 2011 2BLR 209 CA.
11. Botswana Railways Organisation v Ditshwane [1998] BLR 68, CA.
12. Attorney General v Mafojane & Others [2000] 2 BLR 74 CA
13. Electricity Supply Authority v Maposa 1999(2) ZLR 452 (SC)
14. Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Limited [2007] 3SA 266 SCA
15. Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (PTY) Limited v Andrews CCT97/07/[2009] ZACC 6.
16. Zhongi Development Construction Engineering Company Limited v Kamoto Copper Company
Sarl JDR 2159 (SCA)
17. Kenya Law Reports; Samuel Kamau Muhindi v Blue Shield Insurance Company Ltd [2010]
eKLR.htm
18. Anne Mumbi Hinga v Victoria Njoki Gathara [2009] eKLR.pdf
19. Sadrudin Kurji & Another v Shalimar Limited & 2 Others [2008] eKLR.pdf
20. Kenya Shell Limited v Kobil Petroleum Limited [2006] eKLR.htm
21. Kenya Law Reports Glencore Grain Ltd v TS.S.S Grain Millers Ltd [2012] eKLR.htm
22. Structural Construction Co. Ltd v International Islamic Relief [2006].pdf
130 These cases were sent in for purposes of this paper by courtesy of colleagues, to all of whom I am 
deeply grateful: Emmanuel Amofa, Olufunke Adekoya, Prof. Paul Idornigie, Bernadette Uwicyeza, 
Edward Luke II and Des Williams.  The list is not closed, the idea being to gather, compile and publish 
as many relevant arbitration decisions as possible.   
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23. Kenya Law Reports Tanzania National Roads Agency v Kundan Singh Construction Limited &
Another [2011] eKLR.htm;
24. Alividza v LZ Engineering Construction Ltd.[1989].pdf
25. Christopher Kagema Gichuhi v Benson Irungi Mbaria & Rosemary Wanjiku Mbaria.[1998].pdf
26. Timothy M. Rintari v Madison Insurance Co. Ltd.[2004].pdf
27. Engineer Charchi Githinji T/A Charchi Githinji & Partners Consulting Engineers v National 
Oil Corporation of Kenya. [1999].pdf 
28. Mohamed Salim Shamsudin v Trishcon Construction Ltd.pdf
29. Ernie Campbell & Co. Ltd v Githunguri Dairy Plant Co. Ltd & Githunguri Dairy Farmers Co-op
Society Ltd.[2003].pdf
30. Adcock Ingram East Africa Limited v Surgilinks Limited [2012] eKLR.pdf
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Rethinking the Role of Courts and Judges in supporting Arbitration in Africa, Lagos Court 
of Arbitration International Centre for Arbitration and ADR, Conference Hall, Lagos, 22-24 
June 2016 
National Court Judges and the Arbitral Process 
Dr Emilia Onyema 
Introduction 
Arbitrators and judges resolve disputes but in different fora. One acts in a private process, the 
arbitrators; and the other in a public process, the judge. Both however are in the business of resolving 
disputes between parties in accordance with the law. They can therefore be said to render 
complimentary services. This paper examines this complementarity between judges and arbitrators in 
the service they provide to disputants. I will examine the different stages courts/judges become 
involved in the arbitral process and interrogate the role/function of judges in arbitration and set out 
the symbiotic nature of these relationships. I will use the terms courts and judges interchangeably. 
This paper sets in context the discussions on the role of courts in arbitration and how they can better 
support the arbitral environment in African states, as the theme of this conference.  
My presentation will be divided into three sections: Section 1 will outline when courts become 
involved in arbitration; section 2 will examine the functions of courts in arbitration; and section 3 will 
examine the symbiotic nature of the relationship between judges and arbitrators.   
1. Identifying the Court
In domestic or international arbitration, recourse to a particular national court by the disputing parties
may be relevant. Such recourse may happen at different stages of the life span of the arbitration
proceedings. In international arbitration, different factors may connect such arbitration to a particular
state or country. It is such connection to a state that implicates the laws and courts of that state in the
arbitral reference. Such factors include: the place of the arbitration; the place where enforcement of
the arbitral award is sought; the place where the parties have assets; or where a court perceived by a
party as being supportive (without any connection to the dispute) is located. Any of these factors will
localise the arbitral reference (effectively connect it to that state).
Such connection of the arbitral reference to a state also implicates the application of its laws to 
regulate the arbitration and the support of its courts. It has long being debated whether all of these 
factors have equal value or whether there are some factors that are more valuable than others. These 
have led to different theoretical analysis of such factors in connection with the arbitration. For some 
commentators the seat of the arbitration has a superior value as the place with the closest connection 
to the dispute. So for example Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides in part, “The 
provisions of this Law, except articles (…) apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this 
state.”131 The English Arbitration Act on its part in Section 2 expressly state that, “The provisions of 
131 Article 1(2) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006 revision). 
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this Part apply where the seat of arbitration is in England …” 132  This effectively means that any 
arbitration seated in England is subject to the English Arbitration Act. In contrast to some other 
jurisdictions such as France, where there is no such localisation of international arbitral references. 
According to Article 1504 of the French Arbitration Law 2011, “Arbitration is international when 
international trade interests are at stake”, this definition is very broad. 
The contestation between the various theories is evident: the seat theorists basically contend that 
since the seat has the closest connection to any arbitration, the law of the seat (and by reference the 
regulatory powers of its courts) should have an overriding interest in such arbitration as compared to 
other laws. The autonomous theorists on their part do not see why the seat should be relevant least 
of all, enjoy an overriding interest in the arbitration, simply because it was chosen by or for the parties. 
They argue that international arbitration should enjoy an autonomous existence, so completely 
emancipated from the domination of the state. For example, the French Cour de Cassation in PT 
Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia) v Rena Holding (France)133 noted that:  
An international arbitral award, which does not belong to any state legal system, is an 
international decision of justice and its validity must be examined according to the applicable 
rules of the country where its recognition and enforcement are sought. 
The proponents of the delocalisation theory on their part agree that arbitration may be connected to 
a particular seat but this should be the place where enforcement of the award is sought and not 
necessarily the seat of the arbitration.134 These theories are interesting and they help us think more 
deeply about the nature of arbitration and its relationship with the courts. I have provided a few 
references for those wishing to further explore these various theories. 
For purposes of this panel discussion, in domestic arbitration, the national courts of the state will be 
the relevant courts while for international arbitration references, generally the relevant laws and 
courts are those of the seat of arbitration (if any), and the place where assets are located (primarily 
for interim measures applications and enforcement of awards). The particular courts with jurisdiction 
over international arbitration are generally clearly defined under most national laws.135  
132 S.3 EAA defines seat of the arbitration to mean the juridical seat; while s.4 EAA states that the mandatory 
provisions of the Act apply “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”. See for example the decision in 
C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282.  
133 PT Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia) v Rena Holding (France) decision of the French SC, First Section, No 05-
18053 of 29 June 2007; Rev Arb 2007, 507. 
134 For a good summary of these theories and the attitude of courts in various jurisdictions, see Ahmed 
Massod, “The influence of the delocalisation and seat theories upon judicial attitudes towards international 
commercial arbitration” (2011) Arbitration, vol 77 no 4, pp. 406-422; Hong-Lin Yu, “Explore the Void: an 
Evaluation of Arbitration Theories, Part 1”, (2004) Int ALR, Vol 7(6), pp 180-190; Hong- Lin Yu, “Explore the 
Void: an Evaluation of Arbitration Theories, Part 2”, (2005) Int ALR, Vol 8(1), pp 14-22; and Jan Paulsson, 
“Arbitration unbound: award detached from the law of its country of origin”, (1981) ICLQ, pp 358-387.   
135 These are the laws and courts referred to in my presentation. 
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2. Functions of Courts in Arbitration
Having identified the state whose law and courts may be engaged in arbitration, this section examines
the role such courts may be requested to play in the reference.136 The role of the court in arbitration
can conveniently be divided into three phases: before the formation of the arbitral tribunal (A); after
the formation of the arbitral tribunal (B); and after the conclusion of the arbitration (C).
2A. Before the formation of the Arbitral Tribunal 
The arbitral tribunal cannot make any decision regarding the dispute between the parties or any 
ancillary matters until it has been constituted. Therefore any assistance that one or all the parties may 
require prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, will need to be sought from either the 
arbitration institution or a national court. Arbitration Rules of some institutions empower the 
institution (or a pre-arbitral referee137 or emergency arbitrator138 or special measures arbitrator139) to 
decide certain matters, while national laws empower national courts to decide other matters.  
Examples include: 
Where one party seeks an anti-suit injunction, a national court will grant such an order (Article II.3 
New York Convention; Article 8 Model Law; Section 6 EAA; Article 1448 French Law; Section 4 Nigerian 
ACA; Section 6 Ghana ADR Act). All these laws require their courts to determine the question of 
whether to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement covering the dispute 
before the court.  
To appoint arbitrators: this function by national courts remains relevant under ad hoc references 
where the parties have not nominated an appointing authority. The modern trend is to leave this task 
to an appointing authority or arbitration institution.140 
Extension of time to take various steps, for example commence the arbitration.141 
Interim measures: this function can be performed by national courts or an emergency arbitrator (or 
any of its variants mentioned above). Dr Seriki will discuss this in greater detail. 
It is evident that all of these functions go to the preservation of the subject matter of the dispute for 
determination of the arbitral tribunal. It can therefore be asserted that at this stage, the role of the 
court (or the arbitration institution) is to ensure the constitution of the arbitral tribunal so the 
arbitrators can effectively enter into the reference and determine the dispute. This is a supportive role 
for the courts. 
136 For a detailed discussion of this various phases and shifts in arbitral power, see Emilia Onyema, “Power Shift 
in International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings”, 14 (1 & 2) Caribbean Law Review, (2004), pp. 62-77. An 
electronic copy of this article is available at: <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/4425/> (last accessed 07 April 2016) 
137 For example, under the ICC Arbitral regime. 
138 For example, under art.28 LACIAC Rules; art.34 KIAC Rules. 
139 For example, Under art.11 of the LCA Rules. 
140 For example art.5 LCIA-MIAC Rules; art.9 LACIAC Rules; arts. 13-15 KIAC Rules; arts 8-10 LCA Rules; arts 6-8 
Cairo Rules; and art.3 OHADA, CCJA Rules. 
141 Extension of time can be granted by national courts, institutions, the arbitral tribunal, or agreed between 
the parties, depending on what the extension applies to. 
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2B. After the Formation of the Arbitral Tribunal 
Once the arbitral tribunal is in place, arbitration rules and laws empower the tribunal to manage the 
reference and take effective control of the dispute, hear the parties and determine the dispute 
submitted to it. The arbitral tribunal lacks coercive powers so that courts may render support to the 
arbitral tribunal by enforcing its orders. Such orders include: granting interim measures of protection, 
summoning witnesses, and gathering evidence. 
Where an arbitrator is challenged, arbitration rules and laws empower the arbitration institution or 
appointing authority to decide the challenge application in the first instance with final recourse to the 
courts. 
The role of the court at this phase is very limited and primarily focused on courts providing 
enforcement support for the orders of the arbitral tribunal. It can be asserted that at this phase of the 
arbitral reference, courts are not expected to engage with the arbitral reference. This is 
understandable considering that there is a decision maker empowered by the parties (with the full 
support or ‘permission’ of the state) in place to make such decisions as are required or necessary in 
the arbitration. 
2C. After the Conclusion of the Arbitration 
The arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio after they have published their award and the arbitrators 
have been paid for their services. Their role in the arbitration effectively comes to an end and the 
tribunal disbands. Arbitration rules and laws generally provide for the opportunity for a reconstitution 
of the arbitral tribunal to make additional awards, interpret or correct their award. Where such post 
award services are not required (or where the original tribunal can no longer be reconstituted), at this 
stage there is no longer an arbitral tribunal in place to make any decisions for the parties. So effectively 
the position reverts back to the arbitral tribunal pre-formation phase (2A above). The parties then 
revert back to the courts. These may be different courts from the courts under 2A because the relevant 
courts at this stage will depend on where the losing party has assets if enforcement of the award is 
sought or the seat of the arbitration if the award is being pro-actively challenged. Application for the 
recognition and enforcement or challenge of the arbitral award can only be made to a national court 
which is empowered to decide such matters. 
At this stage, national courts get the opportunity to give effect to the decision of the arbitral tribunal 
or reject it; but such rejection must be on very limited grounds.142 This limitation of the grounds of 
challenge is another evidence of the limited role courts play in arbitration and points directly to the 
nature of the relationship between arbitration and litigation, arbitrators and judges in the arbitral 
process.     
3. Symbiotic Nature of the Relationship
As mentioned above, arbitrators and judges make decisions that are binding on the disputing parties
but both operate in different domains with an evident hierarchy of authority. Arbitrators operate in
the private domain and are very much subject to judges who act in the public domain (and as a matter
of constitutional law, as an emanation of the state). Thus, though the law recognises the decision
arbitrators and judges make as binding, the same law provide for this hierarchy by empowering
142 See for example: art V of the New York Convention; and arts 34 and 36 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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national courts to recognise and enforce the same decisions made by the arbitral tribunal or annul 
it.143 Evidently there is no question of competition between these two processes. Most national laws 
clearly demarcate the spheres of influence of judges and arbitrators. These spheres as shown under 
section 2 above are dedicated to supporting each other.  It is therefore argued that national court 
judges and arbitrators, in the same manner as the processes of litigation and arbitration, can co-exist 
symbiotically, as they each understand the functions of the other in the dispute resolution provision 
service. Arbitrators do not have any powers to encroach on the functions of the judges and do not. 
This is primarily because their powers are circumscribed by the agreement of the parties (as the source 
of the powers of the arbitrator). It is posited that one reason for the interventionist attitude from 
some members of the judiciary is the lack of a clear understanding of the role and functions of 
arbitrators in the dispute resolution process and how arbitrators add value to the task performed by 
national court judges. 
Conclusion 
An appreciation of this symbiotic nature of the relationship between judges and arbitrators, and 
between arbitration and litigation, will assist judges in their decision making in arbitration–related 
matters: to seek to support the arbitral reference within the purview of the law applicable to the 
reference and give due deference to the decisions of the arbitral tribunal. Such co-existence will bring 
to fruition the intention of the legislators in the African states as reflected in their arbitration laws. It 
will also instil confidence in the commercial community (both domestic and international) that their 
choice to arbitrate their disputes will be respected by the state through the judiciary. It will reduce 
the workload of judges who, at the same time, retain a watchful eye over the arbitral process to ensure 
the basic tenets of procedural fairness and their laws (including public policy) are not breached and 
parties left without adequate redress. Finally it will ensure that the perception of interventionist 
judiciaries across the continent (and the attendant impact of such perception) begins to shift away 
from intervention to support.  
143 Or remit the decision back to the arbitral tribunal. 
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The Attitude of the Sudanese Courts to Arbitration 
Ahmed Bannanga 
Abstract 
Arbitration existed in Sudan in civil disputes before independence.144 Arbitration was provided first in 
Section 6(4) of the Civil Procedures Act 1983 (CPA). This Section gave Sudanese courts control over 
the arbitral process. In 2005, the first Sudanese Arbitration Act (SAA 2005) was promulgated with great 
similarities to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1985.  In 2016, a new Arbitration Act was promulgated (SAA 
2016) to enhance the practice of arbitration and incorporate judicial precedents from the application 
of SAA 2005. 
In general and in the last decade, Sudanese courts can be said to be supportive of arbitration. The 
published decisions of the courts confirm this support. Decisions from the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court of Sudan have focused on two main issues. These are:  the validity of the 
arbitration agreement and the contest of the arbitral award under the nullity of suit conditions. It 
projects the debate in the legal practice regarding these two significant issues and how the higher 
courts guided the process positively.  
Therefore, this paper examines the decisions of these two courts on these issues to understand the 
attitude of the Sudanese judiciary towards arbitration and project the future path of the judiciary 
under the new SAA 2016.  
Introduction 
Sudan is a Common Law jurisdiction, which observes the doctrine of precedents and ‘judge-made law’. 
Hence the interpretation of any law by the courts is as significant as the legislation itself. In 2005, 
Sudan adopted its first arbitration legislation in the form of the Sudan Arbitration Act (SAA 2005). It 
was anticipated that the interpretation of the text by the courts would be a challenge since the history 
of arbitration in Sudan did not regard arbitration as an independent method of resolving disputes145.In 
order to understand the interpretation of the court of this legislation, it is important to discuss 
arbitration precedents prior to and after the SAA 2005 to assess the development of arbitration in 
Sudan. The discussion will also focus on the controversial case of Tractors Co. v The Gov. of Sudan, by 
the Supreme Court.  
This paper (and my presentation) is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the court 
precedents prior to the adoption of the SAA 2005 (1). The second section discusses some arbitration 
related decisions of the courts under the SAA 2005 (2). The third section concludes this paper by 
analysing the practice of arbitration under SAA 2005 and the expectation under the new SAA 2016 (3). 
1. The Precedents Prior to the Sudan Arbitration Act 2005
In the Almagmou’a Almutakamela case,146 the Supreme Court held that the agreement of arbitration
is not “sufficient” so that parties have to agree to arbitrate before the court. This means that the
144 Dr. Draig explaining the history of arbitration in “Arbitration Act 2016 and the Implications on the 
Engineering Sector Forum”, Engineers Society, 1st March.2016, Khartoum-Sudan   
145CPA, sub section 6-4 (repelled) 
146Civil Recourse No.624/1999, Almagmou’aAlmutakamela (Integrated Group) v Borahn and other, Sudan Law 
Journal & Reports, 1999 p 192. 
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parties have to submit their case first to the court and then agree to arbitrate. Otherwise their 
agreement to arbitrate is not valid and does not bind the court to refer the dispute to arbitration. In 
this 1999 case, the Supreme Court confirmed this situation which had existed since Sudan’s modern 
judicial system in 1900147. This case was the first precedent published on arbitration in Sudan. It 
reflected that arbitration was not recognised as an independent method of resolving disputes. Thus, 
the Almagmou’a Almutakamela case is significant to assess the courts stand and understanding of 
arbitration and points out the development of that understanding after 2005 Act. 
2. Judicial Precedents after Arbitration Act 2005
In 2005, and after a few months of the SAA 2005 coming into force, the first precedent GNPOC v
Ramsees148was published. The case was referred to arbitration after the request of the parties prior
to the SAA. By the time the arbitral award was rendered, SAA was in force and the Civil Procedures
Act 1983 (CPA) Section 6 was repealed. The losing party requested the court to apply this Section 6 of
the CPA instead of the SAA as the parties had agreed and proceeded with arbitration while Section 6
was the valid law. The court refused this appeal as the CPA was already repealed. The Supreme Court,
however, accepted the concept of the finality of the award, and therefore, the first instance court
decision remained intact. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Nullity
Suit149was not supportive of arbitration. It held that although the losing party cannot contest the
arbitral award unless under nullity suit conditions, but the decision of the first instance court in the
nullity suit is subject to all levels of appeal under the provisions of the CPA. This decision meant that
it was only the procedure the losing party followed that was wrong. According to this decision, the
appellant should have followed the conditions of the nullity suit to appeal before the Appeal Court
with further right of appeal to the Supreme Court as the CPA provides.
A new case emerged to correct the interpretation in the GNPOC case. In Fisal Bank v Osman Musa150, 
The Supreme Court held that “the Nullity Suit is not a separate suit applicable to all rules in the CPA. 
This is because the arbitral proceedings purpose was set to reduce the time of adjudication and its 
domains”. In other words, the GNPOC case understanding was corrected making the nullity suit 
decision final and not subject to any appeal or recourse process. With this decision, it became clearer 
that arbitration practice and the interpretation of the courts are leaning towards favouring the arbitral 
process.151  
One of the shortcomings of the SAA 2005 is the lack of any guidance to courts to assist with the 
appointment of the default party arbitrator, which frustrates the arbitral process. In Alamin v 
Abualarki,152 the first instance court dismissed the claimant’s request for assistance with appointing 
the respondent’s arbitrator. In its judgment, the judge said the SAA 2005 did not mention or give the 
court the power to appoint the parties’ arbitrators. In addition, that the court is not a lawmaker to 
147 There has been no precedent of arbitration since the first law journal and report of 1900.  
148Civil Recourse No. 1216/2005, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co. v Ramsees Engineering Co, 2006 Law 
Journal & Reports, pp 148-151. 
149Art: 40 SAA allows the losing party to contest the award before the competent court following the Nullity 
Suite process. It follows most of art 34 of the Model Law“Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse 
against 
arbitral award” 
150C.R/86/2007-Revision/21/2008, Sudan Journal & Law Reports, 2008, pp137-141 
151 Art: 41-2 “The request referred to in sub-section (1), shall be presented before the competent court, whose 
decision shall be final.” 
152 Civil Appeal No. 2370/2006, Huda Abu Alaraki v Abdalla Al-amin(unpublished) 
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initiate its own power.153 However, the Appeal Court overruled this decision. In the judgment of the 
Supreme Court in Nile Inter Trade Co. v Atcoco Co,154 the judge noted that,  
Although article 14 does not give the court the authority to appoint the reluctant party 
arbitrator, which considers a literal interpretation violates the intent of the legislator. The role 
of the court is to interpret the law by the way that makes it executable...despite the fact that 
the law does not clearly authorize the court to do so, but the law embodies such authority.155 
This judgement is considered to be supportive of arbitration and it provides positive guidance to lower 
courts and stakeholders that the Supreme Court will make sure that arbitration will be supported and 
not crippled as in the Abualarki case. 
In SAS Co v A. Fattah,156 the Supreme Court was explicit in identifying the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. The court explained that the arbitration agreement can take two forms: the first is the 
agreement after the dispute has arisen and the second is the arbitration clause or agreement 
stipulated prior the dispute arising. In both cases, the agreement and the award upon that agreement 
are valid and subject to the Nullity Suit conditions only. This case is significant as it repealed the 
Almagmou’a Almutakamela case previously noted and strengthens the understanding of the arbitral 
agreement and its outcome. In 2013, in Kassala State v Sala International,157 the Supreme Court stated 
clearly that the court must refer the parties to arbitration unless they both neglect the arbitration 
agreement and proceed with the litigation. This case ended any debate about the validity of the 
arbitration agreement and made it clear to stakeholders that the court will not have any discretion in 
an existence of an arbitration agreement following Article 10 of the SAA 2005.158 
In 2014, the Constitutional Court made a decision that is very supportive of arbitration in Sudan. In 
Marble Art Co. v Abdelaziz,159 the losing party (Marble Art) submitted a constitutional petition claiming 
that Article 41(2) of the SAA 2005 is not constitutional.160  The main claim was the contradiction 
between this Article and the constitutional “right to litigation”. 161  The petitioner claimed that 
according to the Article in question, the decision of the first instance court is final, hence, no appeal 
application will be accepted, since such appeal effectively limits the party’s “right to litigation” as 
provided in the Constitution. Judge Haj Al Tahir162 was very clear in his analysis of the issues raised and 
confirmed that the “right to litigation” was not in question since the SAA allowed any party to apply 
to the jurisdictional court to annul the award under the nullity suit conditions. Accordingly, the “right 
to litigation” was preserved. The decision also noted that the legislator was clear in the limited levels 
of appeal due to the nature of arbitration and its advantages of speed and confidentiality. The 
Constitutional Court strengthened its decision by quoting similar claims raised in the Alamatong 
153Darig, Ibrahim.,  Concluded Arbitral Principles (ةصلختسم ةيميكحت ئدابم), 2008, Sudanese House for Books, pp 
100-03
154 Civil Recourse No. 310/2006, Nile Inter Trade v Atcoco for Advanced Trading and Chemical Works Co.
(unpublished) cited in Darig, Ibrahim.,  Concluded Arbitral Principles ( ةصلختسمةيميكحتئدابم ,)8200 ), Sudanese
House for Books, pp 146-149.
155Deraig, pp146-49 (translated from the Arabic text)
156C.R/1053/2008, Sudan Journal & Law Reports, 2008, pp 180-184
157 C.R/232/2011- R/94/2012, Sudan Journal & Law Reports, 2013, pp 278-285
158 SAA Art: 10 “Stay of Suit proceedings for the purpose of Arbitration”
159C.J/66/2014 Marble Art v Abdel Aziz Abbas & the Gov. of Sudan case. the Constitutional Court decision was
notified to the parties in 23.02.2015. (The Law Journal of the Constitutional Court has not yet printed)
160 SAA art: 41-2 “(2) The request referred to in sub-section (1), shall be presented before the competent court,
whose decision shall be final.”
161The Interim Constitution of Sudan art: 35 “the Right to Litigation” states “the right to litigation shall be
guaranteed for all person; no person shall be denied the right to resort to justice”
162 Professor Haj Adam Hassan ALTAHIR, a known Constitutional Court judge and professor of law.
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Leather Co v Cleopatra Co163and State of South Kordofan v Jebarooky Engineering Co164 cases. In both 
cases, the Constitutional Court stated clearly that Article 41(2) of the SAA 2005 does not contradict 
the constitution. These constitutional precedents were victories for arbitration in Sudan and ended 
the debate over the finality of the arbitral award and the limitations on the discretion of the 
jurisdictional court, which are the main motivation to arbitrate. 
3. Judicial Attitude under Sudan Arbitration Act 2016
However, in January 2016, the Supreme Court followed a new trajectory that shocked the Sudanese
arbitration community. The Minister of Justice unveiled a new Supreme Court decision in the Ministry
of Finance v Tractors Co.165  case to defend his proposal in the new Sudan Arbitration Act of 2016 (SAA
2016). The decision clearly states:
Article 41(2) states that the jurisdictional court decision is final… this is a clear infringement 
to article 35 of the Constitution that  has given everybody the right to litigate and it is not 
allowed to forbid anyone to reside to justice. The constitutional text is a commander and 
conclusive and neither discretion nor deception can be held against it by any legislative 
authority to forbid, limit or cripple the right to litigation…   
These are very strong words used by the Supreme Court which effectively deviates from the path it 
followed under SAA 2005. The Minister of Justice published this decision in a newspaper article he 
penned to defend his position after passing the controversial Arbitration Act of 2016 (SAA 2016). The 
new Act was designed to clarify some issues in the wording of the SAA, instead the Minister of Justice, 
according to the Head of the Drafting Committee,166 changed many of its provisions to remove the 
finality of the arbitral award and include greater interference by the jurisdictional court, by allowing 
the parties to exhaust the appeal process under the provisions of the CPA.167  
Following the precedents previously discussed, revoking the concept of finality can be in favour of the 
state. In the Almatanog and South Kordofan constitutional precedents previously noted, the 
government of Sudan was the petitioner before the constitutional court. In the Tractors Co case,168
the government of Sudan was the defendant. In addition the new SAA 2016 was passed by a 
presidential temporary decree as the Legislative Committee169 of the General Assembly rejected the 
bill and the Minister waited for the General Assembly to go on vacation, to proceed under the 
Presidential Decree option.170 This new tendency that treats arbitration as one level of the litigation 
process171 is evidence of the government’s intent to frustrate the finality of the arbitral award.172This 
intention of the government is understandable as the government enjoys multiple grace times 
following the CPA rules of many levels of litigation173 not mentioning the exhaustion of all levels of 
163C.J/79/2008. 
164C.J/23/2008. 
165S.C/892/2015, The Finality or the Fees, Dr. Hassan ALNOR,- Minister of Justice, in AL-Sudani Newspaper, 
28.02.2016. 
166Dr. Ibrahim DRAIG, The Head of the Arbitration Act Review Committee. Interview 23.Feb.2016 
167 SAA16 Art: 44 Procedures of reviewing the nullity request. 
168Also known as Manga Case. 
169Badria SULIMAN, a famous lawyer and Head of the Legislative Committee at the General Assembly. She was 
seriously ill and the Minister couldn’t manage to convince the Committee to vote for the bill he presented.   
170Dr. Awad ALNOR, The Finality or the Fees, Alintabah Newspaper, 28.02.2016. 
171Ahmed BANNAGA, Response to the Minister of Justice, Alahram Newspaper, 23.02.2016  
172 It is to be noted that the CPA gives the state many time extensions and appeal process, which are not 
applied in SAA. This fair and fast process was not embedded in the government bodies, which makes the 
finality of the award and the limitedness of appeal process not welcomed by the state. 
173 The CPA articles gives the government grace time in many levels before the suit in art: 33-4 (2 months) and 
the execution process art: 213 (4 months). 
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appeal that make the dispute carry on over several years.174 In arbitration, government bodies do not 
have this protection, which puts the government in unfamiliar position. The new SAA 2016 reflects 
this issue, and was contested by the Bar Association, 175  the Arbitration Centres,176  the Engineers 
Society177 and arbitration commentators.178  
It is significant to state that there has been no attempt to enforce an international arbitration award 
in Sudan since Sudan is not a New York Convention signatory or member state.179 This means that no 
precedents on this convention have been issued to reflect the Sudanese courts attitude towards the 
enforcement of international awards or interpretation of the New York Convention. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that in Sudan arbitration practice has been developing slowly but positively. The precedents 
of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court encouraged disputants to rely on arbitration. In 
the last, many parties have altered their contract provisions from choice of court to include arbitration 
clauses. Even government institutions and companies relied on arbitration and the precedents 
previously discussed show the engagement of the Ministry of justice in many cases. Despite the fact 
that in most of these cases, the awards rendered were against the government, the Ministry of Justice 
did not issue any restrictions to governmental bodies to limit or cease referral of state disputes to 
arbitration. The new SAA 2016 reflects the willingness of the state to arbitrate rather than litigate, and 
therefore, the Ministry of Justice chose to alter the provisions of the Act rather than limit their use of 
arbitration. Hence, arbitration has taken its place as an independent dispute resolution method in 
Sudan and the debate now is how to run the arbitral process not why to arbitrate. 
Though the setbacks from the decision in the Tractors Co case and Article 44 of the new SAA 2016 are 
disappointing, the reaction and objections published by Sudanese arbitration stakeholders are 
promising and confirm the awareness of the negative impact of this new tendency towards arbitral 
practice and business. The Bar, unions, arbitration centres and practitioners all agree that the push 
for the annulment of the new SAA 2016 in the next General Assembly, on the grounds that its 
promulgation did not comply with the requirement of the Sudanese constitution.180 Also the Tractors 
Co decision can be revoked in the revision level181 by the Supreme Court itself or by the Constitutional 
Court as it contradicts clearly all the Constitutional Court precedents not to mention the lack of 
jurisdiction to rule over the constitutional claims. 
174 According to the CPA, appeal can take up to four levels from the Appeal Court to the Constitutional Court. 
175A public announcement by the Council of the Bar Association was published in the second day of passing the 
law 11.02.2016. 
176Workshop held by the Arab Arbitration Centre in 9th February.16 a week after passing the new Act heavily 
criticised the Act and most of its new articles that abandoned the basic rules of commercial arbitration. 
Workshop on the New Arbitration Act 2016, University of Khartoum- Sharjah Hall  9th.Feb.16 
177Forum of Arbitration 01.03.2016  
178Dr. Magdi ELSALIABI, “The New Arbitration Act 2015 and the Necessity to pass it Under a Temporary 
Decree”Alintabah Newspaper, 16.02.2016. 
179 The Minster of Justice pointed, for the first time, the stand of Sudan towards New York Convention. He 
believes that the NYC needs workshops and debate to avoid the issues raised in different states as result of 
applying the Convention. Dr. Awad ALNOR, The Arbitration Act 2016 & the Bar Association Statement, 
Alintabah Newspaper, 16.02.2016. 
180 The Interim Sudan’s Constitution 2005 art: 109.  
181The CPA art: 197 allows the Head of the Supreme Court to review its decision by a panel of five Supreme 
Court judges.  
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PRACTITIONERS  EXPERIENCE OF THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN UPHOLDING 
ARBITRATION IN AFRICA PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOTSWANA 
Edward W. FASHOLE-LUKE11 
Introduction 
I would like to thank the most High GOD and HIS son JESUS CHRIST for making it possible for me to 
arrive here safely. I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, namely Dr Emilia Onyema 
of the Prestigious SOAS, University of London, my alma mater   for inviting me to speak at this 
conference whose theme is 'PRACTITIONERS’ EXPERIENCE OF THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN UPHOLDING 
ARBITRATION IN AFRICA.’  
I have been asked to speak on the topic of ‘PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO BOTSWANA ON PRACTIONERS EXPERIENCE OF THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN ARBITRATION 
IN AFRICA’, I think it would be prudent to start with a quote from one of the most fascinating, dynamic, 
kind, and extraordinary human beings I have ever had the privilege of meeting.  I am told that when 
this person visited New York, trading on Wall Street was brought to a grinding halt as virtually 
everyone wanted a glimpse of this amazing statesman. President Nelson Mandela said inter alia the 
following:   
It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor. 
I respectfully concur with these sentiments as a view of an Africa-based arbitrator. I respectfully 
believe that Nelson Mandela would have made a brilliant and very effective Africa-based arbitrator as 
it was these skills that enabled him to effectively and successfully navigate South Africa to 
Independent democratic rule in 1994. 
Botswana Arbitration Act 
 Arbitration in Botswana, is governed by the Arbitration Act cap 06:01 of the Laws of Botswana. It is 
extremely out dated in my respectful submission, having been passed in 1959. That notwithstanding, 
it has been my experience, that the courts in Botswana are pro-arbitration. The Arbitration Act of 1959 
vests the courts with certain powers and roles that pertain to arbitration. Where arbitration 
proceedings are misconducted or awards are procured in a way that is not in accordance with the Act, 
the courts are vested with the power to intervene. Courts also have the discretion to make an order 
to stay arbitration where a party to an arbitration agreement requests for that to be done. 
Furthermore, the courts have the power to appoint or remove arbitrators, set aside arbitration awards 
and award costs. 
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Section 11 of the Arbitration Act of Botswana gives the courts the power to appoint an arbitrator in 
any of the following cases: 
 Where a submission provides that the reference shall be to a single arbitrator and all the
parties do not, after differences have arisen, concur in the appointment of an arbitrator;
 If an appointed arbitrator refuses to act, is incapable of acting or dies, and the submission
does not show that it was intended that the vacancy should not be supplied and the parties
do not supply the vacancy;
 where the parties or two arbitrators are at liberty to appoint an umpire or third arbitrator and
do not appoint him, or where two arbitrators are required to appoint an umpire and do not
appoint him; or
 where an appointed umpire or third arbitrator refuses to act, is incapable of acting or dies,
and the submission does not show that it was intended that the vacancy should not be
supplied, and the parties or arbitrators do not supply the vacancy, any party may serve the
other parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to appoint  or, as
the case may be, concur in appointing  an arbitrator, umpire or third arbitrator, and if the
appointment is not made within seven clear days after the service of the notice, the court or
a  judge thereof may, on application by the party who gave the  notice, appoint an arbitrator,
umpire or third arbitrator who shall have similar powers to act in the case and make an award
as if he had been appointed by consent of all parties.
Section 18 of the Act provides for interim measures and states that: 
Unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, every submission shall, where such a 
provision is applicable to the reference, be deemed to contain a provision that the arbitrator 
or umpire may, if he thinks fit, make an interim award, and any reference in this part of the 
Act to an award includes a reference to an interim award.  
I must use a quote by that most brilliant English judge, The Right Honourable, the Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill, who was referred to in The Guardian Newspaper as, ‘the most eminent of our judges’, who 
held office successively as Master of the Rolls, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior Law 
Lord in the House of Lords and who was appointed by HM the Queen, a knight of the Garter in 2005, 
the highest knighthood and the first professional judge to be so honoured. In his gem of a book 
entitled, ‘The Rule of Law’, he states the following at page 85:  
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means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide 
civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve.   
At page 86 he goes on to say: 
An alternative to mediation and conciliation is arbitration: the appointment of an independent 
arbitrator, often chosen by the parties, to rule on their dispute according to the terms of 
reference they give him. This can only be done by agreement, before or after the dispute 
arises, but where it is done the arbitrator has authority to make an award which is binding on 
the parties and enforceable by the court. 
Some Court Judgements 
Let me turn to some decisions my country Botswana. Our Arbitration Act of 1959 as I stated earlier, is 
rather out-dated, but our courts have over the years upheld arbitrations. My starting point is Section 
13(2) of the Arbitration Act which empowers a court to set aside an arbitration award, where it has 
been established that the arbitrator has, 'misconducted the proceedings', or his award has been 
'improperly procured'. In the case of SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL VS VLUG AND ANO (2010) 3 BLR 
315 Newman J said inter alia: 
Before giving consideration to these terms, it is an appropriate time to clarify one small, but 
important, issue. In Total support vs Diversified Health  Systems 2002 4 SA 661  Smalberger 
AJP at p673H emphasised the point that an arbitration arises through the exercise of private 
rather than public powers, and does not fall within the sphere of 'administrative action'. The 
hallmark of arbitration is that it is an adjudication, flowing from the consent of the parties to 
the arbitration agreement, who define the powers of adjudication, and are equally free to 
modify or withdraw that power at any time by way of further agreement... As arbitration is a 
form of private adjudication the function of an arbitrator is not administrative but judicial in 
nature. 
It is respectfully submitted that the conclusion in this case demonstrates that there is a bright future 
for arbitration in Botswana and Africa. Newman J also noted: 
In the premises, it is the finding of this court that the client has failed to make out a case that 
the arbitrator has 'misconducted  the proceedings', and, to the extent that errors of fact or 
law were committed by the arbitrator, same were not so manifest as to amount to misconduct, 
as judicially interpreted. As Harms JA aptly put it, in the TELCORDIA case at pp 301-302 'The 
fact that the arbitrator may have either misinterpreted the agreement, failed to apply South 
African law correctly, or had regard to inadmissible evidence does not mean that he 
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misconceived the nature of the inquiry or his duties in connection therewith. It only means 
that he erred in the performance of his duties. An arbitrator 'has the right to be wrong' on the 
merits of .the case, and it is a perversion of language and logic to label mistakes of this kind 
as a misconception of the nature of the inquiry. Likewise, it is a fallacy to label a wrong 
interpretation of a contract, a wrong perception or application of South African law, or an 
incorrect reliance on inadmissible evidence by the arbitrator as a transgression of the limits 
of his power. The power given to the arbitrator was to interpret the agreement, rightly or 
wrongly; to determine the applicable law, rightly or wrongly; to determine the applicable law, 
rightly or wrongly; and to determine what evidence was admissible, rightly or wrongly. Errors 
of the kind mentioned have nothing to do with him exceeding his powers; they are errors 
committed within the scope of his mandate. To illustrate, an arbitrator in a 'normal' local 
arbitration has to apply South African law but if he errs in his understanding or application of 
local law the parties have to live with it. If such an error amounted to a transgression of his 
powers it would mean that all errors of law are reviewable, which is absurd. 
I have cited the judgment of this case in extensu as it demonstrates the extent to which our 
courts will go to demonstrate the role of judges to uphold arbitration agreements in 
Botswana. 
New York Convention 
Finally, Botswana is a party to the New York convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards. The law here permits a party in whose favour an award has been made to 
enforce the award or an arbitration agreement in the same manner as a judgment, with leave of the 
court. Section 3 of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act provides: 
No arbitral award made in any country which is a party to the convention shall be enforceable 
in Botswana unless a similar award made in Botswana would be enforceable in such country. 
I thank you so very much for your attention. 
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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF COURTS AND JUDGES IN SUPPORTING 
ARBITRATION IN AFRICA – A YOUNG PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE. 
Isaiah Bozimo, FCIArb. 
INTRODUCTION 
A Flawed System? 
The present topic contains an unstated assumption that the role of Courts in arbitration is, or should 
be, different from their everyday role.  The role of the Courts in the Nigerian Legal System is 
governmental.  They exercise judicial powers under the 1999 Constitution to put an end to 
controversies finally and authoritatively.  As such, the Courts have acquired a privileged status in 
Nigeria as the final dispute resolution process. 
On the other hand, Arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process.   Because it is consensual, 
the parties to an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration may need to resort to the Courts to 
enforce incidents of their agreement. 
Ideally, the relationship between Courts and Arbitration should be symbiotic. 
However, rethinking the role of Courts and Judges in supporting Arbitration in Africa suggests a flaw 
in the current system.  Two interesting questions arise here: 
1. Why do we need to rethink the role Courts and Judges?
2. What are the ideal qualities that practitioners expect of these Courts and Judges?
Why do we need a rethink? - Influence of Courts on the choice of arbitral seat. 
With Court support and minimal intervention, Arbitration has the potential to flourish in Africa.  If the 
balance is struck differently, however, parties will avoid choosing jurisdictions in Africa as the seat for 
international arbitrations, and arbitration will also become less attractive to domestic parties.  
Results from the 2015 Queen Mary International Arbitration Survey 182  reflect this sentiment. 
Respondents to the survey identified the two most valuable characteristics of Arbitration as: 
 Enforceability of Awards (65%); and
 Avoiding specific legal systems/national courts (64%).
Respondents to the survey were also asked to specify their preferred seats.  The five most preferred 
and widely used seats are London, Paris, Hong Kong, Singapore and Geneva.  When asked the reasons 
why they prefer certain seats to others, the three paramount factors relate to the formal legal 
infrastructure of the seat – namely: 
 neutrality and impartiality of the local legal system;
182 Queen Mary University of London, '2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations 
in International Arbitration' <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf> accessed 15 June 2016. 
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 national arbitration law; and
 track record of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.
Empirical data, therefore, confirms a direct correlation between the formal legal infrastructure of a 
seat, and the selection of that seat for international arbitration. 
The ideal Court for International Commercial Arbitration 
The success of any particular jurisdiction as it concerns international commercial arbitration depends 
on the quality and qualities of its Courts.  The Queen Mary data confirms that these Courts, as 
supervising seat Courts and as enforcing Courts, are a critical component in the successful operation 
of international commercial arbitration.   
Chief Justice James Allsop of the Federal Court of Australia aptly identified that the desired qualities 
of such Courts can be taken from the description of the subject matter: (1) international; (2) 
commercial; and (3) arbitration.183  
According to the Learned Judge: 
First, the court must be international in focus and approach.  This requires an attitude or state 
of mind of judges, of court administrators and officers, and of practitioners to welcome and 
encourage foreign commercial parties to the jurisdiction.  This international focus of the 
judiciary should be reflected in an arbitration law (written and unwritten) that is 
internationally focused and “arbitration-friendly”.  
Secondly, the Court must be commercial in its focus, skills and approach.  This requires that 
the judges handling arbitral proceedings (whether support, supervision or enforcement) 
understand the commerce involved in the substantive dispute.  How else, for instance, can a 
seat court or enforcing court assess the fairness, or not, as the case may be, of arbitrators 
dismissing a point latterly thought up by a party and of little legal worth that would delay the 
reference or the making of the award.  The fairness of the approach of the arbitrators who 
think the point meritless should be considered by a judge who understands the point.  It is 
critical that international commercial arbitration is supervised by judges who understand 
commerce.  
Thirdly, the court must understand arbitration.  This is not merely quantitative; it is not simply 
knowing about arbitration law and practice.  But it is also qualitative; it involves understanding 
the perspective and approach that facilitates the smooth working of the arbitral system.  This 
183 James Allsop, 'National Courts and Arbitration: Collaboration or Competition?' 
<http://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/ciarbdocuments/london/the-hon-chief-justice-james-allsop-ao-
(australia).pdf?sfvrsn=0> accessed 15 June 2016. 
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“cultural perspective” comes from experience, judicial education and professional 
collaboration with the arbitral community.  
In summary, the ideal Court (and, by extension, the ideal Judge) is: 
 international in outlook,
 commercial in skill and
 arbitration sympathetic.
The pertinent question at this juncture is: have the Nigerian Courts and Judges displayed these 
qualities in their determination of Arbitration related proceedings? 
The Courts will usually become involved with arbitration at the time that either one party seeks to 
enforce the agreement to arbitrate a dispute while the other aims to litigate it, or one party challenges 
or seeks the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award. 
In answering the question posed above, therefore, I propose to review decisions that cut across the 
entire spectrum of the interface between Arbitration and the Courts. 
UPHOLDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS & SUPPORTING THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 
A. Upholding Arbitration Agreements
Imoukhuede v. Mekwunye & 2 Ors.184 
A dispute arose out of a tenancy agreement between the parties, which contained an arbitration 
clause to the effect that disputes were to be referred to a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed by the 
President of the “Chartered Institute of Arbitration (London) Nigerian Chapter”.  
“M” issued a notice of arbitration and wrote to the Nigerian Branch of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (CIArb.) requesting the appointment of a sole arbitrator.  CIArb. complied with the request. 
The arbitral proceedings continued, and a final award was made.  
“I” challenged the award at the High Court of Lagos State on the ground, amongst others, that there 
was no valid arbitration agreement between the parties.   
The contention was that “there is no body/organization known as THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF 
ARBITRATION (LONDON) NIGERIAN CHAPTER and as such, there cannot be a referral for arbitration to 
a non-existent body.”  
The High Court dismissed the challenge.  It found that the Parties’ intention was to refer their disputes 
to arbitration and that the intended appointing authority was the Chairman of the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators, Nigeria Branch. 
184 (2015) 1 CLRN 30 
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The Court of Appeal disagreed.  It held: 
There is nothing from the processes before the lower court to support the 
conclusion reached by the lower court that the Chairman of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators (United Kingdom) Nigeria Branch is the same person as the 
president of the chartered institute of arbitrators London - Nigeria Chapter when 
the words used, in the agreement are clear and ‘do not in my view admit of any 
ambiguity. The duty of the courts inclusive of the lower court where the language 
of an agreement is clear and unambiguous is to make a pronouncement on the 
clear and unambiguous agreement and concur with same.  
… 
If the parties in this appeal really intended that any other person other than the 
President of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators London Nigeria Chapter should 
be the appointing authority as canvassed by learned counsel for the 1st 
respondent, surely same would have been explicitly stated in Exhibit B.  
… 
It follows therefore that since there is in effect no body/organization known as 
the Chartered Institute of Arbitration (London) Nigerian chapter, the clause itself 
is unenforceable. 
With due respect, their Lordships’ decision does not demonstrate an understanding of the arbitral 
process – specifically, the interpretation of pathological arbitration clauses. 
The decision is questionable because for a number of reasons.  First, while Nigerian law enjoins the 
Courts not to rewrite a contract for the parties, where a term of a contract is open to more than one 
interpretation, it is appropriate to adopt the interpretation that is most consistent with business 
common sense.185 
Secondly, the commercial intention of the parties was to submit any dispute arising out of the tenancy 
agreement to binding arbitration. A mistake in the name of an appointing authority does not derogate 
from that intention.  The clause should have been interpreted to give congruent application to this 
intention.    In any event, Nigerian Courts have applied the ‘blue pencil’ rule to invalidate only the 
offending portion of a contractual provision.186 
Thirdly, Nigerian Courts recognise that arbitration clauses are to be respected and should be read, and 
thus construed, as liberally as possible.  In Fidelity Bank Plc. v. Jimmy Rose Co. Limited187, the same 
Division of the Court of Appeal (through presided over by a different panel of Justices) held: 
The position of the law is that whether or not the arbitration agreement is a 
document signed by the parties as envisaged by Section 1(1)(a) of the Arbitration 
185 Texaco Overseas (Nig.) Pet. Co. Unltd. v. Rangk Ltd. (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 494) 1520. 
186 Idika v. Uzoukwu (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1091) 34. 
187 (2012) 6 CLRN 82. 
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and Conciliation Act … or discoverable from their correspondences as per Section 
1(1)(b) thereof, the essential prerequisite is that it must be precise and 
unequivocal. The court will hold such an agreement to be unequivocal if the word 
used is neither permissive nor discretionary.   (Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, in Frontier Oil Limited v. Mai Epo Manu Oil Nigeria Limited, the High Court of Lagos State 
affirmed: 
Courts of law have inherent jurisdiction to decide disputes between parties, but 
where the parties by their own agreement opt for arbitration the courts will 
always respect such agreements and decline jurisdiction. See - Obi Obembe v. 
Wemabod Estates Ltd (1977) 5 SC 131. 
… 
For courts to accept and recognise an agreement as an arbitration agreement it 
must be precise and mandatory… The Agreement will be held to be mandatory 
and unequivocal if it contains the mandatory word “shall” and not the permissive 
and discretionary “may”.  (Emphasis added.) 
I commend the rationale of the respective Courts in Fidelity Bank and Frontier Oil.  The primary focus 
of the Court should be to determine whether the parties have a real intention to submit their dispute 
to arbitration.  That intention crystallises where the reference to arbitration is mandatory.  
To paraphrase the UK House of Lords (as it was then known) in Premium Nafta Products Limited and 
others v. Fili Shipping Company Limited and others (“Fiona Trust”), where the parties make provision 
for an arbitration clause, the interpretation of the said clause should begin with the assumption that 
the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of their 
contractual relationship to be decided by an arbitral tribunal. 
B. Allowing Third-Parties to intervene in Arbitral Proceedings
Statoil Nigeria Limited v. Federal Inland Revenue Service188 
A dispute arose between Statoil and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as to the 
interpretation and performance of the Petroleum Sharing Contract (PSC) between the parties.  This 
resulted in arbitration proceedings being instituted by Statoil. 
The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) subsequently commenced proceedings against all the 
parties to the arbitral proceedings seeking to determine whether the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction 
to determine the subject matter of the arbitration.  FIRS’ position was that the dispute was based on 
issues of tax and the interpretation of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act and was not arbitrable as it 
impacted upon its statutory obligations under the Federal Inland Revenue Act. 
188 (2014) LPELR-23144(CA) 
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Without deciding whether the dispute before the arbitration tribunal was arbitrable, the Court of 
Appeal held that although FIRS was not a party to the arbitration agreement it could intervene in the 
arbitration proceedings.  It held:  
 if a party to an arbitral agreement can challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, or that the arbitral agreement was ab initio, null and void, what about a 
person or authority such as the 1st respondent who was not a party to the 
agreement but complains or that if an award is eventually made one way or the 
other is of the view that the proceedings or subsequent award by an arbitral 
tribunal constitute an infringement of some provisions of the Constitution or the 
laws of the land or impede her constitutional and statutory functions or powers, 
would the person be debarred from seeking declaratory remedies or by 
originating summons ?  I do not think so.  Where there is proved a wrong, there 
has to be a remedy. 
 The Court also held that the third party was not required to wait for an award and then seek to set it 
aside, it could bring independent proceedings to challenge the arbitration proceedings.  It held:  
I am of the humble opinion that it will be in the best interest of the 1st respondent 
not to wait or stand by for the Arbitration Tribunal to complete the proceedings 
and make an award.  1st respondent has the locus standi to act timeously to arrest 
the situation by a declaratory action or originating summons in a Court of law. 
Where the claim succeeds, the Court may make a declaration that the arbitral 
agreement was void ab initio or that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction 
to have entertained the dispute on grounds of constitutional or statutory illegality, 
etc. 
In light of this decision, it appears that a non-party to an arbitration agreement can challenge an award 
in circumstances where the issue of jurisdiction is raised and where the powers conferred by the 
Constitution or by statute are contravened or need to be interpreted. 
This decision highlights the tension between the need for judicial restraint under Section 34 of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) and the inclination of Courts to enforce their Constitutional role 
as the ultimate arbiters of disputes.  This is an important point; to which I will return below. 
C. Interim Measures of Protection
Econet Wireless Limited v. Econet Wireless Nigeria Limited189 
A dispute arose between the parties concerning the operation of a Shareholders Agreement.  Before 
the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Econet Wireless Limited (Econet) sought injunctive reliefs 
against Econet Wireless Nigeria Limited (Econet Nigeria) before the Lagos Division of the Federal High 
Court. 
189 Suit No: FHC/L/CS/832/2003 
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The Court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the Application because the substantive dispute 
impacted on the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act.  Having said that, the Court found 
that an injunction is a remedy and not a cause of action.  Since there was no substantive action before 
the Court from which injunctive reliefs could flow, the Court adjudged the application to be 
incompetent. 
Some commentators attempt to justify the Court’s decision by an analysis of Section 34 ACA.  The 
contention is that, under Section 34, Courts are precluded from intervening in arbitral matters except 
in circumstances provided under the Arbitration Act.  To this end, the ACA does not contain a provision 
that allows a party could apply to Court for an interim order of protection prior to the constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal. 
With respect, this contention is based on the erroneous proposition that the entire scope of Court 
intervention is to be found in the ACA and nowhere else.  I disagree with this.  Rather, Section 34 
envisages two distinct systems of Court intervention.  In matters governed by the Act, the ACA takes 
effect, and no other relief may be sought or granted except for those set out in the Act.   
However, in matters not governed by the Act, the Courts may continue to offer all such remedies in 
all such circumstances as are available under existing law.   
To ascertain which of the two systems is applicable in a given case, it must be determined whether 
that case is a ‘matter governed by’ the ACA.   To “govern” a matter implies the existence in the ACA 
of a defined power to regulate and control a specified matter.  
Happily, the Courts have departed from the rationale displayed in the Econet decision. 
Lagos State Government v. Power Holding Company of Nigeria190 
A dispute arose between the Lagos State Government and Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
in respect of a Barge Power Purchase Agreement and Contribution Agreement.  The said dispute was 
referred to arbitration. 
Lagos State Government sought interim measures of protection against PHCN and third parties that 
were not signatories to the Arbitration Agreement. 
The High Court of Lagos State found that it had jurisdiction to grant the interim measures sought, even 
while arbitral proceedings were pending between some of the parties to the Application.  Also, the 
Court found that the provisions of the Arbitration Act did not apply to Arbitral Tribunals alone.  The 
jurisdiction of the High Court could also be engaged in appropriate circumstances. 
190 (2012) 7 CLRN 134. 
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D. Supporting the Arbitral Process
Statoil Nigeria Limited v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation191 
This case concerns the dispute between Statoil and NNPC as to the interpretation and performance of 
the Petroleum Sharing Contract (PSC) between the parties.  NNPC challenged the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction on the ground that the subject-matter of the dispute (which it alleged to be taxation) was 
not arbitrable under Nigerian law. 
Before the hearing of the jurisdictional challenge, NNPC applied to the arbitral tribunal for a stay of 
proceedings on the ground that the proceedings would be affected by the decision of the Federal High 
Court in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/774/11- FIRS v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation & 4 Ors. which 
related provisions of a production sharing contract involving tax issues. 
The arbitral tribunal refused the application.  NNPC proceeded to file an ex parte application at the 
Federal High Court (FHC) for an order of interim injunction restraining the arbitral tribunal from 
continuing the arbitration proceedings.  The FHC granted the interim order of injunction.  
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeal held that a Court cannot issue an injunction to restrain 
arbitral proceedings.  The Court held: 
In this instant case, the issuance of ex parte interim injunction does not fall under 
the exceptions to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.  It is very clear from the 
intendment of the legislature that the court cannot intervene in arbitral 
proceedings outside those specifically provided.  
Where there is no provision for intervention, this should not be done. The learned 
trial judge of the lower court acted outside the jurisdiction conferred on him by 
granting the ex parte interim order.”  (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Statoil decision in Nigerian Agip Exploration Limited v. Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation192.  As with Statoil, the underlying dispute arose from the operation 
of a Production Sharing Contract between the parties.  NNPC challenged a Partial Award under which 
the tribunal assumed jurisdiction over the substantive dispute; and sought an interlocutory injunction 
restraining the tribunal from continuing with the Arbitration.  The Federal High Court granted the 
interlocutory injunction. 
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the Courts did not have jurisdiction to issue anti-arbitration 
injunctions.  Relying on Section 34 of the ACA, the Court held: 
On the import of Section 34 of A.C.A., J.O. Orojo and M.A. Ajomo the learned 
authors of LAWS AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION and CONCILIATION IN NIGERIA 
at p. 269 on the input of S.34 of A.C.A., stated thus – 
191 (2013) 7 CLRN 72 
192 (2014) 6 CLRN  150 
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“The Decree provides for the intervention of the court in certain aspects of 
the arbitral process … Where, however, the Decree does not provide for the 
intervention of the court, this should not be done…”  
The Statoil and NAE decisions have been celebrated as reinforcing the position that domestic courts 
should not intervene where parties have consented to arbitral proceedings, except to the extent that 
such intervention is expressly permitted by the ACA. 
While I might agree with the outcome of the decisions, I nevertheless question the Court’s 
interpretation of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.  My reasons have been articulated 
above.  Having said that, the ‘correct’ application of Section 34 ACA can yield uncertain outcomes. 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v. Crestar Integrated Natural Resources Limited193 
In SPDC v. Crestar, the applicant (Crestar) sought an interlocutory injunction from the Court of Appeal 
to restrain (amongst others) SPDC from continuing with an ICC Arbitration between the parties, seated 
in London.  SPDC relied on the Statoil and NAE decisions in inviting the Court to dismiss the application. 
The Court of Appeal considered necessary to clarify: 
… Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is only applicable to matters ‘governed by the
Act’ so that if it is found in any proceeding, that the particular facts and 
circumstances do not come within the purview of the Act, the provisions of 
Section 34 cannot apply with full force. 
The Court found that the ACA only applied to ‘domestic’ arbitral proceedings seated in Nigeria.  For 
that reason, it considered a Court’s jurisdiction to restrain foreign arbitral proceedings is not a matter 
that is governed by the Act. 
Relying on Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to grant the 
injunction, and further found that it was appropriate the grant the said injunction in the circumstances. 
In my humble opinion, the Court’s interpretation of Section 34 was correct.  However, I have some 
concerns as to the application of Section 34 and the effect of the Court’s decision. 
First, it would appear that the Court of Appeal has inadvertently declared the ACA to be inapplicable 
to international arbitration, even if seated in Nigeria. 
Secondly, it also seems that the decision has created two regimes.  As it concerns domestic arbitration, 
the Courts do not have jurisdiction to issue anti-arbitration injunctions.  However, in international 
arbitration, the jurisdiction remains intact. 
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal interfered with the Tribunal’s power to determine its jurisdiction.  The 
injunction was sought on the premise that the arbitration agreement was null and void.  The tribunal 
did not have the opportunity to decide this question. 
193 Appeal No. CA/L/331M/2015 
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ENFORCING/SETTING ASIDE ARBITRAL AWARDS 
Guinness Nigeria Plc. v. NIBOL Properties Ltd.194 
Guinness issued proceedings to set aside a Final Award made pursuant to arbitral proceedings 
between the parties.  NIBOL commenced separate proceedings to enforce the said Award.  Both 
applications were consolidated. 
The High Court of Lagos State made a number of ‘arbitration friendly’ pronouncements and succinctly 
summarised the position under Nigerian Law.  It held: 
I am in total agreement … that there is a live Judicial Policy of ascribing priority to 
the upholding of Arbitral Awards, by the regular Courts … and that there is a 
narrow compass that attracts the Courts to override this Policy by setting aside 
an Award.  This argument is valid and pivotal for a Court to keep in mind in these 
type of matters for reasons espoused in the Case Law … 
The Court proceeded to make reference to the following decisions of the Court of Appeal: 
Aye-Fenus Ent. Ltd. v. Saipem Nig. Ltd.195, where the Court found: 
Parties to a transaction choose their Arbitrator for better or for worse to be the 
Judge both as to the decisions of Law and decisions of fact in dispute between 
them.  Thus none of them can when the Award is prima facie good on the face of 
it, object to its decision wither upon the Law of the Facts simply because the 
Award is not in his favour. 
Arbico Nigeria Limited v. Nigeria Machine Tools Limited196, on the point that: 
The Court in spite of its wide power has to bear in mind that he Parties have 
provided in their Agreement to have their dispute or difference referred to 
Arbitration as against the regular Courts … and it has to show reluctance to 
interfere with the Arbitrator’s jurisdiction as the Sole Judge of the Law and Facts 
unless it is compelled to do so… 
Baker Marine Nigeria Limited. v. Chevron Nigeria Limited197, which confirmed: 
The lower Court was not sitting as an Appellate Court over the Award of the 
Arbitrators.  The lower Court was not therefore empowered to determine 
whether or not the findings of the Arbitrators and their conclusions were wrong 
in Law.  What the lower Court had to do it to look at the Award and determine 
whether the state of the Law as understood by them and as stated on the face of 
the Award the Arbitrators complied with the Law as they, themselves, rightly or 
194 (2015) 5 CLRN 65 
195 (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1126) 483. 
196 (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 789) 1. 
197 (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 391. 
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wrongly perceived it.  The approach here is subjective.  The Court places itself in 
the position of the Arbitrator, not above them, and then determines on that 
hypothesis whether the Arbitrators followed the Law as they understood and 
expressed it. 
Based on the foregoing decisions, the High Court of Lagos State concluded (in the Guinness decision): 
… I am satisfied that the evidential burden on GUINNESS must necessarily be a
strident one …  I agree and hold that it is a high hurdle, indeed, to be scaled, for 
GUINNESS to get the regular Court to ignore the contractual, consensual and 
Arbitral Forum elected by the Parties; elongate the more summary and timely 
Arbitral experience; and interfere with, subvert and substitute the Arbitrator’s 
Jurisdiction as the Sole Judge of Law or Fact. 
Though the evidential burden for applicants seeking to set aside an arbitral award is high, any benefits 
derived are eroded by the slow pace of the administration of justice before the Nigerian Courts. 
IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation198 
IPCO v. NNPC is an English decision, but it contains very interesting information concerning the lack of 
efficiency of the Nigerian judicial process in setting aside/enforcing arbitral awards. 
At para 158 of the Judgement, the English Court of Appeal observed: 
The analysis set out above derives from (i) a consideration of the applications now in issue; (ii) 
the timescales for determination at first instance contemplated by Tomlinson J; (iii) and what 
has happened in fact. It is supported by the expert evidence before Field J. The Hon Justice 
S.M.A. Belgore, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, instructed on behalf of IPCO, agreed with the
evidence of the late Justice Eso that it was "conceivable that there will be no fixed
determination of the issue of whether the arbitral award will be set aside for twenty or thirty
years or longer". I take him to be meaning another 20 or 30 years from the date of his report
in 2013 rather than from that of Justice Eso in 2007 i.e., at the very lowest, an additional 6
years. Consistently with that he said that there had been no change in the delay in the
administration of justice in Nigeria since Justice Eso made his first witness statement and that
in fact the circumstances were "far worse" as the courts were experiencing more congestion.
The Court of Appeal ordered that IPCO should be able, in principle, to enforce the Award, 
notwithstanding the existence of challenges to it in Nigeria, given the very significant delay in resolving 
those challenges before the Nigerian courts.  
198 [2015] EWCA Civ 1144 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Have the Nigerian Courts been international in outlook, commercial in skill and sympathetic to 
arbitration?  The answer is evocative of old Western Film, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”. 
The Good 
Generally speaking, arbitration awards are not easily set aside in Nigeria.  The decision of the High 
Court of Lagos State in Guinness Nigeria Plc. v. NIBOL Properties Ltd confirms that there is a high 
evidentiary threshold to be met, and few and far between are those cases where the challenges have 
been found successful. 
Likewise, the contemporary view is that Nigerian Courts have the power to grant interim relief pending 
arbitration (Lagos State Government v. Power Holding Company of Nigeria). 
While the Nigerian Courts have broad Constitutional powers to decide disputes between parties, they 
recognise that where the parties by their agreement opt for arbitration, the Courts will always respect 
such agreements and decline jurisdiction (Frontier Oil Limited v. Mai Epo Manu Oil Nigeria Limited; 
Fidelity Bank Plc. v. Jimmy Rose Co. Limited). 
The principle of limited Court intervention is robust in Nigeria.  The Court of Appeal decisions in Statoil 
v. NNPC and NAE v. NNPC support the position that a Court cannot issue an injunction to restrain
arbitral proceedings.
The Bad 
There is a lack of consistency in the Court decisions.  While the Court lacks the jurisdiction to restrain 
arbitral proceedings in domestic arbitration, it appears that this prohibition does not extend to 
international arbitration (SPDC v. Crestar). 
The wheels of justice turn “fantastically” slow in the Nigerian Courts (IPCO v. NNPC).  This negates the 
beneficial effect of decisions that are considered to be arbitration friendly. 
Some decisions demonstrate a lack of understanding of the qualitative perspective and approach that 
facilitates the smooth working of the arbitral system (Imoukhuede v. Mekwunye; Econet Wireless 
Limited v. Econet Wireless Nigeria Limited). 
The Ugly 
A disturbing trend is emerging, which appears to suggest that cases with a political element are more 
likely to negatively impact the arbitral process – I have in mind the first instance decisions the first 
instance decisions of the Federal High Court in NNPC v. Statoil and NNPC v. NAE, where anti-arbitration 
injunctions were issued by the respective Courts. 
Nevertheless, this trend is curbed by the Court of Appeal decisions in Statoil v. NNPC and NAE v. NNPC. 
How can the system be reoriented to be more ‘arbitration friendly’? 
The disparity in judicial decisions flowing from arbitral proceedings is inimical to the growth of 
Arbitration in Nigeria and Africa.  A number measures can be taken to enhance judicial efficiency in 
this regard. 
We can ensure efficiency in Court decisions by: 
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 Introducing guidelines for the interpretation of provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention.
 Continuous training of Judges and legal practitioners in the field of commercial arbitration.
 Introducing an online repository of domestic and foreign decisions arising from arbitration
applications.
 Introducing an ‘Arbitration Support Judge’ in each State, in whom jurisdiction will be vested to
support domestic and arbitration proceedings.
Given the criticism in IPCO v NNPC, is it also time to consider: 
 Introducing time limits for the determination of arbitration applications.  The Lagos State
Arbitration Law and the Draft Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Bill contain Case Management
Provisions to achieve this aim.
 Conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal for all arbitration applications?  This
removes one layer of ‘bureaucracy’ in the form of the High Courts.  Besides, there is a trend in
Nigeria that arbitration-related decisions become more coherent as they travel up the judicial
hierarchy.
Implementing these measures will go some way to ensuring that Nigerian Courts and Judges are 
international in outlook, commercial in skill and arbitration sympathetic. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: African Countries: Status of Arbitration Laws and Conventions 
No Country National Legislation New York 
Convention 
ICSID 
Convention 
1 Algeria Arbitration Law No 08-09, 2008 8 May 1989 22 March 1996 
2 Angola Voluntary Arbitration Law 2003 - - 
3 Benin Republic OHADA UAA 14 Aug 1974 14 Oct 1966 
4 Botswana Arbitration Act, 1959 19 Mar 1972 14 Feb 1970 
5 Burkina Faso OHADA UAA 21 June 1987 14 Oct 1966 
6 Burundi Civil Procedure Code 2004 21 Sept 2014 5 Dec 1969 
7 Cameroon OHADA UAA 19 May 1988 2 Feb 1967 
8 Cape Verde Arbitration Law of 2005 - 26 Jan 2011 
9 Central Africa Republic OHADA UAA 13 Jan 1963 14 Oct 1966 
10 Chad OHADA UAA - 14 Oct 1966 
11 Comoros OHADA UAA 27 July 2015 7 Dec 1978 
12 Congo, Republic of OHADA UAA - 14 Oct 1966 
13 Cote d’Ivoire OHADA UAA 2 May 1991 14 Oct 1966 
14 Democratic Republic of Congo OHADA UAA 3 Feb 2015 29 May 1970 
15 Djibouti Code of International Arbitration 1984 27 June 1977 - 
16 Egypt Arbitration Law 1994 (amended 1997) 7 June 1959 2 June 1972 
17 Eritrea Book IV, Civil Procedure Code 1965 - Signed 21 Sept 
1965 
18 Ethiopia Civil Procedure Code of 1991 - Signed 21 Sept 
1965 
19 Equatorial Guinea OHADA UAA - 19 Nov 1978 
20 Gabon OHADA UAA 15 Mar 2007 14 Oct 1966 
21 Gambia ADR Act 2005 - 26 Jan 1975 
22 Ghana ADR Act 2010 8 July 1968 14 Oct 1966 
23 Guinea OHADA UAA 23 April 1991 4 Dec 1968 
24 Guinea-Bissau OHADA UAA - Signed 4 Sept 
1991 
25 Kenya Arbitration Act 2005 amended 2009 11 May 1989 2 Feb 1967 
26 Lesotho Arbitration Act No 12 of 1980 11 Sept 1989 7 Aug 1969 
27 Liberia Arbitration Law, Chapter 7 Commercial 
Code 2010 
15 Dec 2005 16 July 1970 
28 Libya Code of Civil Procedure 1953 - - 
29 Madagascar Arbitration Law 98-019 of  2 Dec 1998 14 Oct 1962 14 Oct 1966 
30 Malawi Arbitration Act of 6 Nov 1967 - 14 Oct 1966 
31 Mali OHADA UAA & Arb Code 2000 7 Dec 1994 2 Feb 1978 
32 Mauritania Code of Arbitration No 2000-06 30 April 1997 14 Oct 1966 
33 Mauritius International Arbitration Act No 37 of 
2008 
17 Sept 1996 2 July 1969 
34 Morocco Code of Civil Procedure 1947 (modified 
in 2007) 
7 June 1959 10 June 1967 
35 Mozambique Law on Arbitration, Conciliation and 
Mediation No 11/99 of  8 July 1999 
9 Sept 1998 7 July 1995 
36 Namibia Arbitration Act No 42 of 1965 - Signed 26 Oct 
1998 
37 Niger OHADA UAA 12 Jan 1965 14 Dec 1966 
38 Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988 15 June 1970 14 Oct 1966 
39 Rwanda Arb & Conciliation in Commercial 
Matters Law No 005 of 2008 
29 Jan 2009 14 Nov 1979 
40 Sao Tome & Principe Voluntary Arb Law No 9 of 2006 18 Feb 2013 19 June 2013 
41 Senegal OHADA UAA 15 Jan 1995 21 May 1967 
42 Seychelles Commercial Code 1977 & Code of Civil 
Procedure 1920 
- 19 April 1978 
43 Sierra Leone - - 14 Oct 1966 
44 Somalia Civil Procedure Code, Book III, 1974 - 30 Mar 1968 
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45 South Africa Arbitration Act No 42 of 1965 1 Aug 1976 - 
46 South Sudan - - 18 May 2012 
47 Sudan Arbitration Act 2005 - 9 May 1973 
48 Swaziland Arbitration Act No 24 of 1904 - 14 July 1971 
49 Tanzania Arbitration Act 1931 revised 2002 11 Jan 1965 17 June 1992 
50 Togo OHADA UAA - 10 Sept 1967 
51 Tunisia Arbitration Code, Law No 93-42, 1993 15 Oct 1967 14 Oct 1966 
52 Uganda Arbitration & Conciliation Act 2000 
(amended 2008) 
12 May 1992 14 Oct 1966 
53 Zambia Arbitration Act No 19 of 2000 12 June 2002 17 July 1970 
54 Zimbabwe Arbitration Act No 6 of 1996 28 Dec 1994 19 June 1994 
OHADA UAA = OHADA Uniform Arbitration Act 11 March 1999 
Sources: https://arbitrationinafrica.com/countries/; http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html; 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx; http://ohada.org/. 
Table 2: African Countries: List of known Arbitration Institutions 
No Institution/Centre Country 
1 Algerian Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Algiers 
Web: http://www.ccis-agadir.com/pages/c_arbitrage.php 
Algeria 
2 Annaba Mediation & Arbitration Centre, Annaba Algeria 
3 Centre for Extra Judicial Resolution of Disputes (CREL) Angola 
4 Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Centre of the Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry of Benin 
Web: http://www.ccibenin.org/ 
Benin Republic 
5 Conciliation and Arbitration Chamber of the Cotton Inter-professional Association 
of Cotonou 
Benin Republic 
6 Ouagadougou Arbitration, Mediation & Conciliation Centre of the Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry 
Web: http://www.camco.bf/ 
Burkina Faso 
7 Burundi Centre for Arbitration & Mediation Burundi 
8 Centre d’Arbitrage du GICAM (Groupement Interpatronal du Cameroun), Douala 
Web: http://legicam.cm/  
Cameroon 
9 Centre d’arbitrage du CPAM, Yaounde 
Web: http://www.cadevafrique.org/  
Cameroon 
10 Centre d’Arbitrage, de Mediation et de Conciliation de Centrafrique (CAMC-CA), 
Bangui. 
Central Africa Republic 
11 Centre de Mediation et d’arbitrage, Ndjamena (project launched in March 2016) Chad 
12 Centre d’Arbitrage et de Mediation attached to the Brazzaville Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Jobs, Libreville. 
Web: www.cciambrazza.com  
Congo 
13 Centre de mediation et d’arbitrage au Congo (CEMACO) Congo 
14 Le Centre d’Arbitrage du Congo (CAC) Kinshasa 
Web: www.cac-rdc.org  
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
15 National Centre for Arbitration, Conciliation & Mediation (CENACOM), Kinshasa 
Web: http://www.cenacom.cd/ 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
16 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Business Arbitration Centre Djibouti 
17 Cairo Regional Centre for ICA (CRCICA) 
Web: http://www.crcica.org.eg  
Egypt 
18 Sharm El Sheikh International Arbitration Centre 
Web: http://www.shiac.com/ 
Egypt 
19 Dr A Kheir Law & Arbitration Center (AKLAC) 
Web: http://www.kheirlaw.com.eg 
Egypt 
20 Addis Ababa Chamber & Sectorial Association Arbitration Institute 
Web: http://www.addischamber.com/ 
Ethiopia 
21 Centre d’Arbitrage, de Mediation et de Conciliation (CAMC-GA) Gabon 
22 Ghana Arbitration Centre 
Web: http://www.ghanaarbitration.org/ 
Ghana 
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23 Ghana Association of Certified Mediators & Arbitrators (GHACMA), Accra 
Web: http://www.ghacma.org/  
Ghana 
24 Arbitration Centre Chambre d’Arbitrage de la Guinee, Conakry Guinea 
25 Arbitration Centre Chambre d’Arbitrage de Cote d’Ivoire 
Web: http://www.caci.ci/ 
Ivory Coast 
26 Common Court of Justice & Arbitration of OHADA 
Web: http://www.ohada.org/ccja.html 
Ivory Coast 
27 Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Ivory Coast, Abidjan 
Web: http://www.cci.ci 
Ivory Coast 
28 Dispute Resolution Centre, Nairobi 
Web: http://www.disputeresolutionkenya.org/ 
Kenya 
29 Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration 
Web: http://ncia.or.ke/   
Kenya 
30 The Directorate of Dispute Prevention & Resolution 
Web: http://www.ddpr.org.ls 
Lesotho 
31 Libyan Centre for Mediation & Arbitration Libya 
32 The Libyan International Arbitration Commercial Centre 
Web: http://odysseia.ly/portfolio-items/the-libyan-international-arbitration-
commercial-center/ 
Libya 
33 Arbitration Centre of Madagascar 
Web: http://www.camm-mada.org/ 
Madagascar 
34 Centre d’Arbitrage et de Conciliation du Mali (CECAM) Bamako 
Web: www.ccigabon.com  
Mali 
35 Permanent Court for Arbitration at the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
Web: http://www.mcci.org/en/ 
Mauritius 
36 LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre, Ebene 
Web: http://www.lcia-miac.org/ 
Mauritius 
37 Euro-Mediterranean Center for Mediation & Arbitration, Casablanca Morocco 
38 Rabat International Mediation & Arbitration Centre (CIMAR) 
Web: http://www.cimar-maroc.org/ 
Morocco 
39 CCIS, Agadir 
Web: http://www.ccis-agadir.com/ 
Morocco 
40 Centre for Arbitration Conciliation & Mediation (GACM) Maputo 
Web: www.cacm.org.mz  
Mozambique 
41 Centre de Mediation et d’Arbitrage de Niamey (CMAN) attached to the Niger 
Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie et d’Artisan 
Web: www.camco.bf  
Niger 
42 Regional Centre for ICA Lagos (RCICAL) 
Web: http://www.rcicalagos.org/ 
Nigeria 
43 Maritime Arbitrators Association of Nigeria (MANN) 
Web: http://maanigeria.org/  
Nigeria 
44 Lagos Court of Arbitration Centre 
Web: http://www.lagosarbitration.org/ 
Nigeria 
45 International Centre for Arbitration & Mediation, Abuja (ICAMA) 
Web: http://www.icama.com/ 
Nigeria 
46 Lagos Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Centre 
Web: http://www.laciac.org/  
Nigeria 
47 Janada International Centre for Arbitration & Mediation, Abuja 
Web: http://www.jicam.org/  
Nigeria 
48 Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC) 
Web: http://www.kiac.org.rw 
Rwanda 
49 Arbitration Centre of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
Web: http://www.cciad.sn/ 
Senegal 
50 Dakar Arbitration & Mediation Centre Senegal 
51 Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa 
Web: http://www.arbitration.co.za 
South Africa 
52 Equillore Group 
Web: http://www.equillore.com/wp/ 
South Africa 
53 Africa Alternative Dispute Resolution (Africa ADR) 
Web: http://www.africaadr.com/ 
South Africa 
54 The Association of Arbitrators South Africa 
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Web: http://www.arbitrators.co.za/  
55 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (CCMA) 
Web: http://www.ccma.org.za/ 
South Africa 
56 Tokiso Dispute Settlement Pty Ltd South Africa 
57 South Sudan Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture, Juba 
Web: http://www.southsudanchamber-commerce.org 
South Sudan 
58 Arab Centre for Arbitration Sudan 
59 International Chamber of Arbitration Sudan 
60 The Sudanese Centre for Conciliation & Arbitration 
Web: http://sudanesearbitration.com/ 
Sudan 
61 Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission (CMAC) 
Web: http://www.cmac.org.sz/ 
Swaziland 
62 The National Construction Council, Dar es Salaam 
Web: http://www.ncc.or.tz/index.html 
Tanzania 
63 East African Court of Justice (Arbitration Institution) Arusha 
Web: http://eacj.org/  
Tanzania 
64 Tanzania Institute of Arbitrators (TIA), Dar es Salaam Tanzania 
65 Arbitration Court CATO, Lome 
Web: http://www.ccit.tg/ 
Togo 
66 Centre for Conciliation & Arbitration of Tunis (CCAT) Tunisia 
67 Al Insaf Center, Tunis Tunisia 
68 Centre for Arbitration & Dispute Resolution, Kampala Uganda 
69 Zambia Centre for Dispute Resolution Zambia 
70 Commercial Arbitration Centre in Harare Zimbabwe 
71 Africa Institute of Mediation and Arbitration, Harare 
Web: http://www.aima.org.zw/  
Zimbabwe 
Table 3: Participation of African parties, cities and arbitrators in ICC Arbitrations: 2000-2015 
Year Parties Cities Arbitrators 
2000 89 2 9 
2001 74 3 12 
2002 74 7 13 
2003 79 6 28 
2004 72 2 18 
2005 68 8 23 
2006 81 - 27 
2007 50 3 16 
2008 87 2 34 
2009 126 14 39 
2010 122 9 40 
2011 174 12 52 
2012 127 6 23 
2013 174 9 27 
2014 163 8 38 
2015 48 3 32 
TOTAL 1608 94 431 
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Table 4: Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Membership Data for Africa: January to 
December 2015 
No Country Associate Member Fellow Total 
1 Kenya 238 174 47 459 
2 Mauritius 29 19 6 54 
3 Nigeria 430 281 96 807 
4 South Africa 15 28 16 59 
5 Zambia 27 31 4 62 
6 Zimbabwe 9 3 5 17 
7 Others* 53 47 5 105 
Total 801 583 179 1563 
*Applies to those members in a country without branch/chapter and who do not wish to be attached to any
existing branch/chapter.
Table 5: Extract from WJY Rule of Law Index 2015: Comparative Table for Ranking of African 
Countries out of 102 Countries worldwide. 
No Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
1 Botswana 32 29 35 55 28 22 33 27 
2 Ghana 28 59 41 30 52 31 34 40 
3 South Africa 40 42 27 39 81 33 39 38 
4 Senegal 29 36 55 40 59 42 46 52 
5 Tunisia 34 44 59 62 50 43 49 41 
6 Morocco 48 48 60 86 44 39 54 86 
7 Malawi 47 80 65 49 83 73 50 48 
8 Tanzania 55 77 62 71 91 77 57 67 
9 Zambia 68 70 72 89 62 68 71 65 
10 Cote d’Ivoire 72 69 93 79 77 65 43 64 
11 Burkina Faso 86 73 90 58 67 67 70 70 
12 Madagascar 81 82 74 81 54 87 90 78 
13 Liberia 54 94 71 50 94 95 81 92 
14 Kenya 50 96 79 76 96 70 73 89 
15 Egypt 91 52 91 98 66 93 92 55 
16 Sierra Leone 59 91 96 63 86 91 85 85 
17 Ethiopia 96 53 94 97 56 98 98 61 
18 Uganda 89 100 92 94 85 94 68 80 
19 Nigeria 63 97 77 87 102 74 62 73 
20 Cameroon 83 101 95 74 98 92 96 91 
21 Zimbabwe 101 92 102 101 78 100 79 72 
Source: World Justice Program Rule of Law Index 2015 available at: 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf (accessed 9 Feb 2016) 
Legend:  
Factor 1: Constraints on government powers 
Factor 2: Absence of corruption 
Factor 3: Open government 
Factor 4: Fundamental rights 
Factor 5: Order and security  
Factor 6: Regulatory enforcement 
Factor 7: Civil justice 
Factor 8: Criminal justice 
Factor 9: Informal justice 
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43 Fidele Masengo Rwanda 
44 Folashade Alli Nigeria 
45 Fri Achu Cameroon 
46 Frinwei Achu Cameroon 
47 Funke Adekoya Nigeria 
48 Georgiana Sara Karim Sierra Leone 
49 Gerard Mbah Tambi Nigeria 
50 Gilbert Awah Bongam Cameroon 
51 Haider Ahmed Daffala Sudan 
52 Hakeem Seriki UK 
53 Harelimana Jean Baptiste France 
54 
Henrietta Ekundayo 
Emilea Cole Sierra Leone 
55 Ikechukwu Ogu Nigeria 
56 Ikpeme Nkebem Nigeria 
57 Irene Chirwa Mambilima Zambia 
58 Isaiah Bozimo Nigeria 
59 Izuchukwu Oboko Nigeria 
60 Janet Ilunga Zambia 
61 Jean Alain Penda Canada 
62 Jespa Tichock Ajereboh Cameroon 
63 Jide Adesokan UK 
64 Jimmy Muyanja Uganda 
65 JImmy Kodo Côte d'Ivoire 
66 Joe Tia Ghana 
67 John Gaffney UAE 
68 Joyce Williams USA 
69 Joyce Thompson Ghana 
70 Justice Mahmoud Nigeria 
71 Justice Okoro Nigeria 
72 Kate Emuchay Nigeria 
73 Kenneth Onyema Nigeria 
74 Khalid Anas Sudan 
75 Kizito Beyuo Ghana 
76 Laurence Ngugi Nigeria 
77 Leyou Tameru Ethiopia 
78 Lise Bosman South Africa 
79 Lola Seun Adebayo Nigeria 
80 Lolade Seun-Adebayo Nigeria 
81 Luke Mirac Chengayam Kisob Cameroon 
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82 Lydian Bate Etah Cameroon 
83 Matilda Idun-Donkor Ghana 
84 Mbanda Epanty Agbor Nde Cameroon 
85 Megha Joshi Nigeria 
86 Michael Swainston UK 
87 Milner Joseph Katolo Zambia 
88 Mirette Dorcas Nkongme Cameroon 
89 Narcisse Aka Côte d'Ivoire 
90 Ndanga Kamau Mauritius 
91 Ngo-Martins Okonmah Nigeria 
92 Nkem Agboti Nigeria 
93 Obinna Okolo Nigeria 
94 Olabisi Makanjuola Nigeria 
95 Olasinmibo Zubair Nigeria 
96 Olusola Ephraim-Oluwanuga Nigeria 
97 Onyema Ugorji UK 
98 Opeyemi Akinlade Nigeria 
99 Osehise Odigie Nigeria 
100 Pamela Serina Nantogmah UK 
101 Patricia Mwila Bowa Zambia 
102 Patrick Libam Moutngui Cameroon 
103 Patson Wilbroad Arinaitwe Uganda 
104 Paul Idornigie Nigeria 
105 Phillip Aliker UK/Uganda 
106 Phrobet Nkamwah Limen Cameroon 
107 Prince Toryem Nigeria 
108 Prince N.C. Olokotor UK 
109 Promise Befeh Cameroon 
110 Roderick Cordara UK 
111 Roseline Nwosu Nigeria 
112 Rukia Baruti Dames UK 
113 Ryham Ragab Egypt 
114 Salman Alhaji Salman Nigeria 
115 Sammy Bate Nchacha Cameroon 
116 Sandra Sangbong Ngwafu Cameroon 
117 Sarr Leon Patrice Senegal 
118 Sekou Oumar Camara Nigeria 
119 Stephen Chima Arubike Nigeria 
120 Steven Finizio UK 
121 Sylvie Bebohi Ebongo Cameroon 
122 Tolu Obamuroh Nigeria 
123 Tsegaye Laurendeau UK 
124 Tunde Ogowewo Nigeria 
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125 Tunde Fagbohunlu Nigeria 
126 Tunde Ogunseitan Nigeria 
127 Uche Ewelukwa USA 
128 Ucheora Onwuamaegbu USA 
129 Ustaz Alsahaby Sudan 
130 Wilfred Ikatari Nigeria 
131 Williams Ukonu Nigeria 
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Extract from Delegates’ Feedback at the Conference 
Below are the verbatim responses from delegates on the question: Could you describe what you 
will do differently as a result of what you have learned? 
“Ensure arbitration institution is appointing authority while drafting the arbitration clause, and to be 
in full control of the process, as an arbitrator.” 
“The need to learn share and engage Africa and Africans as the seat and Arbitrators respectively, the 
big apple that we are is pertinent.” 
“Engage more with other arbitration practitioners in Africa.” 
“I will always have an arbitration clause in agreements; and I will train baby lawyers and students on 
the practice of arbitration & challenges.” 
“I have pledged to consider African arbitrators when making nominations!” 
“Greater awareness of the quality of African arbitrators.” 
“Pushing for development in my home country regarding arbitration.” 
“My Approach to networking with African arbitrators will now be different positively.” 
“I will more inclined to advise my clients to use arbitration and ADR rather than litigation. 
I will also not file frivolous actions aimed at frustrating arbitration and ADR.I will advise my colleagues 
to do the same.” 
“Minimize the recourse to national courts as much as possible. Encourage collaboration between 
institutions, and referrals, within Africa.” 
“I will always make sure that in any contract I am involved in drafting I will insert an arbitration clause 
and make sure I advise my clients and or parties on the advantages of arbitration.” 
“Take a keener interest in arbitration related decisions from other African jurisdictions.” 
“I will as a result of what I have learnt encourage parties to hold Arbitration within Africa.” 
“Stay connected to the contacts I made during the conference on arbitration related matters and also 
other legal matters that I might be dealing with which touches on their jurisdiction or practice areas.” 
"My advise to clients on arbitration and generally shall be different, it shall be more objective and 
prone to ADR procedures. I shall not engage in any frivolous actions or appeals and shall advise 
colleagues to do same." 
"I will adopt a different approach to a thesis I am writing on arbitration. Also I intend to quicken my 
steps towards becoming an arbitrator". 
"I will ensure I collaborate with the judiciary particularly the judges in Abuja to build capacities of our 
judges" 
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"Continue learning and networking with experience(d) arbitrators to build capacity." 
"I will from this moment be more and more interested in the training and eventual practice of 
arbitration." 
"I picked up the challenge to develop a law report on arbitration cases within the OHADA jurisdiction 
and provide certain proposals to our institutional court - CCJA." 
"I will urge my institution to communicate more and make data available." 
"I have been further encouraged to pursue arbitration as a veritable and reliable source of dispute 
resolution." 
Please indicate anything you think we could improve on: 
“Have a young arbitrators panel.” 
“The organisation is simply fantastic, you may wish to develop a template for collaboration among 
countries.” 
“Would suggest three days and more networking opportunities needed.” 
“Periodic, say quarterly, communications to/among participants and other stakeholders on 
developments in the conference mission, for the purpose of keeping it fresh in our consciousness.” 
“I think improvements should be done in emphasizing on formal training for both Arbitrators and Judges.” 
Overall responses received:- 
 70.8% of delegates rated speakers at the conference as 10 out of 10.
 Delegates would recommend a peer to attend our conferences.
 Delegates would attend future conferences.
 Delegates benefited from attending the conference.
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